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ABSTRACT 
Economic reforms initiated in Indian economy in early nineties 
were far broader in their scope. 
Reforms were attempted earlier too but their scope and coverage 
was not that wide as the reforms under reference for this study were far 
extensive, touching almost every aspect, of the economy in some 
measure. Thus, some sort of restructuring of the economy has been 
attempted. 
Public sector in India occupies a very central position in the 
structure of the economy. It represented not only an economic activity but 
a philosophy and strategy for economic development. In a sense the 
responsibility of economic development in India as also the shape the 
Indian industry would take was, in greater degree, assigned to the public 
sector through the industrial policy resolutions of 1948 and 1956. 
Public sector progressed impressively in the first two and a half 
decade but then started showing the signs of decline in efficiency. The 
problems significantly for some public sector units magnified to assume 
the crises proportion. Finally the voices began to be raised against its 
very existence. ,The major cause for worry was the persistent losses 
incurred by some public sector units and the pressure that was put on the 
governments' budget to keep these units going on. Deteriorating fiscal 
condition could not have sustained such pressure as its priorities too 
were to be reshuffled and the things culminated into the reforms of 1991. 
Present study examines the whole range of questions. The 
Introductory Chapter discusses the scenario in brief and sets the 
agenda for study by identifying research questions, that are; 
• If the need for which huge public sector was created, did not exist 
any longer, 
• If there is some problem inherent in the structure of PSEs, 
• If the project selections were made objectively. 
Besides setting the problem in the proper context, it also explains 
the methodology, data base and limitations of the study. 
The Second Chapter contains the referential matter on the 
Economic Policy, Economic Reforms, Public Sector, Industrialization, 
Privatization and disinvestment. Some of the views of the scholars who 
have dealt with different aspects of the Indian economy are being given 
here under: 
India's industrial policy and planning have had a mix of economic 
and social objectives. The economic objective is growth and the social 
objectives have been located in the sphere of encouragement of small 
industry, promotion of regional balance, prevention of concentration, etc. 
(J.C Sandesara), The primary objective of industrial policy has to be to 
search for an industrial pattern which would be less energy-intensive, 
less capital-intensive, more employment-intensive and yet capable of 
improving overall factor productivity in the economy (Arun Ghosh); The 
reforms introduced in 1991 had two dominant objectives. There was an 
immediate objective of managing the balance of payments crisis and 
restoring viability in external payments and also a medium term objective 
of setting the economy on the path of rapid and sustainable growth 
(Montek S. Ahluwalia), India's biggest failure in its economic reforms 
programme is that there has not been a transformation of public 
enterphse (Anand P. Gupta); The public enterprises are inherently 
inefficient, and as contended that a crucial aspect has been the 
objectives and the priorities with which the public enterprises have been 
run (Sudip Chaudhuri); The privatization is a major theme in public sector 
reform. It is argued on the basis of empirical evidence that improving the 
performance of public enterprises is an alternative measure where 
privatization is a difficult policy option to implement in the short term (K.P. 
Kalirajan and R.T. Shand), Many enthusiasts of privatization seem to 
believe that a shift from public to private ownership will automatically 
make for improved performance (T.T. Ram Mohan); Disinvestment of 
public sector undertakings became an important aspect of fiscal of 
Government of India. On account of the diverse political ideologies, 
disinvestment continues to remain a contentious issue with valuation 
being at the core of controversies (Sarvashri Nand Kishore, Ms. Rudra 
Saha etc.), there is a strong relation between the public and private 
sector in India. The argument is that it is competition between industries 
and not their ownership, which determines efficiency of an enterprise and 
this criterion should guide the allocation of resources between the two 
sectors. The deliberation also undertakes a critical appraisal of the 
disinvestment process through the case studies of BALCO, Lagan Jute, 
Air India, CMC and MFIL (Simrit Kaur) and so on. 
The Third Chapter presents what the public sector had inherited 
from its colonial past which forced it to adopt the policy of reform. The 
policy of reform did not procure the substantive role of the public sector in 
a sudden way, but passing through the certain stages it became effective 
to broaden the scope of this sector in the interest of the country's 
economy. 
This chapter basically stresses on the concept of mixed economy. 
In this context, I have explained IPR 1948, 1956, various policy 
statements and new economic policy. The chapter also focuses on the 
Five-Year Plans in order to observe how far the public sector has grown 
during the plans. However, the sixth plan was the first plan when 
allocation to the public sector was smaller than the private one. It was 
realized during the seventh plan that the public sector be eased off some 
of the pressures what it had shouldered successfully. The purpose was 
to prepare the Indian industry to respond effectively to the emerging 
challenges. 
Moreover, the needs for the public sector in India and the major 
objectives of setting up of the public sector have also been discussed 
herein. It is found necessary to explain the problems faced by the public 
sector and the government's efforts to reform the public sector. The 
government took a number of steps in this regard to reform the public 
sector like establishment of Public Sector industrial Board (PSIB), BIFR 
and one of the most important measures was to redefine the role of the 
government and the downsizing its hold on the public sector. 
Chapter Four explains the need for reforms in the economy in the 
light of the momentum of economic growth achieved during the eighties, 
particularly the seventh plan period was impossible to sustain without 
comprehensive policy changes. 
The basic thrust of economic reforms was on simplifying 
procedures, reducing bureaucracy induced delays and encouraging 
larger inter-play of market forces through private initiative. 
Moreover, chapter also discusses the immediate cause of reforms 
which forced the government to move towards the structural adjustment 
program. In continuance of this discussion, nature of reforms is examined 
which shows that crisis was so multidimensional that a multi-seeded 
strategy was needed through bold economic reforms The root of crisis 
may be attributed to factors such as steep increase in public spending 
during 1980s leading to continuous increase in fiscal deficit, deficits in 
balance of payments (BOP) financed by continuous external borrowings, 
growing inflation rate, failure of the public sector to generate surpluses, 
restrictive trade and industrial licensing policies resulting in serious loss 
of efficiency in production and export competitiveness of Indian products, 
gulf crisis in leading to fall in remittances and increase in oil price etc. 
In this context, I have analyzed the annual average growth rate of 
Indian economy, inflation, growth of imports and exports, impact of 
reforms on external sector, gross domestic product and its sectoral 
shares, growth of GDP, savings, capital formation, consumption 
expenditure etc. a discussion is also made on the relation between 
growth of employment and GDP including the steps taken by the 
government regarding public sector reform. 
The objectives of the reform were to promote both domestic and 
foreign competition to accelerate productivity, achieve reduction in cost 
and improvements in quality of products and services, and encourage 
innovations and adaptation of modern technologies. 
Chapter Five includes a brief discussion on the development of 
the public sector during sixties, seventies and eighties. Thereafter, the 
role of the public sector in India and significance of the public sector has 
been elaborated. In furtherance of the same, the impact of reforms on the 
performance of the PSEs like pattern of investment, contribution to the 
industrial production, contribution to resources, capital productivity, 
employment generation, comparison of employment in the organized 
public and private sector, efficiency use of investment, financial 
performance of the PSEs, i.e. their profit profile and net losses, export 
earning and foreign exchange earning are deliberated in detail. In 
addition to this, the developments of essential services as well as the 
relation between the fiscal deficit and savings-investment gap are also 
taken into consideration. 
This chapter also traces at what extent budgetary supports to the 
PSEs were provided. Lastly, the reasons are given for the poor 
performance of the PSUs and suggestions for their betterment. 
Thus, the discussion on the performance of the public enterprises 
reveals that the vast investments failed to produce surpluses which they 
were expected to generate and the return on capital employed was 
obviously quite low. This raises the issue whether the present ills of the 
PSUs can be modified by adopting the policy of disinvestment. The main 
thrust on this device is the content of the next chapter. 
In Chapter Six, the impact of disinvestment on the performance of 
PSEs has been examined. Since the initiation of the disinvestment 
process in 1991-92, the policy on the subject has evolved broadly in 
three phases. The first phase can be traced from 1991-92 to 1995-96, 
when partial disinvestments were undertaken in a step-wise manner. In 
the second phase, from 1996-97 to 1997-98, an effort was made to 
institutionalize the disinvestment process by constituting the 
disinvestment commission. In the third phase, from 1998-99 onwards, a 
department (later a ministry) of disinvestment was formed in December 
1999. Since then, the policy of disinvestment changed from partial sale to 
strategic sale. 
This chapter includes the background leading to divestiture 
decisions, and year-wise details of disinvestment that were carried out. It 
also analyzes policy objectives, procedure, fiscal impact and valuation 
issue connected with the disinvestment. Suggestions on these aspects 
are also offered. 
The policies towards loss-making PSEs are still under 
consideration. The Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) was amended 
to bring sick public sector enterprises under the purview of the BIFR in 
the same way as the private sector companies. Sick public sector 
companies (defined under the law as companies which have completely 
eroded their net worth) are now automatically referred to BIFR. As on 
30.6.2007, 75 PSEs were registered with BIFR. Out of these 5 
enterprises have been declared no longer sick and the cases of another 
4 PSEs have been dropped due to their net worth becoming positive. 
It Is observed that in the last decade the government has gradually 
moved from partial disinvestment of equity to strategic sale. Modern 
Foods Industries Ltd. was the first such case in January 2000, wherein 
74 percent of the government equity was disinvested to a strategic 
partner with management control. Thereafter, major disinvestment had 
been of BALCO, CMC, HTL, IBP, VSNL, Paradeep Phosphate Ltd., 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. Maruti Udyug Ltd., IPCL, numerous of ITDC hotels 
etc. 
Disinvestment has been, thus, the key-determinant of the Indian 
public sector reforms. The common perception is that not only it raises 
resources for the governments and reduces fiscal deficits, but also 
releases resources for public investment in essential areas like primary 
education and basic health. It is accordingly argued that ultimately such 
programs are desirable to create job opportunities and add to mass 
welfare. 
The Last Chapter pertains to the conclusion which presents in a 
consolidated form the findings of the study. It incidentally does not 
support the tune of argument advanced for closing down of the PSEs 
only on the ground that they are incurring losses and as such as drain for 
public resources. It highlights the fact that PSEs were never created for 
the profit but for launching an economic development at a scale that 
would not have been possible otherwise. Therefore, the question that 
emerged is that if the PSEs have outlined their utility. The answer is not a 
clear cut 'yes'. Logically, the PSEs that are earning profits can not be 
ignored or treated at par with some units making unsustainable losses. 
So, the case against the PSEshas been rejected by the theory. The 
only ground conceded has been that where these units have to be 
dispensed with, and such thing should be alone in a phased manner. 
The study also recommends a further probe into working out of the 
revenue loss to the public budget on account of the dilution of 
governments' equity holding 
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PREFACE 
Debate over the public sector is not a new phenomenon. There are 
clearly two lines of arguments far and against such establishment, its size and 
its role in the economy. When this topic was selected for the study of economic 
reforms initiated in 1991 that had already become more than ten years old. It 
was considered that this was probably the right time when controversy around 
the public sector enterprises and the attempted reforms directed at them could 
be revisited. It was as evidenced then, which continues to exist even today, that 
the public sector undertakings are big liability to the economy. A close scrutiny 
of data suggests that it is partially true as public sector from the eighties 
onwards began to be evaluated on the basis of profitability alone. Its 
contribution, directly or indirectly, to the other spheres of economy seems to be 
Ignored. It is in this background the attempt has been made through the 
present study to evaluate the public sector afresh taking into accounts all its 
related aspects. 
In view of the above, the present study focuses on economic reforms 
and especially the performance of public sector enterprises. 
Besides setting of the problems and identifying the research questions, 
the first chapter of the thesis entitled 'introduction' discusses the background of 
the economy especially with respect to the evolution of the public sector 
undertakings. The research questions so identified are with regard to the 
relevance of the public sector in the contemporary context as well as the 
structure of the public sector undertakings to ascertain if there was some 
inherent weakness in such structure. The chapter also contains data base, the 
methodology, the hypothesis, the limitations etc. 
The second chapter is based on the 'Review of Literature' so as to 
collect valuable informations from the books and journals published earlier for 
the background of the present study. Out of the different approaches of 
scholars to the Indian economy, some of their relevant views are taken into 
account to go ahead with the performance of public sector enterprises and the 
importance of disinvestment of the PSEs. 
In the third chapter the exigency to adopt the policy of reform is 
underlined. Here the growth of public sector during the Five-Year Plans has 
also been a matter of discussion. Likewise, attention is paid to the problems 
faced by the public sector and the steps taken by the government for its reform. 
The need of reforms in the economy and change in the policy of the 
government to move towards the structural adjustment programs is the theme 
of the fourth chapter. Main objectives of reform and adaptation of modern 
technologies to accelerate the productivity in a qualitative way are elaborated in 
the chapter as well. 
The fifth chapter exhibits the significant role of the public sector in the 
country with an account of the impact of reforms on its performance. It reveals 
the actual position of budgetary support extended to the PSEs. Moreover, the 
poor performance of the PSEs and suggestions for their better output are 
described in the chapter. 
As regards the sixth chapter, the most exquisite proportion of the 
presentation, it contains the detailed description of the disinvestment process in 
the phased manner. The new existence of the disinvestment commission, 
which later became an independent ministry for a short period, details of 
disinvestment carried out, need of amendment in the Sick industrial Act 
(SAICA) including the bright prospects of have been thoroughly apprehended 
at this place. 
Finally, the study concludes (Chapter Seven) that the argument for 
closing down of the loss-making public sector enterprises conveys no solution 
to the problem. In fact, the PSEs were brought into existence to enhance the 
economic development of the country and not merely to earn the profit. It can 
not be advocated that the public sector may be put to an end for having no 
utility. The call is to identify and relinquish the areas that do not favor the PSEs 
so as to save them from incurring the losses in future. 
Some additional are given in the Annexures that were not contained in 
any of the chapter of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER-1 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic reforms, initiated in India in 1991, attempted some 
macroeconomic restructuring. Almost every macro variable was affected by 
them in one way or the other. Though the reforms were not directed at the 
public sector undertakings nor were they sparked by the working of the same. 
But like any other economic variable or institutions the PSEs were also affected 
by them. In fact it was not the reform measures as such but the changing 
outlook towards the PSEs that seems to have influenced them. The PSEs were 
created as a result of a well thought out strategy and a political philosophy that 
might have its genesis in the colonial past. 
1.1 Relevant Historical 'Development: 
Industrialization in India did not take place as a normal course of 
economic development where economy's resources and savings generated in 
agriculture and other traditional sector helps it in the initial days, extra labor is 
also taken off from agriculture to be employed in upcoming industries. Thus, 
both the sectors are benefited, manufacturing sector gets cheap labor and 
agriculture relieved of redundant labor which is more a liability than asset. This 
course of economic development ought to be followed in the countries that 
have vast agricultural sector and abundant labor resource. 
Indian economy was moving well on the path of economic development 
and its manufacturing sector had developed in good manner and was 
competing in western market till the middle of the 18"^  century. The use of 
modern machines (the result of industrial revolution in Europe) was absent; 
rather it was the indigenous tools and technology coupled with very fine quality 
of artisanship that Indian manufacturing sector had developed. Since the 
technology was labor-intensive one, it suited the requirements of the economy 
best. 
But India became the subject of alien power which did not have its 
commercial interests as well. India was to be made a market for the British 
manufacture. So as a result of deliberate policy designs, Indian handicraft was 
subjected to unfair competition resulting in decaying of age old manufacturing 
sector. The subsequent period of colonial rule worsened the economy. It had 
been deprived of sizeable portion of its savings which was draining out in the 
favor of "home charges"\ The magnitude of such drain was estimated to be 
roughly 25 per cent of India's National Income. 
It is that not only Indian economy received no government help in the 
form of the creation of social and economic infrastructure but also the 
atmosphere congenial to economic growth and development could not be 
allowed to do whatever it could have done on its own. Therefore, what India 
could inherit from its colonial past was backward agriculture and substantial 
amount of disguised unemployment^ , weak infrastructural base, and almost no 
industrialization (except in few pockets where some industrial activity could be 
stated despite the adverse circumstances). 
India as a sovereign nation was at liberty to chalk out its strategy for 
economic development keeping in consideration the limitations. Achieving 
higher growth rate was essential to cope with the problem of abject poverty and 
deprivation of essential goods and services of a large number of its population. 
To meet this end, the certain direction was required to be given to the 
investment. Economies all over the world were following either capitalist mode 
or the socialist one. Both of these have their merits and demerits. Former being 
based on the market was said to offer best solution as the market reflects the 
people's choices. Latter, on the other hand, does not have the things to be 
determined by the market determined solution as it may not be socially optimal. 
India adopted the model representing the mix of two where the private sector 
would be allowed to coexist with the public sector the latter being assigned the 
dominant role. 
1.2 The Public Sector Enterprises in India: 
There has always been a debate over the question of government's 
interference with the economic matters of an economy. The issues that 
becomes the main subject of debate is; the extent of government's inten/ention. 
^ Nauroji, Dadabhai: Poverty and British Rule in India, London 1901. 
^ State where marginal productivity of labor is zero. 
One approach could have been entering the arena as a big player of the game; 
the other one could be only the regulatory role where government would 
regulate the private sector. Each of these approaches has consequences for 
the economy. Whereas the former would entail increased amount of 
government's claim over economy's savings and investing in every sector in 
order to give the private sector a healthy competition, the latter approach 
subjects the private sector to various kinds of control in defiance of market 
wisdom. 
India adopted an approach different from either of the two. The Industrial 
Policy Resolution (IPR) 1956 reserves the items that would be the exclusive 
domain of the public sector. The items included in this category are the one 
which were considered to be sensitive from the view point of security. Those 
items in which both the private sector and the public sector could have entered, 
the government's desired to enter those areas where it was feared that the 
private investment would not be forthcoming as they might not promise the 
handsome project. 
After Independence, under the Keynesian era of world economy, a 
developing country like India had been pursuing a path in which the PSEs were 
expected to be the engine of growth. Historically the public sector had been 
assigned an important role and contributed a lot to the progress of Indian 
economy. While the public sector has to its credit some notable achievements 
but all is not well with its working. Some serious failings have crept into it, so 
that the concept of public sector has been questioned. The public sector had 
overgrown itself and its shortcomings started manifesting in the shape of low 
capacity utilization and low efficiency due to substantial time and cost over 
runs, inability to innovate and to take quick and timely decisions, large 
interference in decision-making process, etc. The public sector in general has, 
therefore, become a liability rather than a productive asset, which it ought to 
have been. The government started to deregulate the areas of its operation and 
in the year 1991 the national economic policy underwent a radical 
transformation. 
The new policy of liberalization, privatization and globalization de-
emphasized the role of the public sector in the nation's economy. Till date, 
several arguments have been put forward by the apologists of market-oriented 
economic structure. 
• The government must not enter in to those areas where the private 
sector can perform better. 
• Market-driven economies are more efficient than the state-planned 
economies. 
• The role of the state should be as a regulator and not as the producer. 
• Government resources locked in commercial activities should be 
released for their deployment in social activities. 
The government is of the view, that PSEs have not generated internal 
surplus on a large scale due to the reasons best known to them. To provide a 
solution to the problems of public sector, the government has decided to adopt 
a new approach; one of the new approaches is disinvestments policy. In other 
words, between 1980 and 2002, the average rate of return on capital employed 
by PSEs was about 3.4 per cent as against the average cost of borrowings, 
which was 8.66 per cent. Disinvestment of PSEs has, therefore, been offered 
as one of the solutions in this context. 
Table 1.1 
Percentage Share of Private and Public Sector in the Plan Outlay 
Plan Period 
First Five Year Plan (1951-56) 
Second Five Year Plan (1956-61) 
Third Five Year Plan (1961-66) 
Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) 
Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-79) 
Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85) 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) 
Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-97) 
Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) 
Percentage Share in Plan 
Outlay 
Public Sector 
54 
60 
65 
64 
70 
62 
52 
50 
45 
Private Sector 
46 
40 
35 
36 
30 
38 
48 
50 
55 
Source: Net 
Percentage Share of Private and Public Sector in the Plan Outlay 
(Fig. 1.1) 
First Plan Second Third Fourth Fifth Plan Sixth Seventh Eighth Ninth 
Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan Plan 
Five-Year Plans 
• Public Sector • • Private Sector' 
The government, therefore, did not adhere to the logic advanced by the 
proponent of minimal government (neo-classical approach) where the 
government should confine itself to the provision of public goods or may be few 
merit goods. Rather it went in for developing a huge public sector, taking which 
to the commanding heights was the stated objective as evident from Table 1.1. 
The justification for dominant public sector was that the economy's savings 
could be channeled into the desired direction regardless of immediate profit 
only through this way. 
We know that the area of work of Public Enterprises during British period 
was almost limited to Railways, Post and Telegraph, Port Trust etc. But there 
were many industries which could not be developed by private sector during 
1940's or 1950's as there was not enough money in the money market and 
entrepreneurship was limited as well. Further, it is a common thinking that for 
economic development of strategic sector of the economy and the security of 
the country, state investment and control over concerned industries is a must. 
Sometimes the closure of certain enterprises may cause major economic or 
social loss, which encourages the government to look into the affair and take 
charge of such enterprise. Considering above and such other reasons, the 
government opted for nationalization of industries. Different Five-Year Plans 
and industrial policies of Indian Government have shown significant impact on 
industrialization. The state-controlled enterprises registered impressive growth 
during the first five-year plans, especially after the second five year plan due to 
the industrial development instead of agricultural development. The percentage 
share of Public Sector in the plan outlay started declining since the sixth five 
year plan, which has taken a dip of as low as 45% in the ninth five year plan. 
As a result, India could develop various heavy and basic industries in the 
public sector which include power generation, oil and natural gas, refineries, 
telecommunications, petrochemicals, steel, fertilizer etc. The development of 
these industries went a long way in India's economic growth. 
1.3 Theoretical Aspects: 
Creating a huge public sector would not have been possible without 
resorting heavy public debt. Incurring public debt used to be considered 
imprudent by the neo-classical wisdom which believes in the efficacy of market 
forces in bringing about necessary equilibrium. All the major macro-variables 
such as employment and price output attain their equilibrium value through the 
market process. 
The crisis in the capitalist world in the early 1930s shattered the neo-
classical belief and paved the way to the acceptance of Keynesian approach 
which favored enhanced public spending through public debt. The post war 
recovery had further strengthened the Keynesian argument about the public 
debt. 
After independence, the India decided to create the huge public sector, 
Keynesian approach became the justifying instrument. Though Keynes did not 
advocate the creation of public sector but certainly made a case for public debt. 
This public debt was no longer a frightening proposition; rather it came to be 
recognized as the instrument to raise the employment level and thus effective 
demand. 
The decline of Keynesianism the world over and its replacement by 
neoclasslcism coincided with the economic crises in India in 1991 which too 
found it constrained to switching over to the neoclassical approach to public 
policy. The new approach did not approve public debt and called for the 
reduction in fiscal deficit to some sustainable level. 
But with the current global crisis, once again the Keynesian perception 
of enhanced public spending, debt is no longer a dreaded word. So the new 
global situation would induce the government to rethink its approach towards 
the PSEs even if some of them are not yielding profit. The study tries to explore 
such angle as well. 
By the time, some of the public sector undertakings became the target of 
critics as they were running into huge losses. Besides, the questions about the 
proficiency of their management began to be raised. Some were criticized on 
the ground that they were not required in the first place and the area was not 
the strategic one from the view point of the economy. But largely the focus of 
criticism remained on their incapability to earn profit. Since they were receiving 
budgetary support in order to run over, they were being considered to be a big 
burden on budgetary resources. 
Since the beginning of 1980s, Keynesian wisdom^ itself was over-
shadowed by neo-classical approach which would not approve fiscal profligacy. 
International financial institutions like IMF and World Bank were adherent to 
this approach. 
India continued to offer budgetary support to many of its PSUs 
regardless of the severe constraints on the budget itself as the revenue deficit, 
which appeared in the Union government's budget in 1979-80 for the first time, 
increased with each passing year. In such situation when there were fiscal 
crisis in 1991, the attack of loss-making PSUs intensified again. 
In the wake of negative balance on revenue account whatever savings 
was occurring in the public sector could be the savings generated in the PSUs. 
Though such savings would have been meager as compared to the household 
savings, but for the most part during the period (since late 1950 till the 
' Keynesian approach justified the deficit budget in order to increase aggregate demand. 
beginning of the reform), it was comparable with the private corporate sector 
savings. 
Again, there are other arguments against the public sector. That is, 
though the overall savings of the PSEs is positive, the loss-making PSEs are 
drag on growth and drain on resources. Still another argument is the lack of 
correspondence between investment and growth in the PSEs. Such 
phenomenon leads to crowding out of the private investment. The situation 
obtained thus, it is argued, is akin to the deployment of capital where it is less 
productive. 
But to judge the PSEs on the basis of profitability and their growth may 
lead to erroneous conclusion as would amounts to not acknowledging their 
contribution in other respects such as contribution to employment, indirect 
contribution to exchequer in the form of various taxes and keeping the price of 
key inputs in check. The present study attempts to track such things. 
After 1991 crises and the initiative of reforms, budgetary support to the 
PSEs became unsustainable. The overall reform process included 
disinvestment of the PSEs as one of its component and the stated strategy was 
to divest the loss-making PSEs. Disinvestment of the PSEs is supposed to 
accord two benefits. One; the public sector will be relieved of loss-making 
PSEs and two; the revenue from such sale will go a long way in bringing down 
the fiscal deficit. Since such receipts are non-debt incurring, they were 
expected to contribute to fiscal correction. 
1.4 Economic Reforms: 
Economic reforms so initiated in 1991 were not forced by the under-
performance of the PSUs. It was, rather, balance of payment difficulties that 
became the immediate factor. In order to get out of that situation, the structural 
adjustment programme was initiated. The economic reforms in the mild form 
have been carried out on and off in India. However, the reforms undertaken in 
1991 were different from the earlier one. They were wider in coverage (being 
attempted in various aspects of economic activities) and also intended for 
bringing about such structural adjustments that could represent the break from 
the past with a sense that the philosophy of economy's manageability itself had 
undergone a significant change. Economic development with socialistic pattern 
almost gave way to market-friendly economy, albeit not in totality. Reforming 
the PSEs was one such program. 
1.5 Disinvestment: 
There is some confusion about the concept of disinvestment and 
privatization. These two concepts are different with each other or we can say 
that disinvestment and privatization are interchangeable terms. Disinvestment 
means a process by which the capital stock of an economy or enterprise is 
reduced, as by not replacing obsolete plant and machinery or we can say that it 
is an act of withdrawing investment from an enterprise or country. 
Simply, disinvestment refers to the sale or liquidation of an asset or 
subsidiary of an organization or government to the private sector. Where as 
privatization means transfer of ownership and/or management of an enterprise 
from the public to the private sector. 
The basic difference between the two is that, whereas in the case of 
privatization, whole of the equity is sold but in case of disinvestment, partial 
equity is sold to the private sector. 
It may be pointed out that the concept of disinvestment is to be 
understood In the framework of generating resources for restricting of the public 
sector undertakings so that the drain on the budgetary resources can be 
stopped. It is explained in the context of the public sector undertakings. There 
was a time when the entire capital had to be provided and therefore, owned by 
the government and, therefore, the government held all the equity and also 
gave loans. The objective of 100 percent share holding, which given the 
government the authority to take decisions considered appropriate in their 
interest can be achieved even with a majority holding like 51 percent. The 
balance of equity can be sold to the public, especially, small investors and the 
workers. In effect, disinvestment broad bases the ownership of the undertaking, 
which is the essence of public sector. What proportion should be sold is a 
matter for experts to decide and, hence, the Disinvestment Commission. 
If disinvestment is to be compared with privatization, a 100 per cent 
disinvestment or ttie total sale of a unit forms complete privatization when it is 
sold to the private sector. Anything short of 100 per cent connotes different 
degrees of disinvestment. Hence, the majority share of 51 per cent being with 
the government explains a situation as that of a joint venture or undertaking 
with the government holding the majority state. 
Thus, disinvestment of a part of Government equity in the public sector 
enterprises (PSEs) is a major policy initiative in India to carry out economic 
reforms. The purpose of disinvestment exercise is to improve the performance 
of PSEs and also to increase their public accountability by broad basing their 
management and ownership. Furthermore, the merit of privatization is seen in 
terms of improvement in efficiency and reduction in the budgetary burden of 
state-owned enterprises. 
Privatization furnishes new life to a sick public sector enterprise, or 
permits an already profitable PSE to become even faster, bigger and stronger. 
But primarily, privatization tackles three major problems of PSEs- incentives, 
priorities and access. 
1.5.1 Rationale of Disinvestment: 
Disinvestment moreover as one of the method of privatization or as an 
instrument for raising revenues or finances should be handled carefully based 
upon certain preset and well thought out policy framework in order to get good 
results out of it. Giving the rationale for disinvestments, the Ministry of 
Disinvestment had outlined the following as the principal objectives: 
• Releasing the large amount of public resources locked up in non-
strategic PSEs, for redeployment in areas that are much higher on the 
social priority, such as basic health, family welfare, primary education 
and social and economic infrastructure. 
• Stemming further outflow of these scarce public resources for 
sustaining the unviable non-strategic PSEs. 
• Reducing the public debt that was threatening to assume 
unmanageable proportions. 
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• Transferring the commercial risk to the private sector wherever the 
private sector was willing and able to step in. 
• Releasing other tangible and intangible resources, such as, large 
manpower currently locked up in managing PSEs, and their time and 
energy, for redeployment in high priority social sectors that were short 
of such resources. 
• Disinvestment would expose the privatized companies to market 
discipline, thereby forcing them to become more efficient and survive or 
cease on their own financial and economic strength. 
• Disinvestment would result in wider distribution of wealth through 
offering of shares of privatized companies to small investors and 
employees. 
• Disinvestment would have a beneficial effect on the capital market, the 
increase in floating stock would give more depth and liquidity, give 
investors easier exit options, help in establishing more accurate bench 
marks for valuation and pricing, and facilitate raising of funds for their 
projects or expansion in future. 
• Opening up the public sector to appropriate private investment would 
increase economic activity and have an overall beneficial effect on the 
economy, employment and tax revenues in the medium to long-run. 
• In many areas, e.g., the telecom sector, the end of public sector 
monopoly would bring relief to consumers by way of more choices, and 
cheaper and better quality of products and services as had already 
started happening. 
• With the quantitative restrictions removed and tariff levels revised owing 
to opening of world markets/ WTO agreements, domestic industry had 
to compete with cheaper imported goods. In the bargain, the common 
man would have access to whole range of cheap and quality goods. 
This would require Indian industries to become more competitive and 
such restructuring would be easier in a privatized environment. 
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1.5.2 Benefits of Disinvestment: 
Some benefits of disinvestment are given below: 
• Disinvestment would expose the privatized companies to market 
discipline, thereby forcing them to become more efficient and survive or 
cease on their own financial and economic strength. They would be 
able to respond to the market forces much faster and cater to their 
business needs in a more professional manner. It would also help in 
freeing the PSE from the government control and introduction of 
corporate governance in the privatized companies. 
• Disinvestment would result in wider distribution of wealth through 
offering of shares of privatized companies to small investor employees. 
« Disinvestment would have a useful effect on the capital market; the 
increase in floating stock would give the market more depth and 
liquidity, give investors easier exit options, help in establishing more 
accurate benchmarks for valuation and pricing and facilitate raising of 
funds by the privatized companies for their projects or expansion in 
future. 
• Opening up the erstwhile public sectors to appropriate private investors 
would increase economic activity and have an overall beneficial effect 
on the economy, employment and tax revenues in the medium to long 
term. 
• In many areas, e.g. the telecom sector, the end of public sector 
monopoly would bring relief to consumers by way of more choices and 
cheaper and better quality of products and services as has already 
started happening. 
1.5.3 PSEs as Burden on the Government: 
The Central Government, and many state governments, were already 
facing debt cnsis, resources were scarce and PSEs were losing money beyond 
afford. Carrying on as inefficiently, as before, was simply no longer an option. 
The government could not continue pumping in more tax-payers money 
indefinitely when Indian families had urgent needs like water, schools, roads 
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and medicines. Experience shows that the longer one waits before privatizing a 
state enterprise the worse it gets and the more subsidies it needs. Since 1992-
93 the Central Government had drained in Rs.34104 crores in the name of 
revival/restructuring of PSEs. And they remained where they were. Six 
attempts were made to revive HEC but it still made a loss of more than 
Rs.1000 crores in 1999-2000. Similar was the story with IDPL, HSCL, Jessop, 
Hindustan Shipyard, and MAMC and so on. 
Needless to say that there is no point in throwing good money after bad. 
This meaningless waste of the tax-payers money has to stop. Privatization 
would end the waste of money in subsidies and let these companies succeed in 
the private sector. The government could redirect the savings to the sectors 
and causes that needed it most. 
Several PSEs were already sick, and their condition was deteriorating by 
the day. Out of a total of 240 PSEs, 116 were loss-making and 87 were already 
sick in 1993-94. Since payments were often held up, workers suffered delays in 
payment and they might even lose jobs, apart from the demoralization arising 
out of sitting idle. Without privatization, things could only go from bad to worse 
and the Government's problems were to increase. Sick PSEs were a sticky 
problem for our political leadership, and the sooner we dealt with it the better it 
was. 
Moreover, less than two per cent of India's workforce was employed by 
PSEs. The argument advanced, therefore, was that more than 98 per cent of 
Indian workers and 100 per cent of Indian taxpayers and consumers were 
penalized by PSE losses and PSE under-performance. And as such it was not 
fair that so many should be made to suffer because of so few. Under these 
circumstances it was deeply felt that privatization was the best way to revive 
and rebuild weakened public-sector enterprises. But at the same time it should 
be born in mind that profitability could not be the criterion to judge their viability. 
The crisis of early 1990s once again provided the opportunity when at least 
loss-making units were to be privatized. 
In the chapter on economic reforms, we found that the pruning of public 
sector was justified on the ground of fiscal prudence. 
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The process of disinvestments in India began in 1992, which was supposed to 
be the tool in the hands of govemnnent to improve the functioning and 
profitability of public sector enterprises and also raise funds to mitigate its fiscal 
deficits. There are two major reasons for disinvestments; 
a. To provide fiscal support. 
b. To improve the efficiency of organization. 
The fiscal support argument is mainly due to increasing demand on both 
the central and the state governments. Because of the current revenue 
expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and salaries of 
government employee and subsidiaries, the government is left with hardly any 
surplus for capital expenditure on social and physical infrastructure. Whereas 
the government should be spending on basic education, primary health and 
family welfare, the huge amounts of resources are blocked in several non-
strategic sectors such as hotels, trading companies, consultancy companies, 
textile companies, chemical and pharmaceuticals companies, consumer goods 
companies etc. Not only is this, but the continued existence of the PSEs forcing 
the government to commit further resources for the sustenance of many non-
viable PSEs. The Government continues to expose the taxpayers' money to 
risk, which it can readily avoid. To top it all, there is a huge amount of 
overhanging debt, which needs to be serviced and reduced before money is 
available to invest in infrastructure. This makes the disinvestments of the 
government at stake in the PSEs absolutely imperative. 
The idea initially was to bail out loss-making PSEs and if it was not 
possible then sell them off. The results that disinvestment program produced 
were the mixed one. But in the name of PSE reforms, it was only disinvestment 
that was attempted; so much so that a separate disinvestment ministry was 
formed in the Union government, though dismantled latter for political 
expediency. 
Disinvestment is one of the most critical areas of economic reforms and 
has been subject of controversy since 1991 when these reforms were 
introduced at first. This issue is more political in nature since it is an issue 
relating to the idea of the role of state. The economic considerations are of 
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secondary importance since the amount involved in disinvestments has been 
relatively small and the major impact of Indian economy is yet to be seen. It is 
interesting to note that the critique hardly objects to privatization process than 
to disinvestments. The distinction in these two must be understood clearly. The 
entire approach of economic reforms is now market-oriented and guided by 
private considerations evolving in public enterprises and by a large number of 
people including critics of disinvestments who have accepted that public 
enterprise should also earn profit and, therefore, policy measures be directed 
towards it. 
1.5.4 Criteria for Selection of PSEs for Disinvestment: 
(a) "Comparative Advantage Criteria: Ramanadham advocates that where a 
public enterprise loses its comparative advantage, it is preferable to privatize it. 
As long as public enterprise is a superior means of making a contribution to the 
national well-being, it should be preferred to other forms; but when it has a 
comparative disadvantage in this respect; it should be reorganized into a 
private enterprise. 
The comparative advantage is to be measured in terms of the commercial 
returns, social returns and a desired trade-off between them. The social-
financial return combinations would be dissimilar among different enterprises or 
sectors, and hence the concept of comparative advantage has to be addressed 
in an enterprise-specific and time-specific manner. As these conditions change 
in the course of time, private enterprise may begin to gain an edge over public 
enterprise, not necessarily because it is intrinsically more efficient, but because 
of two other reasons. 
First, the social returns element in the comparative advantage of a public 
enterprise generally weakens over time in several sectors of activity. Second, 
public enterprise, as an institution, is exposed to certain intrinsic costs, which 
can be a constant drag on its performance. There is undue focus on mistakes, 
resulting in 'play safe' syndrome by managers who avoid taking risk. In a public 
enterprise loss of comparative advantage is not necessarily synonymous with 
inefficiency. The situation may have arisen from certain macro changes in the 
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national economic circumstances and from changes in the scales of social 
preferences. 
(b) Economic Criteria: According to this, the criterion for divestiture is net 
economic yield generated by the enterprise as state-owned entity and as 
privatized entity. Two distinct elements affect this difference: the transfer of 
funds from the private sector to the public sector in connection with purchase of 
enterprise and the transfer of productive facilities from the public sector to the 
private sector. 
Jones et al. have suggested a model to answer which enterprises should 
be disinvested. According to this, an asset should be sold only if the seller is 
better off after the sale, i.e. the change in welfare (AW) is positive. If the 
government behaves as a private seller, then this would simply require that the 
sale price exceed the value of the future-earning stream foregone, i.e. 
SellifA\/V=Z-Vsg>0 
Where AW = Change in welfare. 
Z = Price at which sale executed. 
Vsg = Social value under continued government option. 
The value to society under public operation is the present value of 
expected net benefits accruing the society as a whole from the continued public 
operation of the enterprise. As the government is concerned about overall 
welfare of society, it must also consider the firm's performance after sale (Vsp), 
i.e., social value under private operation. The social value under private 
operation is the present value of expected net benefits accruing to society as a 
whole from the private operation of enterprise. 
Another consideration is the impact of transferring funds from private to 
public hands in case of divestiture. One impact may be 'crowding out' of other 
capital needs in the private sector in the country. However, the government 
may use this income to retire some of its own debts, thereby releasing new 
funds to the private sector and thus could offset the crowding out effect. 
Another impact which should be examined is how the sale proceeds are 
used. This depends on the difference between the private revenue multiplier 
(;^ p) and government revenue multipliers {X^). Thus, divestiture has both a 
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behavioral impact (reflected in the V sp - Vsg differential) and a fiscal innpact 
(reflected in the A.g - A.p differential). 
Keeping these parameters in view, the decision to sell becomes; 
Sell if, AW = Vsp - Vsg + (Xg - p^) Z > 0 
Orsellif, Z>Vsg-Vsp/^g-^p 
This means that whenever social welfare is higher under private 
ownership than public, and government revenue multiplier greater than private 
profit multiplier, the price is of no consequence, and the government should be 
willing to pay the private sector to take over the enterprise. This might happen, 
if the enterprise which is loss-making under government operation becomes 
viable under private ownership without large deleterious welfare effects on 
consumers or workers.'' 
As a general principle, the commission recommended that where 
appropriate, PSUs should be restructured before disinvestment in order to 
enhance enterprise and the intrinsic share values, where disinvestment 
becomes necessary, it will be based on the following considerations:^ 
• Extent of restructuring required and the potential for improving share 
values, 
• The permissible extent of disinvestment with reference to the 
classification of industry as core or non-core, 
• The size of the company and the phasing of disinvestment, 
• Equity fund raising program of the concerned PSU, 
• Categorization of the industry as high, medium or low potential, 
• Alternatives modalities of disinvestment. 
In short, disinvestment entails loss of assets and potential future income. The 
receipts expected from the sale of assets should therefore be put against the 
worth being lost in terms of assets. This is important because loss-making units 
might not fetch better price. Besides the asset loss it is the social aspects of 
such sale that is required to be factored in. Therefore, the following research 
questions emerge; 
" Kaur, Simrit (2003); Privatization and Public Regulation; The Indian Experience; Macmillan India Ltd., 
New Delhi; P. 135-137. 
^ Disinvestment Commission, Report 1; February 1997; P. 21; Net 
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• If the need for which huge public sector was created, did not exist any 
longer, 
• If there is some problem inherent in the structure of PSEs, 
• If the project selections were made objectively. 
1.5.5 Arguments against Disinvestment: 
Opponents of disinvestment ague that it is undesirable to let private 
entrepreneurs own public institutions for the following reasons: 
• Private companies do not have any other goal than to maximize profit. 
• The public does not have any control or oversight of private companies. 
• A centralized enterprise is generally more cost-effective than multiple 
smaller ones. Therefore, splitting up a public company into smaller 
private chunks will reduce efficiency. 
• Profits from successful enterprises end up in private pockets instead of 
being available for the common good. 
• Nationalized industries are usually guaranteed against bankruptcy by 
the state, they can therefore borrow money at a lower interest rate to 
reflect the lower risk of loan default to the leader. 
• In the cases where public services or utilities are privatized, it can 
create a conflict of interest between profit and maintaining a sufficient 
service. A private company may be tempted to cut back on 
maintenance or staff training etc. to maximize profits. 
1.6 Objectives of tlie Study: 
Present study seeks to evaluate the Issue in totality. The principal issues 
to be examined, therefore, were: 
1. To What extent PSEs failed to realize the objectives for which they were 
created, 
2. would loss-making PSEs be still undesirable if other benefits like, their 
contribution to social security, economic infrastructure and competition 
to the private sector etc. are taken into consideration. 
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3. If the selection of PSE units for privatization was economically justified, 
and if not, the social considerations were so compelling to outweigh the 
former, 
4. Did disinvestment yield the government sufficient revenue to justify it? 
1.7 Data Base and Methodology: 
Data used in the study are secondary one. They are taken from 
Government publications like- Public Enterprise Survey, Economic Survey; 
Report on Currency and Finance; RBI: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 
Economy; Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). 
Most of the analyses are presented through the ratios, percentages and 
graphs. The government's policy decisions with regard to public sector, 
especially the disinvestments have been evaluated by considering the 
problems in totality rather than merely the profitability. The following hypothesis 
has been proposed to be tested. 
"Disinvestment of public sector especially the manner in which it was 
carried out was not a sound policy option". 
1.8 Limitations of the Study: 
The study is subject to certain limitations as well. The major limitation is 
the absence of the use of econometric tools which should have yielded the 
precision to various findings of the study. Still another aspect that has been left 
out is the predictive assessment about the future revenue implications of the 
disinvestment decisions. For such things to attempt certain forecasting 
techniques would have to be deployed. 
In spite of these limitations, an attempt has been made to at least 
identify the problem areas and the possible solutions. 
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CHAPTER-2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The very existence of the public sector undertakings is an issue of debate 
and the opinions appear to be fairly divided. There are those who believe in a 
greater role of the public sector. On the other hand, there are advocates of 
neoclassical approach who do not see any role for the government to interfere 
in the market process. The government's ownership of these enterprises would 
alter the allocation of resources as the government, through public policy, is 
capable of effective reallocation to the disadvantage of the private sector. 
There is still another view about the public sector, and that appears to be the 
balanced one. Such view favors that the public sector should play a role 
wherefore the private sector finds it difficult to influence the market forces. 
The other approach favors such role for the government as market 
determined allocation of resources for the production of goods and services 
might not be socially optimum. The greater degree of consent is on the 
approach that the government should enter into the business as a big player so 
as to give the private sector a better competition. Besides, it should also step in 
where private investment is not expected to be lucrative in any significant 
manner. 
The model India chose was that of mixed economy where the public 
sector would exist along with the private sector. It was the public sector that 
was assigned greater responsibility of development. At first, was made 
apprehensible by the Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) of 1948; but things 
actually began to alter since mid 1980s and by the year 1991 the entire 
scenario changed drastically. 
The debate on the economic literature presents two opposing views. One 
that favors the government's withdrawal from the PSEs as their losses became, 
over the years, untenable and therefore they turned to be only the source of 
drain for the government finances. 
The contesting view to this is that public enterprises serve certain 
purpose and are still doing so. If some of them are making losses, it may not be 
because of some inherent weaknesses in PSEs but in the manner they are 
managed or rather mismanaged. Moreover, their contribution to the economy 
can not be judged on the criterion of profitability alone. Therefore, the need of 
the day is not the disregard of the public enterprises but rather their revamping 
through reform process. The literature reviewed for the present study can be 
classified along the above-mentioned categories. 
Ghosh, Arun (1991)^  advocates that the primary objective of industrial 
policy has to be to search for an industrial pattern which would be less energy-
intensive, less capital-intensive, more employment-intensive and yet capable of 
improving overall factor productivity in the economy. 
Iyer, Ramaswami R. (1991)^  highlights the need for drastic reforms in 
our industrial/economic regime. The paper looks at some of the probable 
consequences of the reforms initiated by the government. It points out that 
many of the components of the new approach, such as the scrapping of 
industrial licensing, the firm faith in market forces and the virtues of 
competition, the strong advocacy of FDI, the liberalization of imports and 
condemnation of the old ideas of import substitution and self-reliance, while 
partially valid, have certain implications for the future. It projects a possible 
scenario of such future, it supports the concerns that need to be recognized 
and addressed, without necessarily reverting to excessive regulation and 
bureaucratic control. 
Kumar, B. Gopalakrishna (1991)^  argued that, while the short-term 
economic problems may at first sight look discouraging, they are tractably 
compared to the longer-term questions which will essentially determine the 
possibilities of development in the nineties and beyond. 
Minhas, B.S. (1991)'* focuses on the relations between the public and 
private sector. To him, the presence of a widespread market failure may call for 
public intervention in some form but not necessarily through government 
production/provision of the relevant goods. In order to decide the question 
whether public intervention should be in the shape of direct 
production/provision of certain goods by the government or through other 
policies, it is practical to use the so-called 'double market failure criterion'. 
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Nagraj, R. (1991)^  presents the investigative exercise that documents 
the long-term trends in some aspects of the public sector performance since 
1960-61, mainly based on National Accounts Statistics and disaggregated by 
type of institutions. More specifically, it highlights the less appreciated aspect of 
a favorable turn although from a very low level in resource mobilization effort of 
public sector enterprises in the 80s, reversing the declining trend of over a 
decade or so. The observed changes in the 80s appear to be significant 
enough to warrant a closer examination as to their causes, since they could 
have a bearing on the current debate on public sector policy reform. 
Nayak, Pulin B. (1991)^  argues that it is difficult to be enthusiastic about 
the recent package of economic policy measures which will be highly 
inflationary and will slow down investment in economic and social 
infrastructure. Additionally, it is going to hurt the poor via cuts in schemes like 
the rural employment generation program. 
In the fiscal sphere too the larger issues still remain to be addressed. The 
tax system needs to be restructured. The overwhelming reliance on indirect 
taxes has to be reduced, the base of personal income tax should be widened 
and tax evasion/avoidance should be minimized. And, above all, there has to 
be made determined effort to curb wasteful current expenditure, and not capital 
expenditure on social and economic infrastructure. This is rather a discouraging 
agenda, but an initial step has to be taken. 
Paranjape, H.K. (1991)^  is of the view that the new industrial policy 
statement is a significant departure from the policy framework that was laid 
down in 1956. The new policy package, whose principal elements are market 
friendliness, privatization and the opening up of the economy to foreign capital 
and trade, has been introduced apparently as a solution to the financial and the 
balance of payment crisis that has resulted from policies in the last decades. 
The paper, through a detailed examination of different aspects of the proposed 
package, concludes that this package is likely to worsen the crisis and not a 
remedy to it. 
Raipuria, Kalyan (1991)^  try to find out certain issues of resource 
generation and mobilization by public enterprises for financing their plans. The 
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focus is on internal resource generation in real terms and on net foreign 
exchange earning by tine public enterprises at lower domestic resource cost. 
Raipuria, Kalyan and Rajesh Mehta (1991)^  speak out that, the 
present discussion in the country on the role of the public and private sectors in 
the economy are misplaced. While the public sector needs reforms, the 
possibilities of substitution by the private sector are given the extremely limited 
stage and the structure of the economy. The strategy of their balancing roles in 
promoting the growth of the economy remains valid. While there is scope for 
improving the production function of both the sectors, the channels and 
instruments of increasing the role of the private sector in the non-agricultural 
sector need a careful consideration if changes are not to lead to crises of 
growth and balance of payments. 
Sandesara, J.C. (1991)^ ° is of the opinion that India's industrial policy 
and planning have had a mix of economic and social objectives. The economic 
objective is growth and the social objectives have been located in the sphere of 
encouragement to small industry, promotion of regional balance, prevention of 
concentration, etc. The New Industrial Policy Statement fails to explain as to 
how these social objectives would be pursued. Arising out of the response to 
this question is a supplementary question: How otherwise are the social 
objectives proposed to be promoted? It is concluded that policies have to be 
followed by action that includes the right kind of investment and production 
decisions and by the right agents if the opportunities, thrown by the above-
mentioned change, are to be seized. 
Srinivasan, T.N. (1991)" analyzes India's development strategy and 
the regulatory framework with respect to industry and foreign trade that failed to 
reach the target-areas. Tinkering with the system here and there, but leaving its 
structure largely intact, will not do. 
Swaminathan, Padmini (1991)^ ^ maintains that freeing industry from 
bureaucratic controls is to be certainly welcomed, but this is only a minor part of 
the story. The central performer in the drama, the private business houses, still 
need to be addressed and shaken up if the conception of a 'successful 
industrial culture' has to start taking firm roots. One such aspect could be the 
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very limited effect of tax concessions on the savings behavior of the corporate 
sector which needs to be looked into, as high debt-equity ratio has encouraged 
the tendency to borrow rather than to find equity funds. 
Chandra, Bipin (1992)^ ^ traces the economic profile of the country at 
the time of independence was extremely distressing. There was hardly any 
growth in the previous half century and both agriculture and industry were 
characterized by severe structural distortions. Against this background, there 
was unanimity among nationalist intellectuals, political leaders and industrialists 
about the directions of economic policy after independence. There was also a 
broad consensus on many of the strategic means such as the vital role of the 
public sector, the discouragement of foreign investment, development of heavy 
industries, and the need for centralized planning. 
Dandekar, V.M. (1992)^ '* evaluated India's economic performance from 
1950 to 1990 on the basis of an analysis of national income accounts and other 
relevant statistical series. It concludes that, at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
country was facing a situation that was critical on both domestic and external 
fronts. In the previous forty years, there were gains in industry and agriculture, 
but these were not sufficient to offset the burdens caused by a rising population 
and increasing fiscal profligacy. Against this background, the new trade, fiscal 
and industrial policy initiatives by the government in July 1991 may be 
welcomed. 
Jalan, Bimal (1992) '^ suggests that an important policy objective now is 
to eliminate the balance of payment once and for all, and to make crisis 
management less of a pre-occupation of policy makers in the 1990s. With this 
objective in view, it proposes a number of policy initiatives to strengthen 
exports, impart flexibility to the management of the exchange rate and increase 
capital inflows, particularly foreign direct investment. 
Mohan, Rakesh (1992)^ ^ traces the history of industrial controls in India 
in the light of the situation prevailing before independence. Most of the controls 
can be traced back to the World War II. After independence, these were further 
strengthened and expanded because it was believed that the state must 
exercise direct and detailed control over the use of national resources. 
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particularly foreign exchange and savings. The inefficiencies associated with 
direct administrative controls became apparent by the mid-1960s. Except for 
some minor changes, the system remained intact till the year 1980. He 
considers the fifteen years period from 1966 to 1980 to be a dark period for 
Indian industry. 
Patel, I.G. (1992)''^  expresses the opinion that, the main thrust of the 
NEP is no doubt, sound and so is the excitement about the new policies but the 
controversy generated by them is also significant. Therefore caution against 
losing the proper historical perspective is necessary. He raises so many 
questions: whether all the new policies are, for example, all that new? Is there 
nothing in our past behavior and belief that is still relevant in the economic 
sphere? Do we need indeed to discard our past obsessions? What is the 
rationale of the NEP and what are the assumptions underlying its superiority? 
And what are the prospects that reality will match the rhetoric or the theoretical 
rationale? 
Bajpai, Nirupam (1993)^ ^ contributes that the developing countries are 
undertaking structural reforms in the midst of macro-economic instability, while 
most of the discussion on economic reform sees growth as more or less an 
assured product of appropriate stabilization and reform policies. The paper 
argues that simultaneous attempts toward stabilization and economic 
liberalization may lead neither to macro stability nor to restoration of 
sustainable growth. In fact, the objective of stabilization is in conflict with the 
objective of re-igniting growth in the economy. 
Different economies with unlike institutional relationships and varying 
lines of causality in their economic systems require different approaches to 
stabilization and structural reform. A case-by-case approach is required with no 
prior bias in favour of liberalization. 
In complete contrast to the main presumption of the Finance Ministry's 
'discussion paper'(1993)^^ on the economic reforms , that stabilization has 
been achieved and the path is now clear for long-run 'structural adjustment', it 
can be concluded that the policies so far have at best landed the economy into 
a precaution steady state where inflation has been moderated at the cost of 
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accepting negligible growth and, even then, continuation of the present 
situation depends critically on the fickle generosity of the rain gods and the aid 
donors. 
Jalan, Bimal (1993)^ ° argues; though the post-independence consensus 
on centralized planning and direct state intervention in the economy was 
inevitable and even desirable during the 50s and 60s, the inadequacies of 
those perspectives can now be ignored only at our own peril. The Indian state's 
recent economic failure, alongside a clear demonstration of much more 
successful and happy state interventions in Japan, Korea and some other 
countries, reveal many of the economic paths and measures which India 
needed to take in the nineties. 
Kumar, Arun (1993)^ ^ maintains that the success of NEP hides the 
problems facing the economy. The lowering of the rate of inflation and the 
increase in the growth rate of the economy has more to do with a good 
monsoon than with the NEP. The industrial sector continues to be in the grip of 
a recession. Foreign exchange reserves are high because of borrowings and 
the industrial recession, and not because of real strength of the producing 
sectors. 
Kurien, C.T. (1993)^ ^ reveals the truth that the nature of restructuring 
and reform what the emerging global economy makes necessary is not as 
simple as privatization, liberalization, marketization, globalization or whatever 
other slogan that is found attractive and marketable for the time being. It calls 
for a proper understanding of the far-reaching changes taking place in the 
global economy and intelligent responses to them with a clear prescription of 
social priorities. 
Mishra, R.K., R. Nandgopal and A. Lateef Syed Mohammad (1993)^ ^ 
complain about the absence of a permanent advisory mechanism to guide the 
government on the modus operandi for launching its disinvestment programme 
which has given credence to the suspicion that disinvestment is not for the 
benefit of the state but for the benefit of a few interested parties. 
NagraJ, R. (1993)^ '* analyzes the macroeconomic impact of PSEs from 
1960-61 to 1989-90 to show; (i) relatively little increase in their overall deficit 
26 
compared to the sharp deterioration of the gross fiscal deficit and (ii) a steep 
decline in their budgetary dependence. While the PSEs' internal resources in 
financing their investment increased distinctly, the same for the private 
corporate sector declined, both converging to similar levels by the end of the 
80s. A statistically significant trend increase in the PSEs' capacity utilization is 
also discernible from 1978-79 to 1990-91. These results, while strengthening 
earlier findings, seem to question the implicit premises of the ongoing reforms 
of the public enterprise sector in India. 
Trivedi, Prajapati (1993)" reviews that the debate on privatization has 
been more ideological than practical, more dogmatic than analytical and more 
bureaucratic than technocratic .This study attempts to piece together various 
policy statements and publicly available documents on this subject to outline 
what appears to be India's approach to the issue of privatization. 
Vyas, V.S. (1993)" identifies that there are several areas where 
concentrated public intervention is imperative if the poors have to participate in 
the growth which the New Economic Policy promises. Some of the specific 
promises are: (i) greater investment in infrastructure to facilitate the 'spread 
effect' of economic growth and to generate productive employment; (ii) greater 
investment in human resource development to strengthen the recipient system 
and improve its social status; (iii) greater emphasis on the programs like IRDP 
and TRYSEM to provide an asset and skill base to the poor; (iv) strengthening 
a well targeted PDS catering to the basic needs of the poor; (v) devising 
adequate and timely social security measures for the 'new poor'. 
Chaudhuri, Sudip (1994)" finds fault with the basic premise underlying 
much of the critical writings on public enterprises is that there is something 
wrong with public enterprises per se. The author reminds that public 
enterprises are not inherently inefficient and contends that a crucial aspect has 
been the objectives and the priorities with which the public enterprises have 
been mobilized. 
Evidence also points to growing income disparities, rising unemployment, 
deterioration in living conditions of the majority of the people, de-
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industrialization, deteriorating environment, loss of food security, decrease in 
technological capability and decline of the public sector. 
With opening up, the economy has become far more unstable than earlier 
and the impact of this will fall on the already marginalized society. 
Ghosh, Arun (1994)^ ^ emphasizes that the pressure from all 
international institutions today Is for privatization. Indeed even more dangerous 
is the ideology that any government intervention in economic activity is bad by 
definition. Even the exponents of 'minimum government' are the strong 
advocates of the states' involvement in maintaining 'lav\/ and order' - to break 
up militant trade unions, crush organized strikes, and so on. 
Mehta, Prayag (1994)^ ^ perceives a little caution about the new 
economic policy (NEP) which is being implemented in the country with the 
claim to make the Indian industry more 'competitive'. Such competitiveness 
has, however, to be obtained in the society and at the workplace where the 
productive energy of the people has to be released for greater innovativeness 
and creativity. With the growing unemployment in the country and the 
threatened 'exist' and 'downsizing' which is likely to result under privatization, 
the society, as a whole, and the workplace, in particular, may have to suffer 
moral and mental health problems. These would suck the self-esteem and self-
efficacy of workers and would, thus, directly hit their skills, capability and 
human development. 
Prasad, Mahesh (1994)^ ° is of the view that the PSEs have to improve 
their efficiency through Memorandum of Understanding (MOD). The focus of 
economic policy of the country has been on stabilization by restoring balance in 
the external sector and on fiscal correction. In this regard, probably, greater 
stress is necessary in the MOUs on efficiency and profitability than on other 
parameters. 
Sinha, Anup (1994)^ '' conceives that the resurgence of conservative 
economic thinking in policy matters and the international pressures faced by 
the government in 1991 led to a substantial revision of macro-economic 
policies. However, the task of stabilization has been far from being successful. 
Even without implementing the really painful prescriptions, demand and 
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business expectations have poised problems. Uncertainties and shrinl^ ing 
employment opportunities have compounded the difficulties. Structural 
adjustments, in terms of institution building, organizational changes and 
redefining the role of government particularly in actively easing infrastructural 
bottlenecks and creating basic capabilities for the large number of the 
underprivileged, have lacked enthusiasm. A quick and substantial integration 
with the world economy has, however, been attempted and is bound to have 
transitional costs in agriculture and the capital goods sector. 
Ahluwalia, Montek S. (1995)^ ^ shows that reforms introduced in 1991 
had two dominant objectives. There was an immediate objective of managing 
the balance of payments crisis and restoring viability in external payments and 
there was also a medium term objective of setting the economy on the path of 
rapid and sustainable growth. The analysis instead focuses on the second and 
much more difficult aspect of the reforms which was to set the economy on 
sustainable high growth path. Achievement of this objective involves basic 
changes in the policy which are sometimes controversial. He indicated that 
there are doubts and fears about one or other component of the strategy, 
differences of opinion about the speed of transition and the sequencing of 
policy changes, and most of all, a growing concern about the distribution of the 
benefits of growth. It raises few questions like; is it necessary to continue with 
the reforms when the crisis is behind us, are the reforms incomplete or 
unbalanced and do we need to redefine priorities to achieve balance etc. 
Bajpai, Nirupam (1995)" asserts that the economic reforms are being 
undertaken almost throughout the developing world today, preceded by a fiscal 
and balance of payments' crisis. The argument goes further that the reforms 
are guided by rules-of-thumb and the underlying general equilibrium model of 
the economy for which these standard rules apply is an unrealistic portrayal of 
most of the developing economies. The model holds good only under very 
restrictive assumptions, perhaps only for small economies and not large ones. 
Besides, while it is important to attain and maintain fiscal discipline, the IMF's 
approach has prolonged the process and invariably failed to yield the desired 
results. For instance, the argument underlining the case for economic 
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liberalization is that allocative efficiency can be achieved by lifting controls in 
commodity market as well as market for credit and foreign exchange. 
The paper discusses the philosophy, process, organizational mechanism, 
expectations and outcome of the government's disinvestment policies. 
Diwan, Romesh (ISSS)^ "* contends that the ongoing 'economic reforms' 
are a political ideology to shore up support for the use of power of the ruling 
Resident Non-Indians (RNI). To understand an ideology, one has basically to 
know the power behind it. The existing power base is apparently shifting from 
industrial to financial capital. As finance defines the power base, it promotes 
the ideology that makes financial capital respectable and desirable. The RNI 
government knows well that these economic reforms define an ideology. Since 
they always had control of government, only minimal changes in the economy 
were needed. Hence, real functioning of the economy is not changed while its 
performance has become more depressing. A positive change will need a 
paradigm shift of ideas. Its underlying principle has to be integrative and not 
divisive. 
Iyer, Ramaswami R. (1995)^ ^ brings together a broad synoptic overview 
of a diversity of concerns relating to the NEP. These include the danger of a 
deepening of the dualism that already exists in India; the possibility of the 
erosion of some of the strengths and capabilities built up during the last four 
decades; the need for alertness in dealing with the MNCs; and the importance 
of safeguarding the national interest in the face of the inequalities of the global 
market and the pressures of the global political configuration. 
Sengupta, Arjun (1995)^ ® argues that the market for financial services 
is most prone to failure which occurs because of the price of financial services, 
more often than not, fails to clear the market. In regard to reform of the financial 
sector, therefore, answers to all questions can not be found and there could be 
the need to move step-by-step, looking at the objective conditions which are 
widely different in a normal course from the ideal conditions, and take decisions 
to reach the goals through trial and error in a practical world. 
Chandrasekhar, C.P. (1996)" finds that no linkage can be established 
between liberalization, private investment and industrial growth in the post-
30 
reform period. What liberalization has done is to unleash a consumption boom, 
fuelled by a surge in consumer credit that has accompanied with financial 
sector reform. Such a boom not only increases balance of payments 
vulnerability, but also offers, in terms of markets, only a once-for-all boost that 
would exhaust itself unless some other stimuli ensure the expansion of the 
home market for manufacturers. 
Diwan, Romesh (1996)^ ^ maintains the reasons that the economic 
reform package has postulated globalization as an end in itself. Many policies 
and activities have been justified simply because they lead to, or follow up, 
globalization. By this time, globalization is a means, not an end. To employ 
globalization as an effective means, it is necessary to develop a related 
strategy of gaining leadership in some of the technologies of the future. This 
requires a whole set of new policies. 
Gouri, Geeta (1996)^ ^ pleads that the lack of a comprehensive policy on 
privatization stands out in contrast to other aspects of the NEP. Perhaps this is 
politically expedient, but in terms of economic management and more so public 
sector management, the lack of a policy can result in unexpected outcomes 
which may not be all that expedient. The paper attempts to provide the 
glimpses of the possible outcomes on privatization, focusing on the fiscal 
efficiency and intersectional dimensions as a result of non-existence of policies. 
Gupta, Anand P. (1996)*° argues that India's biggest failure in its 
economic reforms program is that there has not been a transformation of public 
enterprise. While privatization appears to be the only way out, it has not made 
much of headway. The attempt is to examine why this has been so, specifically 
exploring the incentives that influence the decisions of India's politicians and 
policy-makers while dealing with the issue of privatization of public enterprises. 
Joshi, Vijay and IMD Little (1996)'*'' observe that when the Narasimha 
Rao government (chapter entitled "Stabilization Policy") assumed office at the 
centre in 1990-91, the country was facing an acute macroeconomic crisis. In a 
short-run sense, the stabilization policies can be adjudged as successful but 
such can not be termed as stable in the long run. 
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It is believed that almost everything in the economic sphere in India 
needed drastic reform in 1991 as if much of the task remained was yet to be 
accomplished. 
Kalirajan, K.P. and R.T. Shand (1996)'*^  conclude that the privatization 
is a major theme in public sector reform. An advanced argument is here on the 
basis of empirical evidence that improving the performance of public 
enterprises is an alternative measure where privatization is a difficult policy 
option to implement in the short term. A bench-mark for measuring the 
productive performance of public enterprises has been evolved and applied to 
measure the productive performance and production behavior. 
Kumar, Arun (1996)"^ manifests that the comparison of the trends and 
the amplitude of fluctuations in several key macro-economic variables in the 
pre- and post-1991 periods suggest an increased economic instability which 
facilitates speculative activity, especially with financial sector liberalization and 
the opening up of the economy. 
It is argued further that the increased amplitude of economic fluctuations 
is a result of the nature of state intervention under the new economic policies 
which has reduced policy effectiveness. The government is unable to control or 
regulate the impact of shocks (external or internal) since it lacks the policy 
instruments or has given up some of them or they are greatly circumscribed by 
the requirements of the new policies precisely at a time when the economy has 
become far more complex and is subject to more external shocks. 
Majumdar, Sumit K. (1996)'*^  examines the productivity trends in Indian 
industry from the period 1950-51 to 1992-93, and respectively during the sub-
periods: 1960-1961 to 1992-93, 1970-1991 to 1992-93 and 1980-1981 to 1992-
1993, by using the latest available Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data that 
have been released by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO). Productivity 
is measured through a linear-programming based technique called data 
envelopment analysis. The results show that during the period of 195Gs, 
industrial efficiency was relatively high; however, in the 1960s and 1970s, there 
was a severe retrogression in efficiency patterns. These patterns began to 
reversing themselves only in the 1980s; while efficiency in the 1980s was no 
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better than it had been in the 1950s; the data indicate that Indian industry has 
reached its highest efficiency potential throughout the 1990s, thus providing 
some evidence that the reforms are being operative. 
Patibandia, Murali and M. Mallikarjun (1996)'** argue that the 
supporters of economic reform look at industrial growth mostly through supply 
side efficiency, but the critics peep into to the demand constraint. This note 
discusses some of the possible supply and demand side factors behind the 
recent trends in industrial growth. 
Rangrajan, C. (1997)*^ discusses various issues posed to the 
Disinvestment Commission as well as to create public awareness of the various 
dimensions of disinvestment. 
In his lecture, issues relating to disinvestment revolve around three 
questions - why, how and how much. To some extent, these issues were 
addressed by the committee on Disinvestment which submitted its report in 
1993. As a background to answering theses issues, we need to look at the 
evolution of the role of public sector enterprise in our country along with their 
performance. 
According to him, there are two major reasons adduced for 
disinvestment. One is to provide fiscal support and other is to improve the 
efficiency of the enterprise. To answer to how to disinvest, he suggested three 
methods for valuation - net asset value method, profit earning capacity value 
method and discounted cash flow method. Of these three methods, the 
discounted cash flow method has the greatest relevance though it is the most 
difficult. 
Further, he suggested the level of disinvestment in an enterprise in any 
year should be deprived from the target level of government ownership in that 
enterprise over the medium term. 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1998)*^ argues that India's economic strategy 
rested on four principle premises: (i) that the external environment for 
increased exports was bleak and this 'export pessimism' justified an inward-
looking import-substitution strategy; (ii) that even if greater exploitation of the 
global economy were possible, it was a risk, not an opportunity; (iii) that 
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massive state intervention was necessary, using an extensive licensing system, 
to guide and monitor production, trade and investment decisions tlirougtiout tine 
economy; and (iv) tliat investments in public enterprises should steadily expand 
in successive five-year plans, eventually leading to domain state ownership of 
the means of production. 
Each of these premises is turned out to be wrong and fatal to India's 
economic health. As the East Asian experience suggests, export pessimism 
was a badly mistaken view. Moreover, the fear of the world economy, leading 
to a hostile view of inward foreign investment, resulted in blocking absorption of 
new technologies. 
In 1991, when the country was facing unprecedented macro-economic 
crisis, the Indian economy was seen as having a variety of problems including 
an efficient high cost and non-competitive industrial structure, and serious 
infrastructure related bottlenecks. It was argued that policy-induced 
microeconomic rigidities and constrained firm choices, apart from protecting 
Indian enterprises from internal and external competition. These micro-
economic rigidities were induced by industrial, trade, public sector and foreign 
investment policies. 
Nanjundappa, D.M. (1998)^ * suggests the ways as to how the public 
sector may overcome the problems by using its two instruments: disinvestment 
and Privatization. This will help the induction of fresh capital and infusion of 
new technology. 
Nayyar, Deepak (1998)'*® traces the interaction between economic 
development and political democracy in India during the past 50 years. The 
process of economic development is lineated in the wider context of political 
democracy to explore the interaction between economies and politics in 
independent India. An analytical framework which is set out divides the past 
five decades into three phases. The current phase, it is concluded, is 
characterized by an absence of consensus and a presence of short-termism in 
which the economics of liberalization and the politics of empowerment are 
moving the economy and the polity in opposite directions. The need of conflict 
34 
resolution is greater than ever before. But tlie task has become more difficult. 
And strangely enough, the effort is much less. 
Neogi, Chiranjib and Buddhadeb Ghosh (1998)^ ° exert to see the 
impact of liberalization on the performance of selected Indian industries with 
firm level data. The performance indicators chosen for this study are growth of 
value added capital intensity, labor productivity (partial productive indicator) 
and total factor productivity (TFP). The paper also takes notice of the 
performance of these industries in terms of inter-temporal changes in efficiency 
from 1989 to 1994. It concludes that productivity growth and efficiency level 
have not improved as per expectation during the post-reform period and the 
distribution of efficiency is skewed. However, the time period is not long enough 
to reach any final conclusion. But such study is needed to review the impact of 
liberalization on Indian Industries for better monitoring of reform policies. 
Patel, I.G. (1998)®^  argues that the decade of the nineties has seen 
important changes in the global economic order and in the way economists 
look at the problems of development and economic change. The new 
consensus recognizes the superiority of market-oriented polices over state-
sponsored development which relied on extensive government intervention in 
economic life. The world economy gets increasingly integrated with relatively 
freer trade and massive flows of capital. Therefore, for India the reforms of the 
public enterprises as well as reforms in the labor laws may be called an 
unfinished agenda. 
Shome, Parthasarathi and Hiranya Mukhopadhyay (1998)" reveal 
three main points. First, the main components of the economic reform process 
in India of the early 1990s, both in its stabilization and structural aspects. 
Second, the inadequacy and the non-sustainability of the measures that were 
undertaken and, the third, by way of proposing some explanations based on 
political economy aspects, provides ground for the overall direction in which 
India needs to move to revitalize its reform process and to sustain it. 
Singh, L.P. (1998)" concludes that safeguarding economic reforms 
against danger and making reform package sensitive of the real needs of our 
teeming masses are the two basic factors to be especially taken care of at the 
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present crucial juncture. This requires a careful mixture of liberalization, 
designed to remove hurdles in the working of the free market, and at the same 
time the carefully targeted interventions designed to limit the damage that 
market forces can inflict. 
Bagchi, Amiya Kumar (1999)^ " examines the policies which have 
promoted the globalization of the Indian economy locating it in the context of 
policy-induced but fragmented globalization under way in other South Asian 
countries. The author also notes the consequences of badly regulated financial 
markets in India and analyses India's experience with the equity markets. The 
paper concludes that the neo-liberal regime in India has so far failed to improve 
the macro-economic management of the economy and to achieve a better level 
of macro-economic capability. 
Kumar, Nagesh (2000)" reviews the performance of the Indian 
economy during the 1990s in terms of certain broad macro-economic 
indicators. The attempt provides a brief sketch of the economic reforms so far, 
analyses their impact and makes recommendations for the second generation 
of economic reforms. 
Vittal, N., (2001)^ ^ exerts to explain the significance of valuation. 
Valuation in a broad sense would mean assessing the worth of something, 
which may be a tangible asset like land or something intangible like goodwill. 
He analyzes different types of valuation. 
Thus, this lecture deals with the definition of valuation in the broad sense 
and may be able to relate new challenges and opportunities and imperatives 
emerging out of the liberalization, privatization and globalization. 
Ram Mohan, T.T. (2001)" confides that privatization is very much the 
flavor of the day. Many enthusiasts of privatization seem to believe that a shift 
from public to private ownership will automatically make for improved 
performance. Yet there is little in economic theory or the empirical evidence on 
privatization to taken out such a simplistic conclusion. The impact of 
privatization is by no means unmixed. In less developed countries particularly, 
where law enforcement and corporate governance tend to be weak, private 
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ownership does not necessarily make for better performance. Somehow, the 
research on privatization makes it possible to draw some tentative conclusions 
for privatization policy. 
Ahluwalia, Montek S. (2002)^ ^ opines that the agenda for the future 
should be determined by looking at existing strength and weaknesses, and 
building on the strength while correcting the weaknesses. 
Baijal, Pradip (2002)^ ® contends that privatization is an evocative 
subject even in the developed economies. In a developing economy like India, 
with its tradition of successful and pervasive public intervention, it generates 
unique mind-blocks. Its implementation therefore requires persistent, 
persuasive zeal. However, the compulsions of ensuring higher levels of 
investment at progressively higher levels of efficiency and productivity require a 
complete restructuring of the economic environment. Low levels of public 
savings, inadequate competition and low export orientation are barriers which 
need to be transcended. Privatization and liberalization of the licensing regime 
for foreign direct investment are two initiatives which can meet the objectives of 
efficiency enhancement, domestic and foreign resource mobilization and 
incremental capital outlays. 
The pace of privatization has quickened since 2000. The adoption of a 
strategy of block sale of government stock in identified PSEs to a strategic 
partner, along with transfer of management control, as opposed to market sale 
of shares in small lots, has enhanced the value received by the government 
through disinvestment. It also ensures that these assets are put to productive 
use in the most optimum time frame and with the maximum benefit. While it is 
too early to quantify such benefits, there is sufficient anecdotal evidence of 
significant welfare gains for the employees, institutional investors and the 
economy, along with quantifiable gains for the government from the additional 
resources freed by the sale of PSEs. 
Chaudhuri, Sudip (2002)^ ° focuses on the impact of India's economic 
reforms on industrial structure and productivity. It reveals a disappointing 
overall performance in both-output growth and employment. This, however, is 
not the result of exogenous factors, but the consequences of the type of 
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policies being followed under economic reforms. If certain mistakes were made 
in the past, those need to be corrected. But efforts should be made to ensure 
that demand is high enough to produce more output to employ more people 
and to reduce poverty. 
Chelliah, Raja (2002)^ '' believes that the obstacles to reforms, to some 
extent, are because of short-term political considerations and lack of financial 
resources. The economic reforms strategy for the next decade will be dictated 
and determined by the basic objectives (a) 6 to 6.5 percent annual rate of 
growth of GDP; (b) considerable emphasis on human resource development, 
and (c) reversing the trend of worsening regional disparities. 
Desai, Ashok V. (2002)" points out that there was an error of 
sequencing. Industries that boomed in the early 1990s are suffering today. 
Industrial licensing was removed first; trade liberalization came much later. The 
result was that the eyes of domestic producers were still focused on the 
domestic market in the early 1990s; in their view, the landscape of the markets 
was little different from the 1980s. The economy was a largely closed one; so 
the growth of industry was based on domestic market expectations. And 
because it was closed, the growth of one domestic industry created the market 
for another; all sorts of industries grew up, efficient and inefficient, high-cost 
and low-cost. 
The present economic crisis is not due to the reforms in industry, trade 
and capital markets, but due to the undone reforms in industrial protection, 
exchange rate policy and infrastructure. 
Jalan, Binfial (2002)" refers to the record of the 40 years of 
development and says that there is very little doubt that India's economy, by 
any standard of measurement, is stronger and more resilient today than was 
the case a decade ago. In his judgment, with a view to the phenomenal 
changes that have taken place in the world economy, the present direction of 
policies to make India more open and more competitive is right and deserves to 
be accelerated. In addition to economic reforms, it is now important to embark 
on an urgent programme to revitalize the governance and public delivery 
system at all levels of the government. 
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Kelkar, Vijay (2002)^ '* believes that the persistent poverty in India is due 
to lower growth rates. In other words, what India faces is the problem of low 
productivity across the sectors as well as of the low growth in this productivity. 
After analyzing the factors that could have contributed to this relative low 
productivity and low growth impasse, he recommends the launching of next 
wave of reforms - the second generation of reforms. According to him, "the first 
wave of reforms launched in 1991 by Dr. Manmohan Singh and Shri Narasimha 
Rao were essentially crisis-driven. This time round we can have consensus-
driven reforms so that we can act in anticipation of a crisis which could 
definitely visit on us, if the present trends are allowed to continue". 
The reform measures required are macro-economic, meso-economic and 
micro-economic. Macro-economic reforms are required to ensure fiscal health. 
A very important area of reforms would be redefining the role of Government 
and down-sizing the Government while improving the quality of governance. 
The down-sizing of the Government will also mean privatization of non-strategic 
public sector including banking sector. Meso-economic reforms include major 
infrastructure-sector reforms such as energy, transport, telecom etc. Micro-
economic reforms should promote competition, in product markets and services 
sector by allowing free-entry and freer international trade. 
Kishore, Sarvashri Nand, Ms. Rudra Saha, Ajaib Singh, A.N. Sarkar 
and S.K. Thakur (2002)^ ^ set out that, with the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1991-92, disinvestment of public sector undertakings became an 
important aspect of fiscal management of the Government of India. On account 
of the diverse political ideologies, disinvestment continues to remain a 
contentious issue with valuation being at the core of controversies. 
The lecture suggests that an appropriate mix of various valuation 
methods may be adopted to ensure fair valuation of the PSUs. Besides, it also 
advises the government to take necessary value-enhanced measures in order 
to reduce the risk perception of the perspective buyers of the PSUs. To obviate 
the post-disinvestment controversies it would be desirable for the government 
to carry out disinvestments process in general and valuation process in 
particular with utmost transparency. 
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Kumar, Nagesh (2002)®^ finds the balance sheet of economic reforms in 
India in the 1990s to be the mixed one. The overall post-reform growth rate of 
output has been robust at an average of 6.8 per cent. The observed growth 
rate for the 1990s is not only significantly higher than that recorded during the 
1980s, but it is also more sustainable in terms of parameters of fiscal and 
current account. It is further pointed out by him that Indian industry has relied 
more on technology imports and affiliations with outside multinational 
companies and less on in-house Research and Development, which is a matter 
of concern for sustaining industrial growth and competitiveness. 
Another area of concern is that the fiscal adjustments have been 
achieved by pruning capital expenditure rather than by containing current 
expenditure of the government. The decline in public investment in physical 
and social infrastructure questions the sustainability of growth. 
Rajamani, R.C. (2002)" indicates that the union budget 2002-2003 
contains a broad strategy to push ahead with the reforms laying stress upon 
the importance of agriculture and food production, as well as calling for 
enhanced public and private investments in infrastructure 
Rangarajan, C. (2002)^ ^ suggests that more market does not mean less 
government but only different government. The need for expanded state 
intervention in the areas of education, health and sanitation cannot be 
underestimated. But it is only an efficient economy that will generate the 
necessary surplus which can enable the state to fulfill its socio-economic 
obligations. Efficiency and equity should not be fixed as opposing condition. 
Kaur, Simrit (2003)" makes a strong case for symbiotic relationship 
between the public and private sector in India. The description contains that it is 
competition between the industries and not their ownership, which determines 
the efficiency of an enterprise and exhibits that this criterion should guide the 
allocation of resources between the two sectors. An assertive elaboration is 
that the entry of private enterprises in infrastructure development would 
increase competition and consequently enhance productivity. The attempt is 
also to evaluate the role of Memorandum of Understanding as a regulatory 
device and provides a systematic exposition of its salient features and also 
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offers reasons for the failure of this device in improving the productivity. By 
observing numerous cases of soft targeting, the quality of regulatory 
intervention, which is important for industrial development of the country, has 
been stressed on. 
In the econometric analysis, it is found that the linkages (forward as well 
as backward) between the PSEs are indeed very high. The attempt also 
undertakes a critical appraisal of the disinvestment process through the case-
studies of BALCO, Lagan Jute, Air India, CMC and MFIL etc. 
Mohnot, S.R (2003)''° declares that there is a Third Option - the option 
of the transformation of the public sector into a professional sector. It will 
secure the objectives of privatization without (conventional) privatization. The 
option will take the sectors to a futuristic meeting-place. This meeting-place has 
to be the goal of all, public as well as private sector enterprises, in the 
emerging economy. Real-time corporate governance, in spirit and not only in 
letters, is the demand of the day. 
Ram Mohan, T.T. (2003)'^  finds the posture that India's privatization 
effort has shifted from disinvestment, the sale of minority shares to the public, 
to strategic sale where a controlling stake is sold to a private buyer. It is 
contended that strategic sale, by transferring control from government to a 
private owner, is best suited to the objective of improved efficiency. Because a 
process of bidding subject to a reserve price is involved, it will also help to meet 
the objective of maximizing government revenues through privatization. The 
paper reviews these claims in the light of the auction theory and the empirical 
evidence on methods of sale in privatization worldwide. It also addresses 
popular misconceptions about the benefits of strategic sale. 
The auction literature suggests that strategic sale using the first-priced 
sealed-bid method currently employed cannot always be counted upon to 
maximize efficiency and revenues. 
Vaidyanathan, A. (2003)^ ^ finds that rapid economic growth and 
eradication of abject poverty have been the core concerns of India's polity and 
the government throughout the last five decades. Coordinated planning with the 
state, playing the leading role in initiating and regulating the process of 
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development in pursuit of these objectives, has been a distinctive feature. 
Specific targets, perceptions of the problem involved and the solutions have 
been changing by the time. The work provides an overview of evolution of this 
process which culminates in the far-reaching orientation of strategy and policies 
during the nineties and a critical assessment of their rationale, implementation 
and impact in view of the political economy perspective. 
Mathur, Vibha (2004)" finds that expansion of public sector took place 
during the 50s and 60s along the lines it was expected. Afterwards, it was 
afflicted with various ills like over-staffing, labor indiscipline, under-utilization of 
installed capacity, excessive political interference, bureaucratic instead of 
professional management and undue emphasis on capital-intensive 
technology. 
The poor performance of PSEs started to be reflected in low profits and in 
some cases mounting losses year after year. Hence, privatization of public 
sector enterprises is a part of the economic reforms process initiated in 1991. 
In dismantling the public sector, India has adopted a gradualist approach. The 
slow pace of privatization has disappointed the public in general. 
The treatise also traces the philosophy and growth of PSEs in India and 
describes recent policy measures for their privatization. Hurdles being faced by 
the government in this gigantic task too are set forth. 
Mr. Ahluwalia (2005)^ '* focuses on the economic issues and elaborately 
deals with economic aspects in a broader sense. 
The picture that emerges from his lecture is that India is grappling 
earnestly with the challenges posed by globalization, and finding solutions to 
these challenges within the framework of her democratic polity. As in the past; 
policy reform in India will continue to be a gradualist process. 
In another lecture (2005)^ ^ he tends to examining India's experience in 
the transition from a relatively dosed economy to one that is much open to 
trade and financial flows and especially to considering how far some of the 
fears and criticism that are typically raised about the dangers of globalizing are 
valid in India's case. 
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Precisely, he concluded that India's experience was very different in a 
clear way from the pessinnistic perceptions and projections of the votaries of 
anti-globalization. The overall growth performance improved significantly and 
poverty as conventionally measured also declined. But it is also true that the 
achievements in these dimensions were less than what was expected and at 
the same time there were distributional problems. The benefits of growth were 
not seen to be evenly distributed among different states and some of the poorer 
and most populous states actually experienced a deceleration in growth. He 
found that the picture on employment levels is mixed. There was a marginal 
increase in unemployment but a very robust increase in real wages. However, 
the growth of organized sector employment decelerated and in the recent years 
even declined. There is evidence that rural areas did not share adequately in 
growth as agriculture decelerated significantly after the mid-1990s. 
Ram Mohan, T.T. (2005)^ ® sets the debate in a proper perspective and 
provides convincing answers to several issues that are currently debated with 
inadequate theoretical understanding or empirical evidence. The pursuit 
provides innovative and universally applicable tools to the study of the 
phenomenon in other country as well. In particular, differentiating privatization 
of industrial enterprise from that of banking is of lasting significance in as much 
as dominance of the externalities and the appropriateness of the regulatory 
framework that are brought out as key-elements in the process of privatization. 
It is argued that privatization is good for improving public finances and 
economic efficiency. 
The approach emphasizes the weighing of relative strengths of public and 
private sector in a dynamic setting in considering and designing the policy and 
process. A valuable point made is that, the governance in both sectors could 
weaken, giving a little scope for a clear-cut choice in aggregate, without 
addressing to the big issues. The criticality of the design of the process is 
highlighted by monetary exposition, and in this context, the conceptual 
distinction between privatization and disinvestment derived from Indian 
experience is in some ways an original contribution. The illustration is also 
made that some private enterprises and efficient public enterprises could co-
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exist, and make the discipline tlirougli partial private sector shareholding that 
could appraise the too much desired autonomy in public enterprises. 
Saksena, K.D. (2005)" analyses the performance of the Indian 
economy during a decade of wide-ranging economic reforms, which 
commenced in the mid-1991, as compared to its behavior in the eighties when 
some piecemeal measures of liberalization had been taken up. Starting with an 
overview, the interpretation comprehensively covers important aspects like 
GDP and employment growth, Human Development, Poverty Alleviation, 
Privatization, Savings and Investment (including foreign investment). 
Agriculture, Industry, Resource Mobilization by the government. Public 
expenditure. Deficit financing. External debt. Foreign trade. Balance of payment 
and Behavior of prices. A comparative study of economic growth in India and 
China during the reforms period has been made to draw lessons from the 
Chinese experience. 
Makhija, Anil K. (2006)^ ^ apprehends that despite the poor performance 
of public sector undertakings, a growing consensus to privatize them and a 
transparent and effective apparatus in place, India has been remarkably slow to 
actually privatize. It is currently hard to get managers and politicians to go 
along with the privatization of PSUs, for the private benefits accruing to them 
from control of these enterprises can be immense. A new privatization scheme 
is proposed to undo the manager-politician nexus by putting the onus of 
privatization on the managers of PSUs, while using competition to restrain any 
giveaways. 
Nagraj, R. (2006)^ ® holds that, since the mid-1980s, the public sector's 
share in domestic investment has been nearly halved, but its output share has 
remained roughly constant at about a quarter of GDP, suggesting a sustained 
rise in productivity over nearly two decades. The improvement in performance 
is also evident from (i) a rise in physical efficiency in electricity generation; (ii) a 
fall in public sector employment growth; and (iii) an increase in central public 
sector enterprises' profitability (even after excluding the petroleum sector). Yet 
the public sector finances have remained adverse. This is because of the fact 
that in activities like electricity, passenger road transport and railways the 
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revenue-cost ratio is less than one, and has declined since the early 1990s. 
Moreover, over the last four decades, the public sector price deflator declined 
by 17 percentage points, relative to the GDP deflator. Hence, correct pricing 
and collecting user charges are probably the ways to setting public sector 
finances right. 
Nagraj, R. (2006)^ ° presents an effort to grapple with a few 
contemporary issues of economic growth, industrial change and policy 
initiatives in India. These studies are motivated by the desire to examine 
carefully some of the widely held propositions on the aggregate and sectoral 
economic performance, premises of a few reform measures and the outcomes 
of some aspects of economic reforms initiated in the 1990s. 
Krishna, K.L (2007)^ ^ has attempted to study the industrial growth and 
diversification during the four decades, i.e. from 1951 to 1990. The focus of the 
study is on the manufacturing sub-sector and its two branches, registered 
manufacturing and unregistered manufacturing. Review of the trends in 
industrial growth and diversification shows that, in terms of growth, the 
progress of industrialization in India has been far below the expectations and 
targets. While within the industrial sector a good measure of diversification has 
been achieved, the share of industry in aggregate GDP at the end of the 1980s 
was a meagre 25 per cent. In the recent decades, capital intensity in organized 
manufacturing increased to such an extent that the employment in the said 
manufacturing showed a decline. 
In spite of special incentives and protections, unregistered manufacturing 
grew much more slowly than organized manufacturing in most the industry 
groups. The long-term viability of unregistered manufacturing remained to be in 
doubt. 
After all, the reform measures introduced in July 1991 show that in the 
coming years Indian industry will contribute more substantially to overall growth 
and structural transformation of the economy. 
Nagraj, R (2007)^ ^ deals with industhal policy and speeding up of 
reforms in the 1990s including the impact of industrial policy on the 
performance of economic reforms. 
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Bhagwati, Jagdish (2007)" points out the low levels of productivity due 
to nature of India's import-substituting industrialization and the vested interest 
that spawned within the business community, the bureaucracy, and the political 
class. These policy failures, which were well understood by the technocracy, 
could be addressed at the time of the balance of payments crisis in 1991, 
despite opposition from the vested interests who had resisted it during the 
1980s. 
Patnaik, Prabhat and C.P. Chandrasekhar (2007)^ " suggest that there 
was no imminent need to undertake the kind of policy reforms that were 
dictated by the Fund-Bank lobby in 1991. There was no crisis in the real 
economy. The crisis was caused largely by finance capital, which decided to 
withdraw from India at the time of an exogenous shock. The attempt is to 
indicate the contradictions within India's model of import substitution and to 
highlight the problems of structural adjustment in India. An alternative 
development paradigm has also been discussed herein. 
Ahluwalia, Montek S. (2007f * traces very lucidly the achievements and 
challenges related to India's gradual reforms. In short, the manifested macro-
picture of India's economic liberalization tells about the evolving relationship 
between the state and the market in the areas such as industry, trade, 
agriculture, infrastructure, the financial sector and the social sector. 
The literature scanned for the present study focuses on the acceleration of 
economic reforms. Such acceleration entails, among other things, the 
restructuring and productivity of the PSEs. The subsequent chapters deal with 
the nature of reforms, their genesis and direction, objectives of the creation of 
public sector and its social responsibilities etc. Finally, the attempt is made to 
evaluate the kinds of reform, which largely consist of the disinvestments of 
certain units of PSEs, in order to arrive at the judgment whether such reforms 
and their direction are consistent with the economic logic and social obligations 
or not? 
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CHAPTER-3 
PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES IN INDIA : 
EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION 
India inherited a patlietic industrial base, underdeveloped infrastructure 
and a stagnant economy. Industrial activity had endured a steep fall after the 
Second World War owing to difficulties in obtaining raw materials, transport 
bottlenecks, accumulation of equipment replacement and labour unrest. Above 
and beyond this, there was lack of government intervention as well as 
deficiency of capital. The ownership was ascertained basically in the private 
sector. Railways as well as Post and Telegraph were the only activities 
acclaimed in the public sector. Technical and managerial skills were in short 
supply. As a consequence the core of the progression of economic 
development was the utilization of the economic surpluses generated in the 
economy for extended reproduction. Development depends on the patterns of 
control over and exploitation of the surpluses. Even as India's potential surplus 
was quite a large, the actual social surplus or the size of internal savings 
accessible for investment in the economy was very small. Subsequently the 
share of industry in capital formation was abysmally low. That is why the Indian 
nationalist leaders have been demanding the government's proactive role in 
leading the capital formation in the economy. 
As we know, the development is not a sudden process but it has to go 
through the several stages. "Rostow distinguished five main stages in the 
process of development: 
The traditional society, 
The transitional stage-pre condition for take-off, 
jii. Take- off, 
iv. Drive to maturity, and 
V. The stage of high mass consumption. 
In Rostow's model, a country achieves industrialization during the take-
off stage. His theory can be seen as an explanation of the process of 
industrialization. In this sense, the third (take-off) stage is of crucial importance. 
The 1®' two stages represent the preparation of industrialization and the last two 
stages are results of industrialization. In the first two stages, particularly the 
second, the non-econonnic factors play an important role while in other stages 
investment plays a crucial role in the process of transition from one stage to 
another"\ Indian economy could at best be operating in stage two in 
accordance with the Rostow's schemes of development. Thus the natural 
choice of development strategy after independence was economic sovereignty 
and economic independence laid in rapid industrialization including particularly 
the promotion of industrial infrastructure. 
It was the attempt to accelerate the industrial development that 
necessitates the greater role in such development to the public sector. 
Therefore, even before planning process was started in independent India, it 
was made known that the public sector was going to play a significant role. 
Although in the First Five-Year Plan, stress was not so much on industrial 
development as the focus remained mainly on correcting the imbalances 
created due to the partition of the country. It was the Second Five-Year Plan, 
launched in 1956, that placed emphasis on the development of basic and the 
keen industries. It was the basic and heavy industry that India preferred to 
expand so as to provide rest of the economy the crucial inputs and 
infrastructure at reasonable price. It was feared that private investment would 
not be helpful in desired magnitude as such projects involve longer gestation 
period, low profitability and greater uncertainty. 
3.1 Policy Objective: 
Industrialization that was so pursued did not have merely the economic 
objectives but was considered to be the tool to realize social objectives as well, 
such as equitable distribution of income and wealth, reduction of poverty 
through generating employment opportunities, balanced regional development 
and attainment of self-reliance. Therefore the primacy was to be accorded to 
public sector. The Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) of 1948 outlined these 
objectives. 
' W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-communist Manifesto; Quoted and explained by 
Seth, Vijay K; Industrialization in India: Spatial Perspective, Commonwealth Publishers, New Delhi, 1987, 
P.94. 
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The Resolution divided the industries into four categories and in that way 
putting an end to all speculations and suspicions in this regard. It affirmed that 
public sector would play an effective and dominant role in the future economic 
development of India. Certain crucial sectors for industrial development were 
reserved for government initiative. Thus, manufacture of arms and ammunition, 
production and control of atomic energy, ownership and management of 
railways became the government monopolies. Furthermore, six basic 
industries, viz. iron and steel, coal, aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding, mineral 
oils, manufacture of telephone, telegraph and wireless apparatus were to be 
developed by the government. 
After the adoption of the Indian constitution which stressed certain socio-
economic goals, the Industrial Policy was comprehensively revised and 
adopted in 1956. With the aim of meeting the new challenges emerged from 
time to time, it was modified through statements in 1973, 1977 and 1980. The 
I PR of 1948 was followed by the I PR of 1956 (launched on the eve of the 
Second Five-Year Plan) which had its objective as the acceleration of the rate 
of economic growth and the speeding up of industrialization as a means of 
attaining a socialist pattern of society. Contrary to the four categories in the 
1948 resolution, the 1956 resolution divided industries into three categories in 
which the state was to take exclusive responsibility (Schedule A), the state 
would call on private sector to supplement its effort (Schedule B), and which 
were to be left to initiative and enterprise of the private sector (the remaining 
industries, i.e. Schedule C). 
The Industrial Policy (IP) statement of 1980 called attention to the need 
for promoting competition in the domestic market, technological upgradation 
and modernization. The policy laid the foundation for an increasingly 
competitive export base and for encouraging foreign investment in high-
technology areas. This found expression in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. From the 
early eighties, attempt to increase the productivity in all economic and 
production activities became the central concern. The policy raised the limits of 
investment prescribed for small-scale and ancillary units. It was around this 
time that the need for involving private sector in the development process came 
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to realization. Consequently, the Seventh Plan assigned, for the first time, 
greater role to the phvate sector in terms of investment. Certain liberalization 
measures were also commencing especially with regards to foreign 
investments. 
Eighties was the decade of robust economic growth. Regardless of 
achieving the growth rate that was never experienced earlier, economy faced 
serious difficulties in 1990. Nonetheless the immediate cause of such crises 
was the balance of payment difficulties, but very remarkably the structural 
weaknesses in the economy were thoroughly exposed prompting the economic 
reforms that were initiated in 1991. One of the reform-measures was the 
considerable reduction of the list of items that were reserved for the public 
sector. 
These policy pronouncements have reiterated successive 
government's need in the public sector for rapid and sustained industrial 
development of the country. Since industrial sector was plagued by near 
stagnation and retrogression for full two decades i.e. from 1965 to 85, the 
industrial licensing policy failed in achieving its objectives; the public sector has 
failed to utilize its resources properly leading to substantial under-utilization of 
capacity and huge wastage of resources etc. a re-look at the industrial policy 
became inevitable. 
Accordingly in line with liberalization measures are gain to be 
undertaken around announced mid eighties, the New Industrial Policy (NIP 
1991) de-regulated the industrial economy in a substantial manner. The major 
objectives of the new policy were to build on the gains already made, to correct 
the distortions or weaknesses that might have crept in and likewise to maintain 
a sustained growth in productivity and gainful employment and attain 
international competitiveness. These policies created a climate for rapid 
industrial growth in the country. Government would continue to pursue a sound 
policy-framework encompassing encouragement of entrepreneurship, 
dismantling of the regulatory system, development of capital markets and 
increasing competitiveness. The spread of industrialization to backward areas 
was to be enthusiastically promoted through appropriate incentives, institutions 
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and infrastructure investments. The New Industrial policy (NIP) and subsequent 
amendments brought influential changes in the policy regime governing 
industrial investments. Besides, NIP adopted a much more liberal attitude to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) than even before in post-independence India. 
The policy allowed automatic approval system for priority industries by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) within two weeks subject to their fulfilling specified 
equity norms. The restrictions on investment by the large industrial houses and 
foreign controlled companies under the MRTP Act were also abolished. 
3.2 Evolution of the Public Sector: 
As mentioned earlier, independent India inherited a weak industrial 
base. In order to be ascendant, such a strategy was required that may well put 
the economy on the path of higher growth and rapid economic development. 
The strategy adopted was the choice of a mixed economy where both the 
public and private sector would coexist as reflected in the Industrial Policy 
Resolution. This was the result of industrial conference, which was held in 
December 1947 to improve the effective matters and remove the uncertainfies 
or any sort of suspicion in the minds of investors and entrepreneurs. The 
outcome was the clear-cut division of industries into the public sector and the 
private sector. It was primarily to put emphasis on this fact that the public sector 
in India was intended to lead economic growth and development. However, 
during the recent years the trends towards increasing liberalization are very 
much evidenfial in India for one acquire the concepfion that the private sector is 
considered to play an important role in the economy. If we look into the 
Industrial Policy Resolution (IPR) 1948 and 1956, we find that the resolution 
divided the industries into different categories. Some fields were enfirely left for 
the public sector, some fields were disfinguished between the public and 
private sector and some others were left totally to the private sector. A brief 
look at the division of field of industrial activity into the public and private sector 
noficeably brings out that while heavy and basic industries were kept for the 
public sector, the entire field of consumer goods industries (having high and 
early returns) was left to the private sector. Outside the industrial field, while 
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g\<a"ir^ trans|: ' ' ' most of the banks, financial corporations, railways\<a1r^ transport etc. are^i*t|Pe 
public sector; the entire agriculture sector (which is the -la^gest^ sector of the 
economy) has been left for the private sector. 
The proposal of industrialization thus aimed at was based on the following 
interpretation. The heavy and basic industries like iron and steel, heavy 
engineering, heavy electrical plant etc. selected for development in the public 
sector while quick yielding consumer goods industries were left to the private 
sector. The industrial programmes of the Government that emerged after 1955 
were built around the following hypothesis: 
1. Private investment should go basically to consumer goods industry, ably 
supported by the restrictive import policy and utilization of excess 
capacity at home. This ought to result in the increase in the profitability 
of private sector. 
2. Public investment, being autonomous of profits, would go to expand the 
infrastructure. 
The logic of the first hypothesis was that private investment was in the 
nature of 'induced investment' and could be promoted by adopting the policy of 
protection against imported substitutes. The logic of the second hypothesis was 
that investments in low profits yielding and heavy investments requiring 
industries were in the nature of autonomous investments and could, 
accordingly be undertaken only by the state. 
The existence of the public sector in India can be observed during the 
Pre-lndependence days. In the early 1930s, the Indian National Congress at its 
Karachi Session passed a resolution which called for the nationalization of all 
key- industries and ownership of natural resources. The term 'Public Sector' 
was used to refer to the public corporate enterprises owned and run by the 
government. Explicitly the Central Government and the State Governments run 
such enterprises. The enterprises under the Central Government were of the 
following categories: 
1. Those run departmentally, like the railways, post and telegraph. 
2. Those run by autonomous bodies formed under the Indian Companies 
Registration Act. 
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3. Those in which the central government had invested money but did not 
undertake their management. 
At first, the Public Sector emphasized mainly upon greater production 
and proper distribution of wealth. The ground reality is that the public sector in 
India had not been developed for any ideological reasons but its conception 
was a historical necessity. Around the period of Independence, the private 
enterprise had neither the resources nor the will to undertake the industrial 
development on a large scale. Moreover, the country's transport system, 
energy sources and certain other components of the infrastructure were also 
undeveloped. Apart from this, most of the industries were of low return and 
involved a long gestation period. What awfully needed in that perspective was 
an immediate deliverance from the ills caused by the long colonial system of 
rule and not to wait for the private enterprise to take up to difficult assignments 
in due course. Thus, in all the developing countries, public enterprise was 
widely a physical necessity and not a matter of choice. 
To be brief, Indian economy emerging from its colonial past needed a 
'big push', but the conditions prevailing in the country were hardly 
advantageous to the economic development in general and industrialization in 
particular. At this stage an effectual intervention of the state in the economy 
was a vital condition to break the low-level equilibrium trap in which the 
economy was caught during the British period. Although modern industries 
were introduced to India not later than the second half of the 19'*^  century but 
their growth was remarkably slow and undersized up to the very end of the 
colonial period, the level of industry and technology remained low-lying. During 
the 19'^  century, the prominent features of industrial development were 
restrained only to the flourished cotton and jute textiles. The iron and steel 
industry developed after 1900 while the sugar, cement and paper industries 
and a few engineering firms came up in the 1930s. Stepping forward, the Indian 
entrepreneurs took benefit of the limited opportunities for import substitution 
emerged out of the depression-induced weaknesses of relation with the 
metropolitan countries. In tune with the times, the government decided to take 
upon itself the accountability of developing strategic sectors so as to create 
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favorable conditions for the development of private economic activity. It can be 
noticed well that massive investments were made in the state sector during the 
last five decades of the 20'^  century. 
As regards the IPR 1956, its intact focus was upon the area of operation 
of the public sector keeping also in views to regulate the growth of the private 
sector for a shift to a more explicit 'Socialistic Stance'^  to be initiated by the 
government. Actually the concept of a 'Socialistic Society' was the dream of 
the- then Prime Minister Ft. Nehru which reflected in the Second Five-Year 
Plan of the country. 
Moving towards the main concern of this presentation, it would be proper 
to look into the advantageous aspects of the New Industrial Policy of 1991. The 
new policy holds that effective measures must be taken to make these 
enterprises more-growth oriented and technically dynamic. According to the 
New Industrial Policy (NIP), the priority areas for growth of the public enterprise 
in the future were as follows: 
• Essential infrastructure, goods and services, 
• Exploration & exploitation of oil and mineral resources, 
• Technology development and enhancement of manufacturing 
capabilities in the areas which are crucial in the long-term development 
of economy and where the private sector investments are inadequate, 
• Manufacture of products where the strategic considerations are 
predominant, such as defence equipments. 
Such enterprises were to be endowing with a much greater degree of 
management autonomy through the system of Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOD). It's apparent that many key-sectors of the economy are today 
dominated by the matured public enterprises that have fruitfully expanded the 
production, opened up new areas of technology and built up a repertory of 
technical competence in a number of areas. As a result, the country's ranking 
in terms of industrialization with other developing countries has gone much 
higher. India's comparative advantages such as a large pool of well-trained 
work-force, technical skills in manufacturing and chemical industries primarily 
^ Bhagwati, Jagdish & Desai, Padma, India: Planning for Industrialization and Trade Policies Since 1951, 
Oxford University Press, London ; 1970, P. 143. 
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arose from the public sector. It is well-known that Indian economy at present is 
passing through a process of crucial change in which the public sector is 
considered to be an efficient pioneer of economic growth. 
3.3 Growth of the Public Sector during the Five-Year Plans: 
When the economic planning in India was started in 1951, an immediate 
task was to correct the imbalances prevailing as a result of the partition of the 
country. The size of the First Plan was, therefore, not very large and its 
objectives were moderate. But the Second Plan accorded a top priority to the 
programmes of industrialization and the planners which were working in the 
direction of a mixed economy which was soon to be given its concrete shape 
during this plan. Based on Mahalanobis model, the plan set out the task of 
establishing basic and capital goods industries on a large scale so that a strong 
base for industrial development in the future could be laid down. The overall 
objective for the industrial sector during the Third Plan was to prepare the solid 
foundation for the rapid industrialization over the next 15 years. During the 
Fourth Five-Year Plan, India was in grip of inflation and depression. By the end 
of the fourth plan period the public sector would further strengthen the state 
control over the 'commanding heights of the economy with a view to providing 
fairly sound base for future growth. Both in terms of proportionate magnitude of 
investments and the nature thereof the public sector will have a dominant 
position in the industrial field. 
By the time the Seventh Plan was launched the economic scenario got 
itself considerably changed. It was realized at this moment that the public 
sector be eased off some of the pressure what it had shouldered successfully. 
This was the time when there was a world-wide revival of the neo-classical 
economic principles in the public policy. Prior to this, the Sixth Plan was the first 
plan when allocation to the public sector was smaller than the private one. The 
purpose was to prepare the Indian industry to respond effectively to the 
emerging challenges. 
The changes in a number of policies and procedures in 1985-86 
intended at increasing the productivity, reducing the cost and improving the 
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quality. The stress was on opening the domestic market to increase 
competitiveness and strengthen our industry to stand on its own in the face of 
internal competition. The public sector was freed from a number of constraints 
and given an enough scope of autonomy. The technological and managerial 
modernization of industry was pursued as the key-instrument for increasing the 
productivity and promoting almost an open competitiveness in the world. The 
net result of all these changes was that the Indian industry grew fast by an 
impressive average annual growth rate of 8.5 per cent during the seventh five-
year plan. 
However, in a nutshell, investment of the public sector during the 
(I 
planning era suffered a gradual decrease. The data shows that during the First 
and Second Plans, of the total investment, 54 per cent was in the public sector 
and the remaining in the private sector. The share of the public sector rose to 
60 per cent in the Third Plan. The Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Plans envisaged 
respectively 57.6 per cent, 52.9 per cent and 47.8 per cent share of the public 
sector in plan investment. As against this, the actual share of the public sector 
in plan investment was 43.3 per cent, 47.8 per cent and 45.7 per cent 
respectively in these plans. The Eighth Plan envisaged 45.2 per cent of the 
public sector in plan investment whereas its actual share was just 34.3 per cent 
(i.e. one-third) of plan investment. The Ninth Plan expects the share of the 
public sector in total plan investment to decline further to just 33 per cent.^  This 
reflects the increasing importance that is now being accorded to the private 
sector. 
From the ninth five-year plan onwards, pattern of industrial development 
has been changed. It is because of new economic policy introduced in 1991 to 
compete with the world economies. Thus, "the year 1991 was a 'watershed' for 
the Indian economy as the macro-economic stabilization and structural 
adjustment programme initiated in this year constituted a 'fundamental 
departure' from the past in Independent India. This is on account of the 
following reasons: 
^ Government of India, Planning Commission, Ninth Five Year Plan (1997-2002), Delhi, 1999, Vol. I, P.50 
& P.53. 
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• Economic growth combined with the economic efficiency became the 
objective function. 
• There was a conscious decision to substantively reduce the role of the 
state in the process of economic development and rely far more on the 
market. Public investment, seen as a catalyst pre-empts scarce 
resources at the expense of the private investment and leads to 
inefficient resource utilization which constitutes a drain on the 
exchequer. 
• The degree of openness of the economy was increased at a rapid pace. 
The object was not simply to enforce a cost-discipline on the supply side 
through international competition, but also to narrow the difference 
between domestic and world prices. Foreign capital and foreign 
technology were assigned a lead role in the process. Every aspect of 
this quest for integration with the world economy provided a striking 
contrast with the development consensus decades earlier. In sum, India 
moved from a quest for state-led capitalism to a world of market-driven 
capitalism'"*. 
3.4 Need for Public Enterprise in India: 
Public sector has played a very prominent role in the nation's economy. 
Though the sector-wise analysis of the public sector's contribution to the total 
industrial production has shown a mixed trend, the production of crucial items 
has increased significantly. Data shows that production of fuel in 1968-69 was 
22 per cent which increased to 96.96 per cent in 1999-2000, fetching a rise of 
340.72 percentage points. However, in 2001-02 it reduced to 95.69 per cent 
which further declined to 92.20 per cent, showing a decline of 3.65 percentage 
points. 
In case of petroleum sector, the ratio of Public Sector Production (PSP) 
to National Production (NP) has shown unprecedented increase from 49.18 per 
cent in 1968-69 to 219.84 per cent in 1999-2000. However, in 2000-01 the ratio 
declined to 74.36 per cent showing a decline of 66.18 percentage points. In 
" Nayyar, Deepak; Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction of Economics and politics 
in Independent India; Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Dec.5, 1998, P.3127 
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2004-05, the ratio of PSP to NP increased to 76.46 per cent from 74.36 per 
cent in 2000-01. 
The ratio of PSP to NP in the area of basic metal industry declined from 
55.68 per cent in 1968-69 to 30.31 per cent in 2004-05. Analysis reveals that 
the non-ferrous metal shows a growth of 10.82 per cent in 1968-69 to 58.25 per 
cent in 1999-00. In 2004-05, the ratio came down to 30.42 per cent registering 
a decline of 47.78 percentage points. 
The central PSEs generate resources internally for financing their 
expansion and development activities. Apart from generating internal 
resources, these enterprises have also been contributing to the central 
exchequer in terms of investment by an increase up to Rs.4146.69 crore in 
1997-98 and Rs.6216.43 crore in 1999-00. The contribution further increased 
respectively to Rs.7718.69 crore in 2001-02 and to Rs.10390.77 crore in 2003-
04. In the year 2005-06 the amount rose to Rs. 19531.38 crore by registering a 
growth of 371.01 percentage points. Similarly, the participation of the public 
sector in taxes and duties (e.g. excise duty, custom duty, corporate tax, sales 
tax, dividend tax, other duties and taxes) stood at Rs.38445.52 crore In 1997-
98. The amount increased in a successive manner to Rs.50217.40 crore in 
1999-2000, to Rs.55146.84 crore in 2001-02, to Rs.78644.56 crore in 2003-04 
and further to Rs. 105852.92 crore in 2005-06, fetching a growth of 175.33 
percentage points. 
If we look at the growth of employment in the public sector, we find that 
during 1884-85, the public sector employed 21,07 lakh people which increased 
to 22.36 lakh in 1989-90, showing a growth of 6.12 per cent. In 1990-91, the 
number of employees declined to 22.19 lakh with the ensuing decline to 20.62 
lakh in 1994-95 and to 16.49 lakh in 2005-06. This figure shows the downward 
bend of employment in the public sector upto the extent of 21.74 percent from 
the year 1984-85 to 2005-06. 
Some of the main reasons for keeping the basic industries in the Public 
Sector of this country are following: 
1 There was the immediate prerequisite of certain amount of infrastructure 
for the industrialization. Such infrastructure itself required heavy doses 
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of investment. It was feared that the private investment would not be 
helpful owing to long term nature of such projects which entails certain 
amount of uncertainties. 
2 In the beginning, the market forces were not expected to produce a 
acceptable outcome in all spheres of economic activity. Increasing 
returns, positive externalities and indivisibilities fall into this category. It's 
a matter of common understanding that industrialization needs the 
facilities of power, transport and communication networks. The 
establishment of the PSEs in these areas was justified, although 
anticipated commercial returns were taken to be inadequate at the 
outset. 
3 In certain areas, the private sector would never be interested to enter. 
Hence, there was a necessity for these areas, such as Food Corporation 
of India (justified on the grounds of meeting social and equity 
objectives), to be ventured into by the public sector. 
4 In view of social & political requirements, involvement of the public 
sector was further reinforced. It is quite inferable that the public sector 
took over many of the sick industrial units in the private sector in order to 
avoid social tension and protect the cause of employees. 
5 The motivation behind the setup of the PSEs was also to ensure proper 
distribution of resources in different sectors as the needs of the society. 
Actually the private enterprises were to concentrate on profitability 
sectors instead of unprofitable sectors, howsoever treated as necessary. 
Thus, the major objectives of settingup of the public sector 
enterprises would be generally summarized as follows: 
• To build infrastructure for economic development and promote rapid 
economic growth and industrialization of the country. 
• To earn return on investments and thus generate the required resources 
for development. 
• To promote redistribution of income and wealth. 
« To create employment opportunities and promote the balanced regional 
development. 
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• To create a self-reliant economy through the development of social 
industries for the substitution of import by encouraging and promoting 
the exports. 
• To generate investible resources for development by earning suitable 
returns. 
• To save and earn foreign exchange for the economy, and finally 
• To prevent / reduce the aggregation of private economic power. 
3.5 Significance of the PSEs: 
The significance of PSEs mainly depends upon country's existing 
political ideology, social customs, stage of economic development and need of 
the people. In a developing economy, "it calls for an excellent arrangement of 
purposeful planning linking balanced allocation of resources in excess of 
assorted projects considered advantageous during a given period from the 
perspective of set objectives." To attain the objectives of accelerated 
development in the preferred track, effectual involvement of the state in 
industrialization becomes inevitable. In the words of Hanson, "whatever the 
ultimate perspective may be, the country anxious to develop economically has 
no alternative but to use public enterprise on a considerable scale, at the very 
least to 'get things going'."^ 
The function of the PSEs may perhaps vary from country to country 
apparently owing to diversified situations. But the cruel bells of poverty, 
unemployment and inequality emerge to be the most widespread at least 
amongst all the less developed countries (LDCs). The PSEs are, as a result 
considered as catalytic agents for economic development by means of 
industrialization. To break the vicious circle of poverty and reduce 
unemployment and inequality, the progression of industrialization can be 
initiated efficiently by the government evidently because the private sector will 
never come ahead to make investment on infrastructures, which is by asset of 
its aptitude a prerequisite for extension of both the production and consumption 
behavior. Therefore, straight participation of the state becomes predictable In 
^ Hanson, A.H. (1960); Public Enterprises and Economic Development, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London; P. 183. 
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most of the developing economies the PSEs have been acknowledged as 
influential instruments both by economic as well as social considerations. 
3.5.1 Economic and Social Significance: 
The opinions advocated in the case of the economic significance of the 
PSEs are mentioned hereunder: 
First, extension of infrastructure and basic heavy industries is a 
requirement for opening the route of industrialization and it involves massive 
amount of investment and risk with little or no profit, which merely state can 
afford through its PSEs. 
Second, in the preliminary phase of development, India and like wise 
most of the Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) experienced the want of capital 
as a major problem in capital formation. The matter of fact is that the public 
sector reduces the dilemma of capital formation to a considerable degree. It 
helps not only in increasing the savings, but in addition in making the finest 
feasible use of the funds towards maximization of economic growth and the 
promotion of industrialization. 
Third, the scarcity of capital and lack of appropriate technology are the 
two foremost hurdles in the course of industrialization in developing economies 
like ours. The state can look for foreign assistance in the form of long-term 
loans and borrow technical know- how with greater simplicity as compared to 
the private sector. 
Fourth, the developing countries encompass the accountability of 
providing maximum goods for most of the people. The PSEs can be used as a 
much improved instrument for maintaining the equilibrium among the two, 
whereas the private sector possibly will overlook this aspect owing to cost and 
profit considerations. 
Fifth, contrary to the private sector, the public sector being a model 
employer enjoys much improved position to this point as widening the scale of 
creating employment opportunities and additional amenities to its employees 
are concerned. 
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Sixth, merely the PSEs are able to take the risk of entering In new and 
untested areas of activity without bothering much about the gestation period 
and the rate of return on investment. 
Seventh, the PSEs have Ideological and social considerations too. 
Therefore, they can supply maximum goods and services at concessional rates 
as compared to the private sector. 
M.P. Todaro has recommended the following "economic significance of 
the PSUs in a developing economy: 
a) Rapid increase in per capita income, 
b) High level of employment, 
c) Relatively stable prices, 
d) Reduction of poverty and income inequality, 
e) Favorable balance of payments, and 
f) Self-reliant economy."^ 
Such significance of the PSEs may clearly be underlined in Indian 
economy as at earlier stage, per capita income and savings were extremely low 
while non-employment, poverty and disparity of income were rampant. 
The same percept is also applicable to the social rationalization of the 
PSEs which can be observed in the following sphere: 
a) PSEs are not subsequent to maximization of profit by utilization of their 
workforce, which is the most familiar aspect in its equivalent, i.e. private 
sector, 
b) The public sector can better put into effect its task in assessing the rising 
income, wealth disparity and conservation of economic power in some 
hands, 
c) The public sector is supposed to be an model employer as compared to 
the private sector, 
d) The public sector provides public utility services at a nominal profit or at 
times below cost to the priority sector, 
^ Todaro, Michale P. (1991); Economic Development in Tliird World, Fourth Edition, Longman; Pg.562 
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e) The part of profit earned by the public sector is deposited in the 
government exchequer and used for development and public wellbeing 
purposes, and 
f) The state owns a social accountability to afford essential infrastructural 
amenities as education, employment, medical facilities and public utility 
services etc. without any profit consideration. 
3.6 Growth and Performance of the PSEs: 
The public sector has played an incredibly outstanding responsibility in 
economic and industrial development of the country and the PSEs, a foremost 
performer in the whole set up of the public sector, have contributed enormously 
in shaping the Indian economy through the massive investment and vast area 
of operation extending to all the States and Union Territories. Therefore, the 
PSEs in general, should be managed on sound marketable lines and must 
produce satisfactory surpluses and make contributions proportionate with the 
quantum of public resources invested in them. Explicitly in the strategic sector, 
the public sector is likely to have a strong existence. PSEs will be called upon 
to play an essential role in certain core sectors of the economy. Conversely this 
ought to be achieved with minimum reliance on budgetary resources while 
government policies must provide a level playing field for the PSEs to compete 
with the private sector. 
As on 31 March 2006, there were 237 Central PSEs (excluding six 
insurance companies and two financial institutions). Out of these, 144 
enterprises were in manufacturing, 83 in services and 10 under construction. 
The cognate groups under which these enterprises have been classified are 
being given in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 
Cognate Group-Wise Classification of Enterprises 
(As on 31 March, 2006) 
Cognate Group 
1. Enterprises under Construction 
II. Enterprises Manufacturing/Producing 
Goods 
Steel 
Minerals and metals 
Coal and lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Fertilizers 
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 
Heavy Engineering 
Medium Engineering 
Transportation Equipment 
Consumer Goods 
Agro-based Industries 
Textiles 
Sub Total II 
III. Enterprises Rendering Services 
Trading and Marketing Services 
Transportation Services 
Contract and Construction Services 
Industrial Development & Technical 
Consultancy Services 
Tourist Services 
Financial Services 
Telecommunication Services 
Sector 25 Companies 
Sub Total III 
Grand Total (l+ll+lll) 
No. of Enterprises 
10 
7 
10 
9 
7 
14 
8 
14 
10 
25 
10 
11 
4 
15 
144 
14 
11 
10 
15 
9 
9 
4 
11 
83 
237 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2005-06. 
3.6.1 Growth of Investment: 
There has been an incredible increase in the magnitude of investment in 
the form of equity capital and long-term loans in Central Public Sector 
Undertakings (CPSUs) of India during the period of Five-Year Plans. Table 3.2 
shows that the number of enterprises in the post-reform period has declined 
from 246 at the beginning of the Eighth Five-Year Plan to 239 as on 31.3.2006. 
However, the investment in public sector enterprises has grown-up from Rs.29 
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Crore (290 million) as on 1 April 1951 to Rs.6237 crore in l " April 1974 to Rs.3, 
24,614 crore in 31.3.2002 to Rs.3, 93,057 crore (3930.6 billion) as on 31 March 
2006 (registering a growth of 21.08 percent from 31.3.2002 to 31.3.2006. 
Table 3.2 
Growth of Investment In Central Public Sector Enterprises 
Particulars 
At the commencement of 
the 1 '^ Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1951) 
At the commencement of 
the 2"*^  Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1956) 
At the commencement of 
the 3rd Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1961) 
At the commencement of 
the 4'^  Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1969) 
At the commencement of 
the 5*^  Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1974) 
At the commencement of 
the 6'^  Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1980) 
At the commencement of 
the 7"^  Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1985) 
At the commencement of 
the 8"" Five-Year plan 
(1.4.1992) 
At the end ofthe 9^'Five-
Year plan (31.3.2002) 
As on 31.3.2003 
As on 31.3.2004 
As on 31.3.2005 
As en 31,3.2006 
Total 
Investment 
(Rs. in Crore) 
29 
81 
948 
3897 
6237 
18150 
42673 
135445 
324614 
335647 
349994 
357939 
393057 
Enterprises 
(Numbers) 
5 
21 
47 
84 
122 
179 
215 
246 
240 
240 
242 
237 
239 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Investment with 
Shifting Base of 
Commencement 
Year 
179.3 
1070.37 
311.08 
60.05 
191.01 
135.11 
217.40 
139.66 
3.39 
4.27 
2.27 
9.81 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey 2005-06 
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While a major share in investment of CPSEs is contributed by the 
Central Government, some State Governments, holding companies which are 
themselves CPSEs, financial institution, banks and private parties (both Indian 
and foreign) also contribute to the investment of these enterprises. The details 
of investment made by different parties ' are given in Table 
3.3. 
Table 3.3 
Sources of Investment 
Items 
(1) 
Equity 
Loan 
Total 
Central 
Govt. 
(2) 
101025 
40036 
141061 
State 
Govt. 
(3) 
3353 
287 
3640 
Holding 
Company 
(4) 
11122 
32036 
43158 
Foreign 
Parties 
(5) 
1514 
27640 
29154 
Fl/Banks 
& 
Others 
(6) 
3475 
166365 
169840 
Total 
(2 to 6) 
(7) 
(2 to 6) 
120489 
266364 
386853 
(As on 31.3.2006) 
Share 
Application 
Money 
Pending 
(8) 
6204 
Total 
In vest-
mint 
(7+8) 
(9) 
(7+8) 
393057 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey 2005-06 
3.6.2 Contribution to the Industrial Production: 
Public sector occupies a key-position in the nation's economy in several 
sectors, especially in the production of fuel, basic metal, non-ferrous metal and 
fertilizers as can be seen under Table 3.4. This shows that over a period of 
time, public sector enterprises have increased their contribution in some 
sectors (coal, petroleum and aluminium), while in others (steel and fertilizers) 
the private sector has an increased capacity. 
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Table 3.4 
Public Sector's Contribution to the total Industrial Production 
Items National Production (NP) 
1968-
69 
1999-
00 
2001-
02 
2004-
05 
Fuel (Million Tonnes): 
Coal 
Lignite 
Petroleum 
Crude Oil 
Natural 
Gas 
Refinery 
Crude 
71.40 
3.98 
300.05 
22.12 
327.64 
23.50 
382.62 
30.34 
Million Tonnes): 
6.06 
NA 
16.55 
31.95 
28.45 
85.96 
32.03 
29.71 
107.27 
33.98 
31.76 
127.12 
Basic Metal Industries (Million Tonnes): 
Finish-ed 
Steel 
4.58 26.71 107.27 40.64 
Non-Ferrous Metals (Thousand Tonnes): 
Alumina-
um 
Primary 
Lead 
Zinc 
125.3 
1.9 
17.0 
617.99 
44.4 
175.0 
638.32 
38.2 
205.2 
886.26 
15.89 
212.28 
Fertilizers (Thousand Tonnes): 
Nitrogen-
oust 
Phosphate 
563 
213 
10890 
3399 
10768 
3860 
11339 
4067 
Public Sector's Production 
(PSP) 
1968-
69 
12.61 
3.98 
3.08 
NA 
8.09 
2.55 
Nil 
1.9 
13.7 
401 
53 
1999-
00 
2001-
02 
290.25 
22.12 
312.53 
23.50 
27.93 
24.98 
68.85 
27.89 
25.66 
72.13 
8.52 9.95 
307.01 
35.1 
145.7 
231.67 
37.8 
176.31 
3431 
777 
2880 
479 
2004-
05 
358.88 
21.57 
29.68 
24.98 
92.81 
12.32 
338.48 
Nil 
Nil 
3054 
266 
Public Sector's Contribution to 
National Production, PSP to NP 
(%) 
1968-
69 
1999-
00 
17.66 
100.00 
96.73 
100.00 
50.83 
NA 
48.88 
87.42 
87.80 
80.10 
55.68 31.90 
Nil 
100.00 
80.60 
49.67 
79.05 
83.25 
71.23 
24.86 
31.51 
22.86 
2001-
02 
95.39 
100.00 
87.07 
86.36 
67.24 
32.51 
36.29 
98.95 
85.91 
26.75 
12.41 
2004-
05 
93.80 
71.09 
87.34 
78.65 
73.01 
30.31 
38.19 
Nil 
Nil 
26.93 
6.54 
Note: NA -> Not Available 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
Besides, fuel and petroleum sector's contribution to national production 
over the years increased. Basic metal industries, non-ferrous metals 
(aluminium & primary lead) and Fertilizer industry have registered decline in 
their contribution to national production. Among them lignite, crude oil, natural 
gas, refinery crude, primary lead and zinc are the chief contributors in the 
country's national production. 
3.6.3 Contribution to Central Exchequer and Internal Resources: 
(a) Central Exchequer: Apart from generating resources, these enterprises 
have also been making contribution to the resources of the central government 
through payment of dividends, taxes and duties, interests, and thereby helping 
in mobilization of funds for financing the needs for planned development of the 
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country. During 2005-06, such contribution amounted to Rs.1, 25,384.32 crores 
as against Rs.1, 10,603.67 crores during 2004-05. The details are given in the 
Table 3.5 
Table 3.5 
Contribution to the Central Exchequer on Actual Basis 
Rs. in Crore) 
Particular 
s 
1. On Invest 
Dividend 
Interest 
Total (1) 
II. Taxes an( 
Excise 
Duty 
Custom 
Duty 
Corporate 
Tax 
Dividend 
Tax 
Sales Tax 
Other 
Duties & 
Taxes 
Total (II) 
Grand 
Total (l+ll) 
ource: Pu 
1997-
98 
nent by CP 
1832.60 
2314.0E 
4146.6! 
i Duties: 
16693.04 
10969.91 
7026.43 
256.90 
2421.31 
777.93 
38445.52 
42292.21 
blic Ent 
1998-
99 
SEs: 
2486.67 
2547.91 
5034.58 
18770.71 
9352.09 
8479.41 
449.59 
2350.41 
2487.78 
41889.99 
46924.57 
erprises 
1999-
00 
3765.75 
2450.66 
6216.43 
26554.13 
10683.14 
7978.30 
1634.59 
2658.86 
50217.4C 
50217.40 
56433.83 
5 Surve' 
2000-
01 
3492.38 
1985.31 
5477.69 
31411.04 
8645.88 
10894.71 
670.81 
3072.44 
864.91 
55559.79 
61037.48 
/, Various 
2001-
02 
5768.68 
1950.01 
7718.69 
30656.07 
8049.98 
11620.89 
352.71 
3410.43 
1056.73 
55146.84 
62865.53 
> Issues. 
2002-
03 
9496.12 
13676.92 
10864.04 
40000.32 
7344.81 
17976.56 
320.15 
4164.07 
1197.12 
71003.03 
81867.07 
2003-
04 
9596.45 
794.32 
10390.77 
43963.75 
8408.67 
17936.29 
1613.00 
3821.62 
3901.23 
78644.56 
89035.33 
2004-
05 
15200.85 
731.67 
15932.52 
44262.34 
10431.95 
23613.61 
2742.48 
4487.8G 
9132.97 
94671.15 
110603.67 
2005-
06 
19393.16 
138.22 
19531.38 
53203.31 
8601.06 
26044.61 
3242.94 
5026.15 
9734.07 
105852.9 
4 
125384.3 
2 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CENTRAL EXCHEQUER ON ACTUAL BASIS 
(RS. IN CRORE) (Fig. 3.1) 
/ 
/ 
/ 
B I II 
1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2 0 0 1 - 0 2 2 0 0 2 - 0 3 2 0 0 3 - 0 4 2 0 0 4 - 0 5 2 0 0 5 - 0 6 
Year 
• Dividend 
• Corporate Tax 
Q Interest 
• 131 vide nd Tax 
a Excise Duty 
• Sales Tax 
a Custom Duty 
o Oti ier Duties & Taxes 
(b) Internal Resources: The Central PSEs generate resources internally 
for financing their expansions and development activities. Internal resources 
consist of depreciation and retained profits. Moreover, a part of gross internal 
resources is utilized for repayment of loans, additional working capital 
requirements, meeting non-plan capital requirements etc. In the wake of this 
objective, efforts have been made to reveal the growth of the ratio between 
internal resources generated and the capital employed by PSEs. Table 3.6 
indicates that the ratio of total internal resources generated to capital employed 
has reduced from 11.80 per cent in 1985-86 to 11.07 per cent in 1990.91, 
besides showing a fluctuating trend over the period. 
Table 3.6 
Generation of Internal Resources by PSEs 
Year 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
No. of 
CPSEs 
Generating 
Gross 
Internal 
Resources 
126 
145 
140 
135 
134 
130 
129 
151 
149 
160 
Capital 
Employed 
42965 
102084 
162451 
302947 
331372 
389934 
417160 
452336 
504407 
581250 
Depreciation 
2264 
5420 
9718 
17521 
19364 
24361 
26477 
30527 
32477 
34244 
Deferred 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
(ORE) 
Written Off 
223 
1205 
449 
247 
344 
255 
619 
769 
538 
670 
Retained 
Profits 
2580 
4672 
9826 
18165 
18103 
27928 
27177 
44117 
50848 
50107 
(Rs in Crore) 
Total 
Internal 
Resources 
5067 
11297 
19993 
35933 
37811 
52544 
54273 
75413 
83863 
85021 
Internal 
Resources 
to Capital 
Employed 
(%) 
11.80 
11.07 
12.31 
11.86 
11.41 
13.48 
13.01 
16.67 
16.63 
14.63 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
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GENERATION OF INTERNAL RESOURCES BY PSES 
(RS. IN CRORES) (Fig. 3.2) 
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§ 30000 
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20000 
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Year / No. of enterprises generating internal resources 
a Depreciation • Deferred Revenue BcpendKure (DR^ Written Off a Retained Profits 
However, as against 11.07 per cent in 1990-91, it has increased to 14.63 
per cent in 2005-06, fetching a rise of 32.16 percentage points during the post-
reform period, which evidently demonstrates the favorable impact of economic 
reforms on the financial performance of CPSEs. 
3.6.4 Capital Productivity: 
As deciphered from Table 3.7, there had been steadily descending 
tendency in the ratio of value of output to capital employed during the pre-
reform period. It reduced from 1.44 in 1984-85 to 1.09 in 1990-91 and has also 
shown a continuous decrease up to 1993-94. But due to execution of economic 
reforms, there has been a sudden change in the situation with an increase from 
1.09 in 1990-91 to 1.20 in 1995-96, but again it fall to 1.03 in 1997-98. In 
addition, Table 3.7 also reveals that the ratio of value added to capital 
employed has reduced from 0.34 in 1984-85 to 0.31 in 1990-91, showing a 
fluctuating trend in the pre-reform period and the early nineties has 
experienced a worsening position. Though with the implementation of the new 
economic reforms, it has gone up gradually from 0.31 in 1990-91 to 0.33 in 
1995-96 and again it slashed to 0.29 in 1997-98 during the post-reform period, 
brightening the scope of greater profitability in Central PSEs. 
Table 3.7 
Ratios of Value of Output and Value Added to Capital Employed 
(Rs. in Crores) 
Year 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
Value 
Output 
52314 
58820 
65030 
73792 
86850 
99490 
111453 
124200 
138525 
149029 
171867 
208703 
233216 
257721 
Capital 
Employed 
36382 
42965 
51835 
55617 
67629 
84760 
102084 
117991 
140110 
159836 
162451 
173948 
231178 
249855 
Value of 
Output to 
Capital 
Employed 
1.44 
1.37 
1.25 
1.33 
1.28 
1.17 
1.09 
1.05 
0.99 
0.93 
1.06 
1.20 
1.01 
1.03 
Value Added 
12505 
13117 
15979 
19889 
24945 
28208 
31922 
35312 
38509 
41466 
47986 
57774 
57176 
72691 
Value Added 
to Capital 
Employed 
0.34 
0.31 
0.31 
0.36 
0.37 
0.33 
0.31 
0.30 
0.27 
0.26 
0.30 
0.33 
0.25 
0.29 
Source: Data compiled from Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
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3.6.5 Employment: 
The employment strategy of a country must be aware of the current 
globalization process and the country's economic reform program. 
India's reform program appears to rest mainly on the two sets of 
neoclassical conditions: (a) perfect mobility of labor, capital and technology with 
infinite substitution between factors of production, and (b) early uninterrupted 
information flow within and across the country boundaries. Both of these are an 
element of the inclusive features of globalization. 
When these two guiding sets of conditions under India's economic 
reform fulfilled, the neoclassical model suggests that the other major social 
benefits of higher growth will percolate on their own. These incorporate 
improved equity, more employment, and better balance of regional 
development and removal of poverty. In these circumstances the generation of 
employment becomes an expected outcome of a production structure selected 
on the basis of global competition. In a world with 'neoclassical labor markets', 
the demand and supply of labor are coordinated by competitive market 
valuation of labor. Therefore, the problem of unemployment does not arise. But 
in actuality many of these conditions are missing within and between the 
regions and groups. This is evidenced by increasing unemployment in different 
regions and sectors as the demand-supply gap in labor markets is prevalent 
Thus, one of the key-challenges as facing the policymakers is how to plan 
appropriate policies to eradicate the restraining barriers and revitalize the 
neoclassical conditions. Nevertheless this is not an effortless challenge, since 
the policies must take into account the national and global conditions. Sooner 
and more comprehensive economic liberalization can explain a part of the 
problem, but many non-economic policy decisions could stand in the way. The 
government initiated a voluntary retirement scheme in the public sector 
enterprises during 1988 to help them shed excess manpower and to improve 
the age-mix and the skill-mix. Concurrently their training and re-training 
programs are also being given considerable boost to bring about overall 
enhancement in per-capita productivity. 
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As on 31.3.2006, the 237 PSEs employed over 16.49 lakh people (Table 
3.8) excluding casual workers in comparison with 2004-05, when 242 PSEs 
employed over 17 lakh people. Table 3.8 shows that there had been a 
continuous increase in the additional number of persons employed in the pre-
reform period, as witnessed by an increase in its number from 21.07 lakh in 
1984-85 to 22.36 lakh in 1989-90, registering a growth of 1.22 percent during 
the period with shifting base. However, contrary to this, during the post-reform 
period, the employment in PSEs reduced from 22.19 lakh in 1990-91 to 18.06 
lakh in 1999-2000 to16.49 lakh in 2005-06, showing a negative growth of 3.0 
per cent over the period. On the other hand, 22.19 lakh people earned average 
annual per capita emoluments of Rs.49179 in 1990-91 to Rs. 168339 (earned 
by 17.40 lakh employee) in 1999-00 and further to Rs.276683 (by 16.49 lakh 
people) in 2005-06, showing decline in the growth from 12.63 per cent in 1990-
91 to (-) 3.25 per cent in the year 2005-06. 
Table 3.8 
Employment and Average Annual Emoluments in Public Enterprises 
Year 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
No. of Employees 
(in lakh) 
21.07 
21.54 
22.11 
22.14 
22.09 
22.36 
22.19 
21.79 
21.52 
20.70 
20.62 
20.52 
20.08 
19.59 
19.00 
18.06 
17.40 
19.92* 
18.66 
17.62 
17.00 
16.49 
Average Annual Per 
Capita Emoluments 
(Rs.) 
24328 
25887 
28820 
32537 
39415 
43665 
49179 
56508 
64983 
72043 
82517 
106876 
110662 
129582 
138179 
168339 
219672 
193554 
225986 
248481 
286053 
276683 
Percentage increase from previous year 
Employment 
— 
2.23 
2.65 
0.14 
-0.23 
1.22 
-0.76 
-1.80 
-1.24 
-3.96 
-0.39 
-0.48 
-2.1 
-2.4 
-3.01 
-4.95 
-3.65 
14.48 
-6.33 
-5.57 
-3.52 
-3.00 
Average Annual 
Emoluments 
— 
6.41 
11.33 
12.89 
21.13 
10.78 
12.63 
14,90 
15.00 
10.86 
14.54 
29.52 
3.54 
17.10 
6.63 
21.83 
30,49 
-11.89 
16.76 
- 9.95 
15.12 
-3.25 
* During the year 2001-02, BSNL has 
Source: Economic Survey and Public 
been included in the survey. 
Enterprises Survey, Various Issues, 
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3.6.5.1 Growth of Employment in the OrgaiUzed Ryblic S3i3j(Qr,^^6 
Private Sector: 
The presented data relating to growth or empioymeni m ine organizea 
public and private sectors dunng a penod of fifteen years i e from 1991 to 2005 
indicate fall in growth by (-) 1 04 per cent in total employment (10 09 per cent in 
the private sector and -5 52 per cent in the public sector) The public sector has 
recorded high negative growth rates over these fifteen years respectively in 
agriculture and hunting etc (-10 79), manufacturing (-38 98), electricity, gas 
and water (-4 97), construction (-20 71), and similarly in transport, storage and 
communications (-9.09) The pnvate sector too recorded high negative growth 
in mining and quarrying (-21 00), as well as in construction (-32 88) 
Table 3.9 
Growth of Employment in the Organized Public and Private Sectors 
through the Industries 
Industry 
1 
1 Agriculture 
hunting etc 
2 Mining and 
quarrying 
3 
Manufacturing 
4 Electncity.Gas 
and Water 
5 Construction 
6 Wholesale 
and Retail 
Trade 
7 Transport, 
storage and 
communications 
8 Finance 
Insurance, 
Real Estate 
etc 
9 Community, 
Social & 
Personal 
services 
Total 
Source 
Public Sector 
1991 
2 
5 56 
9 99 
18 52 
9 05 
11 49 
1 50 
30 26 
11 94 
92 27 
190.58 
Economic 
2005 
3 
4 96 
10 14 
11 3 
86 
911 
1 84 
27 51 
14 08 
92 52 
180.06 
Survey, 2 
%age 
growth 
4 
-10 79 
150 
-38 98 
-4 97 
-20 71 
22 67 
-9 09 
17 92 
0 27 
-5.52 
D07-08 
(No of persons in Lakh 
Private Sector 
1991 
5 
8 91 
100 
44 81 
0 40 
0 73 
3 00 
0 53 
2 54 
14 85 
76.77 
2005 
6 
9 83 
0 79 
44 89 
0 49 
0 49 
3 75 
0 85 
5 23 
182 
84.52 
%age 
growth 
7 
10 33 
-2100 
018 
22 5 
-32 88 
25 00 
60 38 
105 91 
22 56 
10.09 
as on 31 
Total of Public and 
Private Sector 
1991 
(2+5) 
8 
14 47 
10 99 
63 33 
9 45 
12 22 
4 50 
30 79 
14 48 
107 12 
267.35 
2005 
(3+6) 
9 
14 79 
10 93 
5619 
9 09 
96 
5 59 
28 36 
19 31 
110 72 
264.58 
%age 
growth 
10 
2 21 
-0 55 
-11 27 
-3 81 
-2144 
24 22 
-7 89 
33 36 
3 36 
-1.04 
March) 
Public Sector 
as % of Total 
1991 (2 
as % of 
8) 
11 
38 42 
90 90 
29 24 
95 77 
94 03 
33 33 
98 28 
82 46 
86 14 
71.28 
2005 
(3 as 
%of 
9) 
12 
33 54 
92 77 
20 11 
94 61 
94 89 
32 92 
97 00 
72 92 
86 37 
68.06 
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Public Sector's share in the total organized sector employment declined 
a little from 71.28 per cent in 1991 to 68.06 per cent in 2005 (Table 3.9). 
3.6.6 Efficiency Use of Investment (Ratio of Sales to Capital 
Employed): 
The efficiency use of invested funds in any enterprise can be worked out 
with the help of the ratio of sales to capital employed. It is derived from Table 
3.10 that despite constant improvement in the absolute figure of sales of 
PSEs, the efficiency use of funds has steadily revealed a descending trend as 
the ratio of sales to capital employed has remarkably come down from 150.58 
in 1984-85 to 115.94 in 1990-91, fetching the negative growth of 23 
percentage points. However, it is useful to record that accomplishment of the 
new reform measure of 1991 has helped a lot in improving the ratio, which 
has gone up from 115.94 in 1990-91 to 143.24 in 2005-06, yielding the growth 
rate of 23.55 percentage points. 
Table 3.10 
Ratio of Sales to Capital Employed 
Year 
1984-85 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Sales 
(Rs. in Crores) 
54784 
106070 
118355 
187126 
389196 
458221 
498219 
572844 
630692 
744302 
832583 
Capital 
Employed (CE) 
36382 
84760 
102084 
162451 
302947 
331372 
389934 
417160 
452336 
504407 
581250 
Ratio of Sales 
to CE % 
150.58 
125.14 
115.94 
115.19 
128.47 
138.28 
122.77 
137.32 
139.43 
147.56 
143.24 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
3.6.7 Ratio to Capital Employed of Gross Margin/Gross Profit/Net Profit: 
Looking in to the financial performance of the CPSEs, it would be 
obvious from the Table 3.11 that there has been a declining trend of rate of 
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return on capital employed in CPSEs during the pre-reform period. The table 
shows that the gross margin to capital employed has reduced from 20.30 per 
cent in 1984-85 to 17.94 per cent in 1990-91, pointing out to a loss of 11.63 
percentage points. Contrary to this, yet efficiency of CPSEs has shown a 
noticeable enhancement during the post-reform period as witnessed by an 
increase in the gross margin to capital employed from 17.94 per cent in 1990-
91 to 24.42 per cent in 2005-06, fetching the growth of 36.12 percentage 
points. A similar trend of the rate of return is also perceived in respect of gross 
profit and net profit to the capital employed. Besides, the ratio of net profit to 
capital employed has increased from 2.23 per cent in 1990-91 to 12.09 per cent 
in 2005-06, fetching an increase of 442.15 percentage points. Thus, the outline 
of financial performance, as discussed above, evidently demonstrates that 
efficiency use of capital employed in CPSEs has been awfully low in the pre-
reform period, which is, however, improved noticeably during the post-reform 
period, validating the premise that economic reforms are likely to enhance the 
rate of return on capital employed. 
Table 3.11 
Ratios to Capital Employed of Gross Margin/Gross Profit/Net Profit 
Year 
1984-85 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Ratios to Capital Employed of 
Gross Margin {%) 
20.30 
19.36 
17.94 
20.55 
20.54 
20.91 
22.96 
24.37 
28.15 
28.26 
24.42 
Gross Profit (%) 
12.72 
12.53 
10.88 
13.93 
13.95 
14.72 
16.21 
17.39 
21.01 
21.49 
18.33 
Net Profit (%) 
2.50 
4.47 
2.23 
4.42 
4,73 
4.72 
6.66 
7.74 
11.72 
12.88 
12.09 
Source: Data compiled from Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
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RATIOS TO CAPITAL EMPLOYED OF GROSS MARGIN/GROSS 
PROFIT/NET PROFIT (%AGE) (Fig. 3.4) 
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3 . 7 P R O B L E M S F A C E D B Y T H E P U B L I C S E C T O R I N I N D I A : 
With the aim of attaining the objectives of the strategy for the industrial 
sector for the 1990s and aftenwards, it is essential to formulate a number of 
changes in the system of the industrial approvals. Major policy initiatives and 
procedural reforms are called for in order to vigorously support and assist the 
Indian entrepreneurs to exploit and meet the emerging domestic and global 
opportunities and challenges. The base of any such package of measures must 
be to let the entrepreneurs make investment decisions on the basis of their own 
commercial judgment. The accomplishment of technological dynamism and 
international competitiveness requires the well-enabled enterprises to respond 
rapidly to the fast-changing external conditions that have become the prime 
characteristic of today's industrial world. Government policy and procedures 
characteristic of today's industrial world. Government policy and procedures 
nnust be geared to assisting the entrepreneurs in their efforts. This can be done 
only if the act of exercising control over them as played by the government is 
diverted to providing help and guidance by making essential procedures fully 
transparent and by eliminating delays. By this time, a number of problems have 
begun to manifest themselves in many of the public enterprises after the initial 
enthusiasm of the public sector entering the new areas of industrial and 
technical competence. The problems that are taken to be serious are observed 
as follows: 
• Unsatisfactory growth in productivity, 
• Poor project management, 
• Over-manning, 
• Lack of continuous technological upgradation, 
• Inadequate attention to R & D and Human Resource development, 
• Large number of chronically sick public enterprises incurring heavy 
losses, 
• A number of public enterprises are operating in a competitive market 
and serving a little or no public purpose, 
• The public enterprises have shown a very low rate of return on the 
capital investment. 
The study presents to view that the secondary sector (which mainly 
comprises mining and manufacturing) grew by just 6.3 per cent a year between 
1991-92 and 1995-96 as compared to the 7.4 per cent growth it registered 
annually between 1985-86 and 1990-91. So to say, the primary sector 
(comprising agriculture, forestry and fishing) grew by 2.5 per cent a year within 
the five years after the reforms began, as compared to the annual 3.7 per cent 
growth in the pre-reform period. It has also been found that the share of 
infrastructure in gross investment fell sharply from 37 per cent in 1986-87 to 26 
per cent a decade later. Side by side, gross public sector investment declined 
from around 12 per cent in the late eighties to 9.5 per cent in1994-95. 
The decline in the public sector investment has been accompanied by a 
rise in corporate sector investment The result is that many of the public 
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enterprises have become a burdensome rather than being an asset to the 
government. The original concept of the public sector has also undergone 
considerable dilution. The most striking example is the take over of sick units 
from the private sector. This category of public sector units accounts for almost 
one-third of the total losses of central public enterprises. 
It is time, therefore that the government should adopt a new approach to 
the public enterprises. There must be a greater commitment to the support of 
public enterprises which are essential for the operation of the industrial 
economy. Units which may be faltering at present but are potentially viable 
must be restructured and given a new lease of life. At the same time, the public 
sector should not be barred from entering the areas not specifically reserved for 
it. 
In view of these considerations, government would review the existing 
portfolio of public Investments with greater realism in respect of industries 
based on low technology, small scale and non-strategic areas, inefficient and 
unproductive areas, areas with low or nil social considerations or public 
purpose and areas where the private sector has developed sufficient expertise 
and resources. 
3.8 Government's Efforts to Reform Since 1991: 
The decade of nineties has witnessed significant changes in the 
country's development strategy and policies. Ever since Independence these 
have been premised on the belief that comprehensive planning combined with 
direct participation and control of economic activity by the state are necessary 
and desirable to achieve rapid economic growth, poverty eradication and a just 
and equitable society. Economic reforms taken place profoundly in India, as 
mentioned below: 
- State monopoly of heavy industries has been abolished in almost all 
sectors which have been opened to the private sector. The truth in 
practice is that "the 1956 resolution had reserved 17 industries for the 
public sector. The 1991 industrial policy reduced this number to 8. Later, 
on May 9, 2001, the government opened up arms and ammunition 
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sector also to the private sector. Now, only 3 industries are exclusively 
reserved for the public sector. These are atomic energy, minerals 
specified in the schedule to the atomic energy and rail transport"^. 
• Government is to provide enhanced support to the small-scale sector so 
that it may flourish in an environment of economic efficiency and 
continuous technology upgradation. 
• License system is a thing of the past. 
• Import licensing has been completely abolished. 
• Government will carry on following the policy of self-reliance in which 
greater emphasis would be placed on building up of our ability to pay for 
imports through our own foreign exchange earnings. In short, it can be 
ascertained the rate of inflation has become low and foreign exchange 
reserves are sufficient to finance imports. Government is also committed 
to development and utilization of indigenous capabilities in technology 
and manufacturing as well as its upgradation to world standards. 
• Highest tariff rate has come down to 45 per cent with the average tariff 
rate declining to less than 25 per cent. 
• Foreign investment regime is as liberal as in other developing Asian 
countries. 
• Insurance has been opened to private investors. 
• The Value Added Tax (VAT) has undergone substantial rationalization. 
• The economy, coupled with full macroeconomic stability, has grown up 
at about 6 per cent comparable with a growth rate of 3.5 per cent during 
1950-80. 
• Government has established a Public Sector Industrial Board (PSIB) to 
take care of the working of all manufacturing units in the public sector. It 
should be the role of this board to set the norm of 
a) Profitability, 
b) Utilization of capacities, 
c) Pricing policy, and 
d) Export performance. 
' Mishra and Puri, Indian Economy, Himalaya Publishing House, Mumbai, 2005 P.486. 
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It will be the main responsibility of each public sector Units' 
management to implement these norms. 
• Beside these, public enterprises which were chronically sick and which 
are unlikely to be turned around will, for the formulation of revival/ 
rehabilitation schemes, be referred to the Board for Industrial and 
Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), or other similar high level institution 
created for the purpose. A social security mechanism will be formed to 
protect the interest of workers likely to be affected by such rehabilitation 
packages. 
• One of the most significant measures would be redefining the role of 
government and down-sizing its hold while improving the quality of 
governance. The down-sizing of the hold of government will also contain 
the privatization of non-strategic PSEs (Public Sector Enterprises) 
including banking sector. 
Thus, Government continued to envisage new prospect. The foremost 
objectives of new industrial policy packages, built on the gains already made, 
were to correct the distortions or weaknesses that might have crept in, to 
maintain a sustained growth in productivity and employment and attain 
international competitiveness. The quest of these objectives will be tempered 
by the need to protect the environment and ensure the efficient use of available 
resources. All sectors of industry whether small, medium or large, belonging to 
the public, private or co-operative sector will be encouraged to grow and 
improve with regard to their past performance. As contemplation, the policy 
initiative in the 1990s was based on substantial support from the mainstream 
economies. As T.N. Srinivasan argued, "they (the reforms) were solidly based 
on an understanding of what went wrong with the Indian development strategy 
since 1950 that delivered neither rapid growth nor appreciably greater equity"^ 
In Jagdish Bhagwati's view, the three main elements of India's policy 
framework that stifled growth and efficiency were: "extensive bureaucratic 
controls over production, investment and trade, inward looking trade and 
Srinivasan, T.N.; 'Demand Deficiency and Industrial Development' Qt. by Nagraj, R., Aspects of India's 
Economic Growth and Reforms, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2006, P.207 
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foreign investment policies and a substantial public sector, going well beyond 
the conventional confines of public utilities and infrastructure"^. 
The Indian experience has been that our policies produced an annual 
growth rate of nearly 3.5 per cent for almost a quarter of century up to the early 
1980s. The economist Raj Krishna described this as "the Hindu growth rate"''°, 
implying perhaps that deep cultural factors destined us to such an unfortunate 
outcome whereas the star performers in the Far-East had delivered growth 
rates at almost double digit levels over the same period, transforming in 
astonishing ways their economies and their standard of living. 
There is almost harmony especially among those, who were not 
committed to ideology, that awfully low growth rates were an outcome of four 
set of policies: 
• Anti-globalization policies on account of which India failed to take 
advantage of the opportunities provided by the growing world economy 
regarding trade and inward flows of direct foreign investment, 
• Off-the-charts confidence on PSEs which, badly affected by foreseeable 
overstaffing and lack of incentives, gradually led to losses that meant 
serious inefficiencies and also a serious strain on our revenues. 
• Defence of capital-intensive choice of techniques that led to a 
moderation of the unproductive units in the public sector that 
exaggerated the remorseful performance of these enterprises, and 
• A remarkable extension of direct controls to an idealistic level that also 
made India a template, a model, of what not to do so as to grow the way 
to sustained development. 
As a device, the Government of India introduced a number of measures, 
spread over a number of years, had two broad objectives: "one was the 
reorientation of the economy from a static, centrally directed and a highly 
controlled economy to what is referred to in the current jargon as a 'market-
friendly economy'. A reduction in direct controls and physical planning was 
expected to improve the efficiency of the economy. It was to be made more 
10 
Bhagwati Jagdish; India's Economy; The Shackled Giant; Qt. by Nagrj. R., Ibid, PP.207-208 
(Ed.) Kapila. Raj and Uma, A Decade of Economic Reforms in India, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 
2002, Ch.7, 'An article entitled 'Growth, Poverty and Reforms' by Jagdish Bhagwati, P. 117. 
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open to external trade and external flows through a reduction in trade barriers 
and liberalization of foreign investment policies. The second objective of the 
reform measures was macro-economic stabilization. This was to be achieved 
by substantially reducing fiscal deficits and the Government's drift on society's 
savings"''\ 
Conclusively, like many other developing countries, India has evolved 
from pre-capitalist form into a mixed economy. The program of large scale 
industrialization adopted by the government ever since the beginning of second 
five-year plan helped the economy getting out of low-level equilibrium trap. But 
the momentum could not be sustained which necessitated some structural 
changes in India's industrial sector. Thus restructuring/reforming PSUs 
inevitably came to occupy significant space in the reform agenda concerning 
industrial sector. 
Since such developments were taking place at a time when the global 
economy (including the institutions) was swept by the wave of neo-classical 
approach to the economic management, the reform process in India has to be 
evaluated in the context of the global economic reality as well as India's socio 
economic compulsions. 
" (Ed ) Kapila Raj and Uma, A Decade of Economic Reforms in India, Academic Foundation New Delhi, 
2002, Ch. 4, An article entitled 'Before and After Ten Years of Economic Refomis' by Bimal Jalan, P. 
55- 56. 
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CHAPTER-4 
ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Economic transformation occurred after its transition to the independent 
India from its colonial past no doubt spectacular. This could be possible 
because of the adoption/creation of policies/institutions by independent India, 
something which was not possible under the colonial rule. But no policy has the 
infinite time span and has to be revised in accordance with the changing 
realities. The need for certain policy adjustments began to be felt much earlier 
but it was the change in global economic and political scenario around 1990 
that precipitated the matter. 
The entire world economy has been experiencing stunning and crucial 
changes during the decade of late eighties and nineties. Various countries of 
the world were now favoring economic reforms because it assures speedy and 
more persistent economic growth. The countries like Mexico, Chile, Spain and 
Greece have carried out far reaching economic reforms seriously and by this 
means realized the benefits of reforms eventually and India was no exception. 
The term 'economic reform' under reference broadly indicates the 
essential structural adjustment to external events. While making such 
adjustments it requires: 
First, lessening of country's expenses to the level equivalent to its 
income and thus reducing its fiscal deficit noticeably. 
Second, such correction need market obtained structural changes in 
order to make the economy more resourceful and flexible and also for using 
both domestic and external resources in a proper manner. This entails gradual 
reduction of import restrictions as well as elimination of export restrictions. 
Three points appear to be crucial for the success of economic reforms: 
First, external assistance-either specific project based or for meeting overall 
balance of payment (BOP) crisis is more effectual in realizing its goal where 
reforms are underway. 
Second, efficacy of economic reforms depends basically on the 
response of investments and institutions towards structural adjustments. Thus, 
reforms are not enough by themselves but what is needed is a spontaneous 
response from the private sector to promote investments and institution building 
to contribute towards poverty alleviation and environment protection program 
and concurrently it also needs complementary actions by the government 
concerned. 
Finally, the success of economic reforms depends on the country's 
involvement in the reform program where consensus must be attained on the 
need for such reforms or structural change. 
Thus to become successful, it is quite essential that people's reaction 
should go in favor of reforms. Otherwise, it will be simply a futile exercise in the 
darkness. 
The process of economic reforms began in the mid 1980s, following a 
recognition that India's performance in 1960s and 1970s was below its 
potential. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was the-then Prime Minister was keenly aware that 
East Asian Countries were outpacing India and a reformation of economic 
policies was necessary, if India has to realize her growth potential. 
Commenting on the process of industrialization until the end of eighties. Prof. 
K.L. Krishna wrote: "since independence, industrial policy in India has stressed 
rapid industrial growth with diversification of the industrial structure as one of 
the important objectives of industrialization. There is general agreement that 
while India has achieved a much diversified industrial structure, her growth 
performance leaves much to be desired, both with regard to the magnitude of 
the growth rate and its stability overtime. Three phases of growth have been 
distinguished: a phase of growth from the early 1950s to the mid 1960s; a 
phase of deceleration from the mid 1960s to late 1970s; and a phase of revival 
in the late 1970s followed by rapid growth in the 1980s"\ 
However, economic reforms were further intensified in the 1990s 
following a serious BOP crisis in 1991. The present Prime Minister Dr. 
Manmohan Singh was the Finance Minister at that time and it can be recalled 
that he was the architect of these reforms. Economic reforms can be viewed as 
a package of new policies announced by the government of P.V. Narasimha 
Tendulkar, Suresh D; Amp, Mitra; K. Narayanan; Kusum Deb Das (eds.) (2006); India; 
Industrialization in a Reforming Economy: Essays for K.L. Krishna, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 
P,24, 
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Rao. It is the result of the policy of liberalization initiated by Mrs. Indira Gandhi 
during the 1970s and intensified by Rajiv Gandhi during 1980s. It asserts 
liberalization, privatization and ultimately globalization of the Indian economy as 
the only feasible option 
The internal liberalization begun in the 1980s was carried further and 
was combined with a gradual process of external liberalization, including 
lowering of import duties, removal of quantitative restrictions on import and a 
major liberalization of foreign direct investment. Referring to the view of 
Behrman and Srinivasan, Nagraj repeated that the reform meant getting rid of 
an internationally discredited statist development paradigm. He quoted them 
again as that "the dethronement of the dominant paradigm and elevation to a 
higher status, if not enthronement, of openness, competition and the market in 
development is best illustrated by India, the earliest articular of and the last 
among major developing countries to abandon, the dominant paradigm"^. 
Hence, the liberalization process which started in the early 1990s include 
comprehensive reform measures in the areas of industry, public finance, 
banking and insurance, foreign trade and exchange rate management. The 
purpose of these economic reforms was two fold: 
a. To restore macroeconomic stability on both domestic and external fronts 
and 
b. To place the economy on a higher growth path through enhanced levels 
of investments, and improvements in productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
In short, reforms can be defined as a movement towards minimal government 
intervention, i.e. movement towards a free market. The recognition that no 
government irrespective of its competence and good objective can replicate 
efficiency of market mechanism has demolished several barriers to reforms. In 
the present scenario, except perhaps Cuba and North Korea, almost all 
countries have adopted a 'free-market' philosophy. 
2 Nagraj, R (2006); Aspects of India's Economic Growth and Reforms; Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 
P,51Quotation from Behrman, Jere and T,N. Srinivasan (eds., 1995), Introduction, Handbook Of 
Development Economics, Vol.3B, Amsterdam. 
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For that reason, economic reforms are aimed at reorientation of the 
centrally controlled economy to a market-oriented one in order to encourage 
greater efficiency and growth. This is being done by bringing in greater 
competition in the economy through progressive internal deregulation 
accompanied by external competition promoted by foreign direct investment 
and trade liberalization. No area of the Indian economy has been as much 
influenced by the impulses of reforms as the industrial sectors. This chapter 
focuses on the different aspects of reforms i.e. need for reforms, nature of 
reforms and how reforms and public sector is co-related? 
4.1 Need for Reforms: 
Soon after political Independence, India embarked upon a bold, 
challenging and comprehensive economic reforms based on the perception of 
economic realities, restraints and pressure existing at that time with the 
objective of transforming a backward and a predominantly agrarian economy 
lacking in basic infrastructure into a modern developed economy. Centuries of 
colonial exploitation had made India a low income country trapped in a 'vicious 
circle of poverty' with low capacity to save and invest and a capital poor 
country with labor as the only abundant resources. Bipin Chandra's view 
regarding the conditions existing at the time of Independence: He states that 
"in the economic sphere, colonialism drastically transformed India, but it led 
only to the development of under-development. The changes many of them 
positive when seen in isolation, became part of the process of 
underdevelopment process they came within and as a part of colonial 
framework. Colonialism was a complex integration of India's economy with the 
world capitalist system in a subservient position"^. 
It is well observed that the momentum of economic growth realized 
during the eighties, particularly the seventh plan period, was impractical to 
maintain without comprehensive policy changes. The basic thrust of economic 
reforms was on simplifying procedures, reducing bureaucracy induced delays 
and on encouraging larger inter-play of market forces through private initiative. 
' Sinha, Birendra Kumar (1998); The Indian Econon:iy in the 2 f ' century: A Global Perspective, Ajanta 
Books International, Delhi, P. 13. 
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Mr. John Echeverri Gent is of the view that "the course of India's economic 
reforms has been long and winding. It has produced incremental rather than 
the radical advances. Often, it has seemed to lack directions and coherent 
strategy. Its road to reform is shaped by a political and cultural terrain that 
makes dramatic new reforms difficult'"*. Although, he covered the period only 
up to 1988, perhaps his statement appears to be more or less valid, especially 
in view of conflicting comments on economic reforms emanating from the 
leaders of political groups and parties. 
Table 4.1 
Some Indicators of 1991-92 Crises in the Indian Economy 
Percentage growth of GDP at constant prices 
Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) as per cent of GDP at 
current prices 
Gross Capital Formation (GCF) at current prices as 
per cent of GDP at market prices 
Percentage change in index no. of agricultural 
Production (Triennium ending 1981-82). All crops 
Percentage change is index no. of industrial 
Production (1980-81=100) 
Trade balance (US $ Million) 
Current account balance (US $ Million) 
NRI Deposits (Net) (US $ Million) 
Commercial borrowing (Net) (US $ Million) 
Overall BOP 
Outstanding Foreign Debt (Rs. Crores) 
Debt Stock GDP Ratio (%) 
Debt service ratio 
Total foreign exchange reserves (US $ Million) 
Import cover of reserves (in months) 
Gross Fiscal Deficit as percent of GDP 
Percentage change in wholesale price index all 
Commodities (average of weeks) (1981-82=100) 
Percentage change in consumer price index-
annual (average of months) 1982=100 (industrial 
workers) 
1990-91 
5.57 
23.10 
26.30 
3.8 
8.2 
-9437 
-9680 
1536 
2248 
-2492 
66313.5 
28.7 
35.3 
5834 
2.7 
9.4 
10.3 
11.6 
1991-92 
1.30 
22.03 
22.55 
-2.0 
0.6 
-2798 
-1178 
290 
1456 
2599 
109676.8 
38.7 
30.2 
9220 
5.6 
7.0 
13.7 
13.5 
Sources: Economic Survey, 1991-92 
' ibid; P.32 
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Table 4.1 shows that though the performance of the economy improved 
as showed by the trade balance, current account balance, overall BOP, level of 
foreign exchange reserves and debt service ratio by the end of the financial 
year 1991-92, it stayed on an abnormal year as it registered a real GDP growth 
of only 1.30 per cent with a significant decline in savings, capital formation and 
agricultural and industrial production and a significant increase in foreign debt 
and inflation rate. However, gross fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP declined 
from 9.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 7 per cent in 1991-92. 
The Indian economy achieved a higher rate of growth during the first half 
of 1990s as compared to pre-reform period. But it could not sustain such 
growth rate during the second half of 1990s due to the economic recession in 
India and due to the impact of global recession. During the first half of 1990s, 
the inflation rate was much higher and the economy achieved an inflation-
oriented grovi/th. 
This can be seen in the Table 4.2 where we found that the rate of growth 
of GDP had collapsed to 0.8 per cent in 1991-92 but it bounced to 5.3 per cent 
in 1992-93, and then accelerated to 6.2 per cent in 1993-94 but again in 1997-
98 it fell to 5.1 per cent. Similarly, the current account deficit, which had 
expanded to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 1990-91, was brought down to 0.4 per cent 
in 1993-94. Foreign exchange resen/es were built to a respectable level of 8.6 
months of inputs by the end of 1993-94. Inflation rate, which had reached to 
13.7 per cent in 1991-92, declined to 8.4 per cent in 1993-94. Table shows that 
there is not much improvement in the gross domestic saving and also in the 
gross domestic investment over the years. Whereas, there is a lot of ups and 
downs in the trend of fiscal deficit from the period 1990-91 to 1997-98. 
During the year 1991, current account deficit noticed a negative growth 
of 3.2 per cent of GDP and its reduction was the main focus of the policy. The 
deficit fell sharply to -0.4 per cent in 1991-92 before widening again to -1.8 per 
cent in the following year. Exports were stagnant in dollar value. Imports fell 
sharply in 1991-92 following a deflationary policy; they rose moderately in 
1992-93 but were still below the 1990-91 level. 
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Table 4.2 
Macroeconomic Performance Indicators 
(Growth rates are percentage over previous year) 
1.Growth Indicators: 
Growth of GDP (%) 
Industrial GDP Growth 
Agricultural GDP Growth 
2.lnternal Balance Indicate 
Gross Domestic Savings 
(%ofGDP) 
Gross Domestic 
Investment (%ofGDP) 
Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) 
Rate of Inflation 
M3 Growth 
3. External Balance Indical 
Reserves (at year end) as 
number of months of 
imports of the year 
Export Growth (US $) 
Import Growth (US $) 
Current Account Deficit (% 
of GDP) 
Debt Service Ratio 
1990-
91 
5.4 
7.0 
4.2 
>rs: 
23.1 
26.3 
8.3 
10.3 
15.1 
ors: 
2.5 
9.2 
13.5 
-3.2 
35.3 
1991-
92 
0.8 
-1.7 
-2.0 
22.0 
22.6 
5.9 
13.7 
19.3 
5.3 
-1.5 
-19.4 
-0.5 
30.2 
1992-
93 
5.3 
4.4 
5.8 
21.8 
23.6 
5.7 
10.1 
15.7 
4.9 
3.8 
12.7 
-1.8 
27.5 
1993-
94 
6.2 
6.9 
3.6 
22.5 
23.1 
7.4 
8.4 
18.4 
8.6 
20.0 
6.5 
-0.4 
25.6 
1994-
95 
7.8 
10.8 
5.2 
24.8 
26.0 
6.1 
10.9 
22.3 
8.4 
18.4 
22.9 
-1.1 
26,2 
1995-
96 
7.2 
12.7 
-2.3 
25.1 
26.9 
5.4 
7.7 
13.7 
6.0 
20.7 
28.0 
-1.8 
24.3 
1996-
97 
7.5 
6.8 
7.3 
23.2 
24.5 
5.2 
6.4 
16.0 
6.6 
5.3 
6.7 
-1.0 
21.4 
1997-
98 
5.1 
5.8 
-1.8 
23.1 
24.6 
6.1 
4.8 
17.0 
7.0 
2.6 
5.8 
-1.5 
18.3 
Source: Economic Survey and Handbook of Statistics, Various Issues. 
As a result, basic idea behind such economic reform is that the 
reduction in the size of the public sector and the lifting of government controls 
and regulations on production, trade and investment would usher in a more 
competitive environment, improve efficiency and hence growth. The pattern of 
industrialization is expected to be not only internationally competitive but also 
sufficiently labor-intensive. 
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4.2 Immediate Cause of Reform: 
No doubt, India's economy grew at the rate of about 5 per cent during 
tlie 1980s. Regardless of this, the country faced a major economic crisis, 
primarily on the external fronts and domestically as well. The crisis manifested 
as follows: 
• Change in the international economic scenario associated with the gulf 
crisis created a severe external liquidity crisis. We lost our exports to gulf 
countries, reducing the flow of foreign exchange. Remittances, which 
were being received from the NRIs in the gulf dried up. Import bill of 
petroleum, oil and lubricants increased. The combined effect of all the 
factors reduced our foreign exchange reserves to a low level of 1 billion 
US dollar which was hardly sufficient to meet India's import bill for two 
weeks reported the Economic Survey 1991-92. By June 1991, the 
balance of payment (BOP) crisis had become awesomely a crisis of 
confidence in the government's ability to manage the BOP. The loss of 
confidence had itself destabilized the government's potential to deal with 
the crisis by closing all resources to external credit. A default on 
payments, for the first time in our set-up, had become a serious 
possibility in June 1991. 
• Economic reforms in India may partly be explained as an awakening 
after the collapse of Soviet Union which initially inspired Indian leaders in 
favor of economic planning and public sector. With the dismemberment 
of Soviet Union, Western powers lost interest in Asia, and, therefore, 
India lost its strategic importance. After the collapse of Soviet Union, the 
scenario changed in Asia and Eastern Europe. The changed 
international scenario increased India's reliance on the developed World. 
The liberalization and privatization conditions tied to aid by donar 
countries are hard to defy. So, economic reforms in India are somewhat 
attributable to international compulsions. 
• Another factor which enforced rethinking on development strategy was 
the experience of China which had initiated the reforms in 1979 and was 
showing encouraging results. India could not ignore the rapid strides 
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being made its immediate step in the field of exports, industrialization 
and inflow of foreign capital. In addition, some East Asian countries were 
doing miracles in the field of economic growth. 
• Noteworthy changes were taking place in the world trade regime. WTO 
is the only International body dealing with the rules of trade between the 
nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, the legal ground rules for 
international commerce and trade policy. The agreements have three 
main objectives: first; to help trade flow as freely as possible, second; to 
attain further liberalization steadily through negotiations, and third; to set 
up a neutral means of setting disputes. Therefore, the new trade policy 
calls for removal of all non-tariff barriers, reduction of tariff barriers, 
eradication of all constraints facing investment and liberalization of 
trading services and protection of intellectual property rights. 
• Control of capital movement in and out of the country. 
• Besides Gulf crisis of 1990, India also witnessed the social and 
communal tensions at home which seriously affected its economy in 
terms of production. 
The situation was summarized by I.G. Patel as, "the crisis that we faced 
since independence, it is for no underlying economic factor which is more 
adverse now than what we had to contend with in the past several decades. It 
is because successive governments in the 1980s chose to abdicate their 
responsibility to the nation for the sake of short-term partisan political gains and 
indeed out of sheer political cynicism". In Patel's view, "bad economic policies 
were responsible to some extent for the crisis and many aspects of the old 
economic regime needed to be changed drastically. But bad microeconomic 
policies may produce low growth; they do not necessarily led to bankruptcy. We 
mismanaged, macro-economically in the 1980s and compounded the error by 
liberalizing imports before restoring a better fiscal and monetary balance. But 
this was not because we did not know better. It was merely because of political 
cynicism"^. 
^ Patel, I.G.; New Economic Policies: A Historical Perspective, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), 
January 4-11, 1992, P.43 
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Therefore, the new government which took charge in June 1991 moved 
swiftly to the tasl< of pulling the economy back from the edge of disaster and 
setting it once more on the path of rapid and sustainable growth. Measures 
undertaken for this purpose had two aspects, (i) program of crisis management 
and (ii) medium-term reform. 
The former refers to immediate actions intended at restoring confidence 
internationally, bringing inflation under control and ensuring viability in the BOP. 
The latter refers to structural reforms aimed at strengthening the growth 
capability of the economy in the medium-term. 
4.3 Nature of Reforms: 
The nature of Indian economy crisis was so multidimensional that a 
multi-seeded approach was needed through bold economic reforms. The root 
of crisis may be attributed to factors such as steep increase in public spending 
during 1980s leading to continuous increase in fiscal deficit, deficits in balance 
of payments (BOP) financed by continuous external borrowings, growing 
inflation rate, failure of the public sector to generate surpluses, restrictive trade 
and industrial licensing policies resulting in serious loss of efficiency in 
production and export competitiveness of Indian products, gulf crisis in leading 
to fall in remittances and increase in oil price etc. The gross fiscal deficit of the 
union government, which measures the difference between the revenue 
receipts plus grants and total expenditure, plus net domestic lending, was 8.2 
per cent of GDP during the second half of 1980s as compared to 6.3 per cent 
during the first half of 1980s. This increase in fiscal deficit had to be met by 
increased borrowing. Interest payments increased from 10 per cent of the total 
Central Government expenditure in 1980-81 to 20 per cent in 1990-91. The 
continual deficits in balance of payments had been constantly financed by 
external borrowings during 1980s. The external debt of the country including 
non-resident deposits reached an alarming level. This indicates that the country 
had been managing its domestic finances and external finances with borrowed 
money. The autonomy to live on borrowed money had been completely over by 
1991 resulting in economic crisis. With a view to restoring internal and external 
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confidence, there was an urgent need for initiating macro-economic 
stabilization measures; persistent and affecting the whole country, not a 
particular sector. Changes in fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate 
policy and wage-income policy are measures, which may stabilize or 
destabilize macroeconomic balances-internal and external. With a view to 
bringing stabilization, reforms in these major policies were suggested to be the 
huge need. 
But the opportunity was also seized upon to correct many micro-
economic (sectoral) policies too. Or, one could say that without parallel 
changes (reforms) in micro-economic policies, reforms in stabilization 
measures would have not been sufficiently effective. There existed an opinion 
at the national and international level that our policies were distorting the prices 
of goods and thereby allocation of resources. We thought that our policies were 
biased, but it was pointed out that our policies were actually distorting allocation 
of resources (via distortion prices). The package of reforms in this sphere came 
to be known as Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Reforms in trade policy, 
industrial policy, public sector policy, administered price policy, tariff policy and 
factor market policy may be specifically mentioned in this context. According to 
some authorities, stabilization refers to measures concerning the aggregate 
demand while structural adjustment concerns the aggregate supply. But, 
according to other authorities, stabilization refers to short-term measures to 
correct macroeconomic imbalances and structural adjustment to measure 
relating to improvement in productivity of labor and capital. The government of 
India has accepted the second view. Attempts to bring changes in fiscal policy, 
monetary policy and foreign exchange policy are all meant to correct macro-
economic imbalances. In short, Indian economic reforms are divided into two 
parts: Macro-economic Stabilization Programme and Structural Adjustment 
Programme. 
Accordingly, economic reforms are aimed at reorientation of the centrally 
controlled economy to a market-oriented one in order to foster greater 
efficiency and growth. This is being done by introducing greater competition in 
the economy through progressive internal deregulation accompanied by 
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external competition; promoted by foreign direct investment and trade 
liberalization. No area of the Indian economy has been as much as influenced 
by the impulses of reforms as the industrial sector. In his memorandum of 
economic policies submitted to International Monetary Fund (IMF), Dr. Man 
Mohan Singh proposed: "the effort will be to increase the efficiency and 
international competitiveness of industrial production, to utilize foreign 
investment and technology to a much greater degree than in the past, to 
improve the performance and rationalize the scope of the public sector, and to 
reform and modernize the financial sector so that it can more efficiently serve 
the needs of the economy"®. Economic reforms in India have undergone two 
stages: 
The primary stage of economic reforms had its origin in 1985 when late 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi took over as Prime Minister. He outlined the new trends in 
economic policies of the government. The measures suggested by him were: 
• Enhancement in productivity, 
• Absorption of modern technology and fuller utilization of capacity. 
• Greater role for the private sector, 
• Technology upgradation, 
• Eradication of controls and restrictions, 
• Changes in fiscal policy, 
• Rationalization and simplification of fiscal system, administrative 
regulations and export-import policy. 
These policy changes were brought with the sole intention to create for 
getting a big boost in private sector investment which would, in turn lead in a 
rapid growth of the economy as well as cover the way to the modernization of 
the economy. But the primary stage of economic reforms failed to yield the 
expected results at most of the fronts. In order to restore both internal and 
external confidence, the Narasimha Rao government initiated a good number 
of stabilization measures in 1991-92. These measures included: 
• Tightening of monetary policy by raising interest rates, 
- Adjustment of exchange rate of Rupee by 22 per cent, 
^ Agrawal, Meenu (2008); Economic Reforms, Unemployment and Poverty: The Indian Experience, New 
Century Publications, New Delhi, PP.44-45 
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• Liberalization and simplification of foreign trade policy, 
• Reduction of fiscal deficit, and 
• Introduction of other reforms in economic policies, necessary to bring a 
new element of dynamism in the process of economic growth of the 
country. 
The major area of the secondary stage of economic reforms included: 
• Initiation of various fiscal measures in order to reduce the fiscal deficit 
from 8.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 5 per cent in 1996-97 and to 5.6 
per cent in 2003-04. 
• Pursuing a restrictive monetary policy for reducing inflationary pressures 
and also for improving balance of payment position. 
• Introduction of stabilization and import compression measures in order 
to reduce the current account deficit in balance of payment to 2.1 per 
cent of GDP in 1991-92 and then to 2 per cent of GDP in 1992-93. 
• Measures to reduce budgetary provision for subsidies and to promote a 
more flexible price structure. The government increased the 
administered prices of various commodities and inputs and gave greater 
freedom to the Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) to set the prices as per 
the market forces. 
• In order to make necessary reforms in its industrial policy, the 
government introduced Its New Industrial Policy on July 24, 1991. 
• Provisions for increased flow of foreign investment in connection with 
technology transfer, marketing expertise and introduction of managerial 
techniques. 
• Measures to eliminate progressively the system of licensing and 
quantitative restrictions particular for capital goods and raw materials. 
• Introduction of various policy measures for making necessary reforms in 
the loss-incurring Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs). 
After execution of economic reforms many major changes have been 
seen in India's economic policies, making a new phase in India's development 
strategy. In this section, the impact of the reforms on economic growth, 
agricultural and industrial sectors, inflation, savings, and capital formation. 
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performance of external sector and structural change of the economy during 
the decade of 1990s needs to be examined. 
The analysis can be started with examining the growth rate of Indian 
economy phor to and after the execution of economic reforms. The growth rate 
of the economy was quite unsatisfactory during the first four five year plan 
periods (Table 4.3). It was much below the moderate growth of 5 per cent per 
annum. The economy registered the moderate growth during the fifth, sixth and 
seventh five year plan periods. During the 1990s, the economy registered the 
highest growth rate which was the landmark of the eighth five-year plan period. 
The economy could not sustain the same level of growth during the ninth plan 
period due to economic recession. But again in the tenth plan, economy 
achieved the highest growth rate. 
Table 4.3 
Annual Average Growth Rate of Indian Economy (At 1999-2000 prices) 
(Per cent) 
Five-Year Plans 
First Plan (1951-56) 
Second Plan (1956-61) 
Third Plan (1961-66) 
Three Annual Plan (1966-69) 
Fourth Plan (1969-74) 
Fifth Plan (1974-79) 
Annual Plan (1979-80) 
Sixth Plan (1980-85) 
Seventh Plan (1985-90) 
Two Annual Plans (1990-92) 
Eighth Plan (1992-97) 
Ninth Plan (1997-2002) 
Tenth Plan (2002-07) 
Source: Economic Survey, 20C 
Gross National 
Product at 
Factor Cost 
(GNPatFc) 
3.7 
4.0 
2.8 
3.9 
3.4 
5.0 
-5.0 
5.4 
5.5 
3.2 
6.6 
5.5 
7.8 
7-08. 
Net National 
Product at Factor 
Cost 
(NNP,,Fc) 
4.4 
3.8 
2.6 
3.9 
3.1 
4.9 
-6.0 
5.4 
5.5 
3.1 
6.7 
5.3 
7.8 
Per Capita Net 
National Product 
(PCNP) 
2.6 
1.7 
0.4 
1.6 
0.8 
2.6 
-8.2 
3.1 
3.3 
1.0 
4.5 
3.3 
6.1 
100 
ANNUAL AVERAGE GROWTH RATE OF INDIAN ECONOMY 
(AT 1999-2000 PRICES) (Fig. 4.1) 
to 
O 
I 
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Five Year Plan 
a GNP at Factor Cost INNP at Factor Cost D Per Capita NNP 
Thus, the available evidences suggest that the Indian economy has 
achieved a high rate of growth continuously for four years starting from 1993-94 
(Table 4.4). During the year 1998-99 and 1999-2000, the economy achieved a 
growth rate of more than six per cent. Though many factors have contributed to 
this, the major factor is the impact of economic reforms. 
A sector-wise analysis of the growth suggests that the growth rate was 
not uniform in all sectors. During the decade of 1990s, the growth of primary 
sector was low or negative for four years (Table 4.4). The secondary sector 
comprising industry, construction, electricity, gas and water supply registered a 
fairly high growth rate during the three years starting from 1994-95. But the 
growth rate was lower in the years 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000. On the 
contrary, the tertiary sectors registered a higher growth rate during the period of 
1990s. The sub-sectors which registered fairly high rate of growth in the major 
part of the said decade were transport, communication, trade, finance, real 
estate and business services (Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 
Annual Growth Rate of GDP at Factor Cost of Indian Economy 
Year 
(1) 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 (P) 
2006-07 (Q) 
Agriculture, 
Forestry and 
Logging, 
Fishing, 
Mining and 
Quarrying 
(2) 
4.6 
-1.1 
5.4 
3.9 
5.3 
-0.3 
8.8 
-1.5 
5.9 
0.6 
0.0 
5.9 
-5.9 
9.3 
0.7 
5.8 
4.0 
IVIanufacturlng, 
Construction, 
Electricity, 
Gas and Water 
Supply 
(3) 
7.4 
-1.0 
4.3 
5.6 
10.3 
12.3 
7.7 
3.8 
3.8 
4.9 
6.8 
2.8 
6.9 
7.8 
10.5 
10.6 
11.5 
Transport, 
Communication 
and Trade 
(4) 
4.9 
2.5 
5.6 
7.1 
10.4 
13.3 
7.8 
7.8 
7.7 
8.5 
7.3 
9.1 
9.2 
12.1 
10.7 
11.5 
11.8 
Financing, 
Insurance, 
Real 
Estate and 
Business 
Services 
(5) 
7.7 
12.0 
5.9 
13.4 
5.6 
8.2 
7.0 
11.6 
7.4 
10.6 
4.1 
7.3 
8.0 
5.6 
8.7 
11.4 
13.9 
Public 
administration, 
Defence and 
Other Services 
(6) 
4.1 
2.6 
4.6 
3.5 
3.2 
7.9 
6.3 
11.7 
10.4 
12.2 
4.8 
4.1 
3.9 
5.4 
6.9 
7.2 
6.9 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product at 
Factor 
Cost 
(2 to 6) 
5.6 
1,3 
5.1 
5.9 
7.3 
7.3 
7.6 
4.6 
6.5 
6.1 
4.4 
5.6 
3.8 
8.5 
7.5 
9.4 
9.6 
P: Provisional Estimates 
Q: Quick Estimates 
Source: Economic Survey, 2007-08 
If we look at the 2000 series of primary sectors, we find that there are so 
many ups and downs in their rate of growth. More or less, in the secondary, 
tertiary and other sub-sectors there is some improvement during the same 
period. The evidences suggest that the impact of reforms was much greater in 
the tertiary sector as compared to the primary and secondary sectors. 
The features of growth rate of agriculture were also reflected in the 
agricultural production. The index of agricultural production registered a 
negative growth rate in the four years during 1990s (Table 4.5). Food grains 
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production registered similarly a negative growth rate for three years. Also in 
2000, we find negative growth rate in both the indexes of agricultural production 
and food grains production. The index of industrial production shows that it was 
moderate or below moderate for most of the years in 1990s and 2000 (Table 
4.5). A similar trend was observed with regard to electricity generation. 
Table 4.5 
Major Economic Indicators (Year on Year Percentaqe Chanqes) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
2007-08 
Agricultural 
Production 
Index 
3.8 
-2.0 
4.1 
3.8 
4.9 
-2.7 
9.1 
-5.4 
7.5 
-0.7 
2.0 
7.9 
-13.8 
16.9p 
-0.5p 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Food Grains 
Production 
3.2 
-4.5 
6.6 
2.7 
3.8 
-5.8 
10.5 
-3.5 
5.6 
1.4 
-6.3 
8.1 
-15.7 
18.4p 
-7.0 
5.2 
4.2 
0.9a 
Industrial 
Production 
Index 
8.2 
0.6 
2.3 
6.0 
9.1 
13.0 
6.1 
6.7 
4.1 
6.7 
5.0 
2.7 
5.8 
7.0 
8.4 
8.2 
11.6 
9.0b 
Electricity 
Generation 
7.8 
9,1 
5.0 
7.3 
8.1 
8.6 
4.3 
6.6 
6.5 
6.9 
4.7 
1.6 
6.5 
4.6 
5.1 
5.2 
7.3 
6.6b 
a; 2"'' advance estimates of 2007-08 
b: April-Dec.2007 
p: provisional estimates 
Source: Economic Survey, 2007-08 
A major impact of the reforms has been on the acceleration of inflationary 
trends in the economy during the first half of 1990s. Due to the protective 
policies, the prices of most of the commodities were maintained at lower levels 
artificially through subsidies, control and other protective measures. With the 
withdrawal of subsidies and control prices, of most of the commodities 
registered a steep rise. The wholesale price index vvfrich reflects changes in the 
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price of commodities covering all traded goods in the primary sector as well as, 
fuel, power and manufacturing sectors. It gives a reliable picture of the rate of 
inflation. The index suggests that the rate of inflation was higher during the 
post-reform period as compared to the pre-reform period (Table 4.6). 
During the first half of 1990s, the rate of inflation was more than ten per 
cent. As a major factor, inflation increased the prices of primary articles such as 
food article, food grains, non-food articles, fuel and power. The rate of inflation 
measured by using consumer price index was much higher during the first half 
of 1990s. On the other hand, the rate of inflation registered a substantial fall 
during the second half of 1990s and 2000. The recessionary trend prevailing in 
the Indian and global economy during the late 1990s mainly caused the fall in 
the inflation rate. 
Table 4.6 
Growth of WPI, CPI, M3, GIMP, GEXP (%age) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Wholesale 
Price 
Index (WPI) 
10.3 
13.7 
10.1 
8.4 
12,6 
8.0 
4.6 
4.4 
5.9 
3.3 
7.2 
1.6 
6.5 
4.6 
5.1 
4.1 
5.9 
Consumer 
Price 
Index (CPI) 
11.6 
13.5 
9.6 
7.3 
10.3 
10.0 
9.4 
6.8 
13.1 
3.4 
3.7 
5.2 
4.1 
3.5 
4.2 
4.9 
6.7 
Money 
Supply 
(M3) 
15.1 
19.3 
15.7 
18.4 
22.3 
13.7 
15.9 
17.3 
19.4 
14.6 
16.7 
14.1 
14.7 
16.6 
12.3 
17.0 
21.3 
Growth of 
Imports 
(GIMP.) 
13.5 
-19.4 
12.7 
6.5 
22.9 
28.0 
6.5 
6.0 
2.2 
17.3 
1.0 
5.0 
9.5 
20.9 
14.7 
48.2 
24.1 
Growth of 
Exports 
(GEXP.) 
9.0 
-1.5 
3.8 
20.0 
18.4 
20.9 
5.3 
4.6 
3.1 
10.8 
23.9 
3.7 
21.7 
6.0 
17.6 
11.8 
15.8 
Source: Economic Survey, 2007-08, Report on Currency and Finance, Various Issues. 
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Growth of WPI, CPI, M3, GIMP, GEXP {%age) (Fig. 4.2) 
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The data on gross domestic savings, net domestic saving and net 
domestic capital formation show that the rate of savings was higher during the 
decade of 1990s as compared to the previous years (Table 4.7). This may be 
due to better economic conditions prevailed during the post-reform period in 
comparison with the earlier periods. 
Table 4.7 
Growth Trend of GDS, GDCF, NDS, NIFC, NDCF {%age) 
Year 
1950-51 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-81 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
* Current 
Gross 
Domestic 
saving 
(GDS) 
Gross Domestic 
Capital 
Formation 
(GDCF) 
As % of GDP 
8.6 
11.2 
14.2 
18.5 
22.8 
24.4 
22.7 
23.8 
22.3 
24.8 
Market Prices 
8.4 
14.0 
15.1 
19.9 
26.0 
26.2 
24.0 
25.3 
23.3 
25.9 
Net 
Domestic 
Saving 
(NDS) 
5.5 
6.4 
8.6 
11.3 
15.1 
16.8 
14.6 
15.0 
13.8 
14.3 
Net Inflow of 
Foreign Capital 
(NIFS) 
Net Domestic 
Capital Formation 
(NDCF) 
As % of NDP* 
-0.3 
3.0 
0.9 
1.6 
3.6 
2.0 
1.5 
1.7 
1.2 
1.2 
5.2 
9.4 
9.5 
12.9 
18.7 
18.8 
16.1 
16.7 
15.0 
15.5 
Source: Economic Survey and Handbook of Statistics, Various Issues. 
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Growth Trend of GDS, GDCF, NDS, NIFC, NDCF 
(%age) (Fig. 4.3) 
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A notable achievement of the economic reforms has been the steady and 
sustained improvement in the balance of payment position (Table 4.8). There 
has been a sharp increase in the coverage of imports by exports earnings 
during 1990s. This improvement in the export-import ratio combined with the 
improvement in the invisible account has resulted in a sharp reduction in the 
current account deficit. The country's dependence on external assistance and 
external commercial borrowing has come down. The heavy dependence on 
commercial borrowing to finance and the current account deficit has been 
brought down to a manageable limit. The debt service ratio has also shown a 
declining trend during the decade. The import cover of foreign exchange 
reserves also registered a steady increase during 1990s. These indicators 
suggest that the Indian economy has moved to more stable and sustainable 
balance of payment position during 1990s as compared to earlier decade. 
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Table 4.8 
Selected indicators of External Sector 
Item/ 
Years 
Growth of 
Exports-
BOP (%) 
Growth of 
Imports-
BOP()% 
Exports/ 
Imports-
BOP (%) 
Import 
cover of 
PER (No. 
of months) 
External 
assistance 
(net)/TC 
(%) 
ECB 
(net)/TC 
(%) 
NR 
deposits/ 
TC (%) 
Exports 
Imports 
Trade 
balance 
Invisible 
balance 
Current 
account 
balance 
External 
debt 
Source: Ec 
1990-
91 
9.0 
14.4 
66.2 
2.5 
26.2 
26.8 
18.3 
5.8 
8.8 
-3.0 
-0.1 
-3.1 
28.7 
onomic 
1995-
96 
20.3 
21.6 
74.0 
6.0 
29.7 
42.9 
37.1 
9.2 
12.4 
1.6 
-1.7 
27.0 
Survey, 
1999-
00 
9.5 
16.5 
67,8 
8.2 
8.3 
2.9 
14.2 
8.4 
12.4 
2.9 
-1.1 
22.1 
CMlEc 
2000-
01 
21.1 
4.6 
78.5 
8.8 
4.8 
50.6 
27.2 
9.9 
12.6 
-2.7 
2.1 
-0.6 
22.5 
ind Han 
2001-
02 
-1.6 
-2.8 
79.4 
11.5 
13.4 
-19.0 
33.0 
9.4 
11.8 
-2.4 
3.1 
0.7 
21.1 
dbook 0 
2002-
03 
20.3 
14.5 
83.4 
14.2 
-29.4 
-15.9 
28.0 
10.6 
12.7 
-2.1 
3.4 
1.2 
20.3 
f Statis 
2003-
04 
23.3 
24.1 
82.9 
16.9 
-16.5 
-16.9 
21.0 
11.0 
13.3 
-2.3 
4.6 
2.3 
17.8 
ics, Var 
2004-
05 
28.5 
48.6 
71.7 
14.3 
6.7 
18.1 
-3.4 
12.2 
17.1 
-4.9 
4.5 
-0.4 
8.51 
ious Iss 
2005-
06 
23.4 
32.0 
67.0 
11.6 
6.9 
11.2 
11.5 
13.0 
19.5 
-6.4 
5.3 
-1.2 
17.2 
ues. 
2006-
07 
21.8 
21.8 
67.0 
12.5 
3.8 
34.8 
9.3 
14.0 
20.9 
-6.9 
5.8 
-1.1 
17.9 
The steady growth in foreign currency reserves is another significant 
development. The movements in foreign exchange reserves are the net result 
of all external transactions. They provide a summary index of the state of the 
country's balance of payment. Foreign exchange reserve which includes 
foreign currency, assets of RBI, gold and SDR's rose from 5834 million US 
dollars in 1990-91 to 21687 million US dollars in 1995-96 and 151622 million 
US dollars in 2005-06. 
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We may also examine the structural change of the economy during the 
pre and post-reform period. The structural change can be examined by the 
changes in the share of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors to the gross 
domestic product. The structural change occurred during 1980s indicated a fall 
in the share of primary sector, an increase in the share of secondary sector and 
a small rise in the share of tertiary sector (Table 4.9). But the pattern of 
structural change of 1990s was different. 
Table 4.9 
Gross Domestic Product and its Sectoral Share 
(At 1993-94 Prices) 
Year 
1950-51 
1960-61 
1970-71 
1980-91 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 P 
2002-03 QE 
2003-04 RE 
Agricultural and 
Allied 
55.4 
50.9 
44.5 
38.1 
30.9 
30.6 
25.0 
23.9 
24.1 
22.0 
22.1 
Industry 
16.1 
20.0 
23.6 
25.9 
30.0 
25.5 
21.6 
22.0 
21.5 
22.0 
21.7 
Services 
28.5 
29.1 
31.9 
36.0 
39.1 
43.9 
53.4 
54.1 
54.4 
56.1 
56.2 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Various Issues. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND ITS SECTORAL SHARE 
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A disturbing development was tine fall in the share of secondary sector. 
Another development was a steady increase in the share of tertiary sector. 
However, in 2000, all the three sectors show ups and downs in their total gross 
domestic product. Thus, the broad trend suggests a decline in the share of 
primary and secondary sectors and increase in the share of tertiary sector. 
4.4 Growth of GDP, Savings, Capital Formation and Consumption: 
The average annual growth rate of real GDP during the reforms was 
5.95 per cent as against 4.67 per cent during the pre-reforms period. Per capita 
real GDP also recorded a higher average annual growth rate of 3.59 per cent 
during the reforms as compared to 2.40 per cent during the pre-reforms. 
Table 4.10 
Growth of GDP, Savings, Capital Formation and Consumption 
Expenditure 
GDP at Factor 
Cost at Constant 
Prices (%age) 
GDP Per Capita 
at Constant 
Prices (%) 
%age Share of 
Public Sector in 
GDP at 
Constant Prices 
GDS as % of 
GDP at Current 
Prices 
%age Share of 
Public Sector in 
GDS at Current 
Prices 
GCF at Current 
Prices as % of 
GDP at IWarket 
Prices 
%age Share of 
Public Sector in 
GCF by Assets 
& Institution at 
Cun'ent Prices 
NCSI at Current 
Prices as % of 
GDP at Market 
Prices 
1984-
85 
4.31 
23.93 
18.76 
15.10 
20.10 
48.28 
272.65 
1989-
90 
6.70 
4.50 
26.14 
22.00 
7.65 
24.53 
40.34 
264.55 
1990-
91 
5.57 
3.42 
25.51 
23.10 
4.78 
26.30 
38.80 
256.25 
1991-
92 
1.30 
-0.71 
26.75 
22.03 
8.94 
22.55 
40.23 
262.07 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
1984-85 
to 1991-
92 
4.47 
2.40 
25.58 
21.47 
9.12 
23.37 
41.91 
263.88 
1994-95 
7.25 
25.89 
24.83 
6.70 
26.00 
37.25 
244.86 
1998-
99 
4.44 
26.33 
21.67 
-4.55 
22.71 
30.77 
236.95 
1999-
00 
6.10 
4.20 
26.28 
23.17 
-3.87 
24.31 
30.65 
231.66 
2000-
01 
3.95 
2.12 
23.39 
-7.06 
24.01 
30.97 
231.40 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 1994-
95 to 2000-
01 
5.95 
3.59 
26.17 
23.27 
-2.20 
24.26 
32.41 
236.22 
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%age Growth of 
NCSI at Current 
Prices 
%age Share of 
Public Sector in 
NCSI at Current 
Prices 
Private Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure at 
Constant Prices 
(%) 
Govt. Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure at 
Constant Prices 
(%) 
14,84 
41.83 
14.03 
44.80 
4.96 
4.69 
13.30 
44.82 
4.47 
3,39 
17.46 
45.13 
2.16 
-0.66 
14.91 
44.15 
3.86 
2.47 
15,65 
44.73 
10.15 
41.56 
6.50 
12.89 
8.36 
41.49 
6.08 
13.20 
8.09 
40.98 
2.82 
0.57 
10.56 
42.19 
5.13 
8.89 
Note: 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GDS: Gross Domestic Saving 
GCF: Gross Capital Formation 
NCSI: Net Capital Stock by Institution 
Source: CIVIIE: National Income Statistics, January 2003; RBI: Handbook of Statistics on the 
Indian Economy, 2002-03. 
These figures do not reveal how the composition of output (food-grains, 
pulses, edible oils, consumer goods, intermediate goods etc) and the sectoral 
distribution (percentage share of agriculture, industry and services in the GDP) 
changed over these periods. But there is a clear empirical evidence of a slightly 
higher growth rate during the reforms period (Table 4.10). 
The net capital stock, which reflects the country's capacity for future 
growth, registered a lower average annual growth rate of 10.56 per cent during 
the reforms as against 14.91 per cent during the corresponding pre-reforms 
years. This suggests a relatively higher growth of unutilized production of 
consumer goods during the reforms. 
Both private and Government consumption grew faster during reforms. 
While the average annual growth rate of private final consumption expenditure 
were increased from 3.86 per cent in pre-reforms to 5.13 per cent in the 
reforms period, the corresponding figures for government final expenditure 
were 2.47 per cent and 8.89 per cent respectively. These growth rates indicate 
an all round increase in consumer demand which should boost the production 
of consumer goods (Table 4.10). 
Contrary to expectations, the average percentage share of the public 
sector in real GDP remained at almost the same level during the pre-reforms 
(25.58 per cent) and the reforms (26.17 per cent) periods. Gross domestic 
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savings as per cent of GDP at current prices recorded a liigher annual growth 
rate of 23.27 per cent during the reforms as compared to 21.47 per cent during 
the pre-reforms, but the annual average growth rate of the public sector's share 
in the gross domestic savings declined steeply from 9.20 per cent during the 
pre-reforms to -2.20 per cent during the reforms indicating that public sector is 
growing lavishly. 
Gross capital formation as percent of GDP at current prices too was 
higher during the reforms, i.e. 24.26 per cent as compared to pre-reforms 
period of 23.26 per cent, but the annual average growth of the percentage 
share of the public sector in the gross capital formation declined to 32.41 per 
cent during the reforms from 41.91 per cent during the pre-reforms period. 
The annual average of the net capital stock as percent of GDP at current 
prices declined from 263.88 per cent during the pre-reforms to 236.22 per cent 
during the reforms and there was a decline in percentage growth of net capital 
stock by institution (NCSI) at current prices too from 14.91 per cent during the 
pre-reforms to 10.56 per cent during the reforms. Public sector's shares in 
NCSI at current prices moved to 42.19 per cent during the reforms from 44.15 
per cent during the pre-reforms period. 
The above figure shows that the public sector still has a large share 
(42.19 per cent) in the country's net capital stock and in gross capital formation 
(32.41 per cent), in spite of a very small share in gross domestic saving (-2.20 
per cent); and by drawing heavily on private savings to maintain a high rate of 
investment, it has managed to retain the same or a slightly higher share in the 
country's GDP (26.17 per cent). 
This brings us to the question as to how productive our total investment 
has been. One measure of the productivity of investment or the use of capital is 
the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR). 
Table 4.11 indicates that the productivity of capital had not been higher 
during the reforms. The filtered ICOR, which was 4.02 from 1981-82 to 1985-86 
increased to 4.56 from 1986-87 to 1990-91 (pre-reforms). It increased further to 
4.74 from 1992-93 to 1996-97 indicating a decline in productivity of investment 
in these four years. There was some improvement in 1997-98, the ICOR 
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declining to 4.62; but it followed a rising trend thereafter with an increase to 
4.74 by 2001-2002. Thus, there has been a clear trend of declining productivity 
of investment from 1998-99 to 2001-2002. 
Table 4.11 
Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR) 
Period/Year 
1981-82 to 1985-86 
1986-87 to 1990-91 
1992-93 to 1996-97 
1997-1998 
1998-1999 
1999-2000 
2000- 2001 
2001-2002 
Actual ICOR 
4.15 
4.00 
3.91 
5.81 
4.14 
3.77 
6.54 
4.70 
Filter ICOR 
4.02 
4.56 
4.74 
4.62 
4.63 
4.66 
4.70 
4.74 
Note: The ICOR can be Susceptible to transitory fluctuations, and is thus 
Smoothened using the HP filter. 
Source: RBI's Report on Currency and Finance, 2001-02. 
4.5 Growth of Employment and GDP: 
The size of employment in any country depends considerably on the level 
of development. Therefore, when a country makes progress and its production 
expands, the employment opportunities often grow. 
In India, from 1991 onwards the production has been expanded in all sectors of 
the economy. However, economic growth by itself does not solve the problem 
of unemployment. In fact, there exists a real conflict between the objectives of 
economic growth and employment in the reforms period. 
There is a positive relation between the GDP growth rate and 
employment generation. The GDP growth determines the demand for labor. 
During 1950s, the employment growth rate was less than 1 per cent, during 
1960s and 1970s it was over 2 per cent (Table 4.12). However, the rate of 
employment decelerated to about 1.8 per cent during 1980s. As far as the GDP 
growth is concerned, the Indian economy recorded an annual growth of GDP 
round about 3.5 per cent from 1950s to 1970s and over 5.5 per cent during 
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1980s showing fluctuation in GDP growth during the period. Even just before 
and also after introduction of economic reforms, this fluctuation continues, 
though after reforms the fluctuations have been minimized with a positive 
growth. 
Table 4.12 
Growth of Employment and GDP during Five Year Plans 
Period 
First FIve-Year Plan (1951-56) 
Second FIve-Year Plan (1956-61) 
Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) 
Three Annual Plans (1966-69) 
Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969-74) 
Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974-79) 
Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-85) 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-90) 
Two annual Plans (1990-92) 
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992-97) 
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) 
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002-07) 
Annual Growth Rates 
GDP 
3.7 
4.0 
2.8 
3.9 
3.4 
5.0 
5.4 
5.5 
3.2 
6.6 
5.5 
7.8 
Employment 
0.39 
0.85 
2.03 
2.21 
1.99 
1.84 
1.73 
1.39 
1.50 
2.61 
2.47 
2.70* 
* Estimated 
Source: Economic Survey, 2007-08 and Handbook of Statistics, Various Issues. 
GROWTH OF EMPLOYMENT AND GDP DURING FIVE YEAR PLANS 
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The fluctuations in GDP growth rate resulted into lesser employment 
generation. The reason is that, during 1950s a large volume of investment was 
made in infrastructural sectors, having only less potential for direct employment 
generation and relatively longer gestation period. During 1960s, employment 
growth grew faster as a result of secondary effects of heavy investments made 
earlier. In the middle of 1970s the employment growth picked up and 
accelerated during 1980s. However, the employment growth did not accelerate 
correspondingly with GDP growth as the major portion of growth was derived 
from productivity growth, and the lines of production, which grew faster, were 
not employment-oriented and as a result the employment elasticity of GDP 
growth declined continuously from 1970s to 1990s. 
The general expectation of economic reform was that, by liberalization, 
the multivariate controls and regulations in different sectors of the economy will 
be removed and more private investments, both internally and externally, will 
be encouraged; hence, capital formation will be boosted. This new competitive 
economic scene will help to add both higher GDP growth rate and employment 
resulting into reduction in unemployment rate. But the introduction of new 
economic policy had adverse effects on employment. It is observed that this 
trend is likely to accelerate with liberalization and opening up of the economy, 
as the compulsions of international competition are likely to further reduce the 
employment intensity partially because of the need of cost reduction but mostly 
for the reasons to improve the quality of the product. 
In short, actual employment growth rates are definitely higher than those 
predicted after liberalization. 
4.5.1 Sectoral Employment Growth: 
There have been similar trends in the annual growth rates of sectoral 
employment. Employment in all sectors increased from 272.39 million in 1987-
88 to 315.84 million in 1993-94 (an annual growth of 2.50 per cent), which 
increased to only 336.75 million in 1999-2000 (1.07 per cent per annum) (Table 
4.13). 
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Table 4.13 
Sectoral Employment Growth 
1. Agriculture 
Employment (in million) 
1987-88 
163.82 
1993-94 
190.72 
1999-00 
190.94 
Annual Growth (%) 
1987-880 to 
1993-94 
2.57 
1993-94 to 
1999-00 
0.02 
II. Industry (Total) 
Mining & Quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, Gas & Water 
Supply 
Construction 
2.40 
32.53 
0.94 
11.98 
2.54 
35.00 
1.43 
11.02 
2.26 
40.79 
1.15 
14.95 
1.00 
1.23 
7.19 
-1.38 
-1.91 
2.58 
-3.53 
5.21 
III. Services (Total) 
Trade Hotels & 
Restaurant 
Transport, Storage & 
Communication 
Financial Insurance, 
Real Estate & Business 
Services 
Community, Social & 
Personal Services 
IV. All Sectors 
22.53 
8.05 
2.59 
27.55 
272.39 
26.88 
9.88 
3.37 
34.98 
315.84 
37.54 
13.65 
4.62 
30.84 
336.75 
2.99 
3.46 
4.50 
4.06 
2.50 
5.72 
5.53 
5.40 
-2.08 
1.07 
Source: Economic Survey, Various Issues. 
The annual growth of employment in certain sectors declined 
considerably and became negative, the largest decline being in 'electricity, gas 
and water supply' from 7.19 per cent in 1987-88 to 1993-94 to -3.55 per cent in 
1993-94 to 1999-00 followed by community, social and personal services (from 
4.06 per cent to -2.08 per cent) and mining and quarrying (from 1.00 per cent to 
-1.91 per cent). In agriculture, the annual growth rate of employment declined 
from 2.57 per cent to 0.02 per cent over these two periods, which may not be 
disturbing as this sector has a lot of surplus labor. In the reforms period, the 
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annual growth rate of employment In manufacturing, construction and all the 
service sectors was much higher than the pre-reforms period. 
4.6 Fiscal Management Indicators: 
Fiscal management indicators do not indicate any significant 
achievements in the reforms period. The annual average growth rate of the 
total revenue of the Centre and the States altogether declined from 16.53 per 
cent in the pre-reforms to 14.22 per cent in the reforms period. As regards the 
decline in tax revenue (15.55 per cent to 14.55 per cent), if is lower as 
compared to no-tax revenue (25.35 per cent to 12.35 per cent). While the 
average annual growth rate of developmental expenditure (excluding loans and 
advances) increased from 14.71 per cent in the pre-reforms to 16.27 per cent in 
the reforms period, the annual average of capital content of developmental 
expenditure declined from 21.83 per cent in the pre-reforms to 18.28 per cent in 
the reforms period. Pre-reforms period also recorded a lower average annual 
growth rate of 16.68 per cent in the case of non-developmental expenditure as 
compared to 17.19 per cent in the reforms period. The annual average of the 
gross fiscal deficit of the centre and the states as percentage of GDP increased 
from 8.58 per cent in the pre-reforms period to 8.78 per cent in the reforms 
period. 
Similarly, the annual average of the total liabilities of the centre and the 
states combined as percentage of GDP increased from 58.95 per cent in pre-
reforms to 61.95 per cent in the reforms period (Table 4.14). 
Thus the main features of the fiscal management during the reforms 
period were a little higher fiscal deficit and developmental expenditure 
(excluding loans and advances) coupled with higher non-developmental 
expenditure. But the areas of concern have been lower growth of resource 
mobilization (both tax and non-tax), decline in the capital content of 
developmental expenditure and a marginal rise in the total liabilities of the 
Centre and the States. 
116 
Table 4.14 
Fiscal Management Indicators (Centre and States Combined) 
1.Total 
revenue 
(tax + non-
tax) %age 
growth 
Non-tax 
revenue 
%age 
growrth 
2. Total 
expendltur 
e 
(Dev, + 
Non-dev.) 
a) 
Developm 
ental 
(excluding 
loans and 
advances) 
%age 
growrth 
d) Capital 
content as 
%of total 
Develop-
mental 
expendltur 
e 
3.Gross 
fiscal 
deficit as a 
% of GDP 
4.Total 
liabilities 
as % of 
GDP 
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8.78 
61.95 
Source: RBI: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Economic Survey, Various Issues. 
4.7 National Policy Regarding Public Sector Reform: 
The Public sector reforms are of strategic importance for furtlier 
sustainable growth of the economy. In the era of the planned economic 
development, there was phenomenal growth in the number as well as coverage 
of public sector enterprises. It is true that after Independence, due to necessity 
as well as in pursuance of the objective of achieving self-reliance with social 
and economic equity, the public sector was assigned dominant role in 
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accelerating the industrial revolution in the country. Besides, the original 
concept of the public sector has also been considerably diluted by takeover of 
sick-units and growth of public enterprises in the consumer goods and service 
sector. The specific reforms related to the restructuring of public sector 
enterprises are as follows: 
• Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed with a view to 
focus it on strategic, high technology and essential infrastructure. 
Further, while reservation for public sector may continue, these areas 
may also be opened to the private sector selectively. The public sector 
will also be allowed entry in the areas not reserved for it. 
• PSEs which are chronically sick and unlikely to be turned around will 
be, for formulation of revival/ rehabilitation schemes, referred to the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) or other similar 
institutions created for the purpose. A social security mechanism will be 
created to protect the interest of workers likely to be affected and 
permitting greater flexibility in taking price decisions, particularly in the 
case of steel, petroleum products and coal. 
• Reducing fiscal deficit by reduction of subsidies and in budgetary 
allocations to the PSUs. 
• Budgetary support to sick public sector industries will be reduced 
drastically. 
• Disinvestments of public sector equity and allowing public sector 
enterprises to form joint ventures and raise fresh equity from the market. 
• In order to raise resources and encourage wider participation, and a part 
of Government shareholding in the public sector would be offered to 
mutual funds, financial institutions, general public and workers. 
• Board of public sector companies would be made more professional 
and given greater powers. 
• There will be greater thrust on performance improvement through the 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOD). Management would be granted 
greater autonomy and will be held accountable. Technical expertise in 
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the Government would be upgraded to make MOU negotiations and 
implementation more effective. 
' To facilitate fuller discussion performance, MOU would be placed in the 
parliament. 
Consequently, the commanding role given to the public sector was an 
economic, social, political compulsion in the post-independent India during the 
50s and 60s. The public sector was considered as the strategic instrument for 
raising the domestic savings and economic growth of the economy. Investment 
rate in the economy was around ten per cent of GDP in 1950-51, which was 
very low. The private sector did not have the financial resources and 
technological capacity to undertake large investments in industry and 
infrastructure. There was negligible possibility for the flow of foreign private or 
global institutional funds for such huge investments. In these conditions, the 
Government had to take up the accountability of large public investment in 
industry and infrastructure through setting up a number of public enterprises. 
The central government followed by the state government was ready to enlarge 
and develop the role of public enterprises. There is no doubt that the 
government did succeed in mobilizing considerable resources which were 
channeled into public sector enterprises for investments in the economy. It is 
also well recognized that in the subsequent period, the PSEs played a 
significant role in the industrialization and infrastructure development of the 
country. Their role in achieving the objective of self-reliance and social targets 
cannot be overlooked. However, the expectation that the public sector would 
generate sufficient surplus which could step up the domestic savings and 
investments in the economy has been counterfeited. The expansion of the 
public sector over the years can be visualized by the fact that by 1988-89, 
PSEs accounted for more than fifty percent of domestic output (at factor cost) 
in mining, manufacturing, electricity, construction, banking and insurance. 
There has been expansion in the investment capacity and output of public 
enterprises, but over the years, there has also been significant decline in their 
profitability and productivity. Consequently, their contribution to the future 
economic growth as well as their capacity to maintain the existing physical 
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assets and discharge the debts incurred by them have been greatly 
undermined and are questionable. The objectives were to make public 
enterprises as an engine of economic progress, eliminate exploitation by 
private sector in natural monopolies, invest the resources in the provision of 
infrastructure facilities and public utility services, which were vital for economic 
survival and sustainability of market-led capitalist system. 
The concept of the Public Sector, as envisaged by Jawaharlal Nehru was 
that public investment should be made in core sector where the infrastructure 
had to be built, and because of its long gestation period and low profitability, 
private investment would not be possible. Hence, public money had to be 
invested in basic industries such as steel, power fertilizers, cement, coal, oil 
and natural infrastructure for producing goods of composition in the private 
sector. At the onset of the decade of 1990s it was felt that the controls and 
regulations had outlined their utility. There was a crying need to give more 
responsibility and role to private capital and enterprise; both domestic and 
foreign market forces were required to be given a greater push. In response to 
this a program of economic reforms has been initiated in the economy. The 
new economic policy is based on the three pillars of Liberalization, Privatization 
and Globalization. In other words, some of the economists believed that the 
Nineties saw the replacement of 'license, quota, permit (LQP) raj' by 
'liberalization, privatization and globalization' (LPG) regime. The policies of 
liberalization, privatization and globalization were given top priorities and made 
basic factors for the development of our economy. 
Liberalization means deregulation and de-licensing of industry, relaxing 
entry barriers and removing restrictions on capacity expansion. While 
privatization, may relate to relative enlargement of the share of the private 
sector in the production of goods and services in the economy. This would 
mean freezing or slowing down of production of goods and services in the 
public sector, and allowing faster expansion of goods and services produced by 
the private sector. For the third pillar, the term 'Globalization' has yet to gain a 
definite meaning. One economist defined it as an exposure to competition with 
the world leader in a particular industry. Another thinks that, it is about free 
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trade in goods and services among tlie nations together with free international 
mobility of factors of production. Therefore, without reforming the PSEs, we 
can't solve the governments' budgetary problem. This has both revenue and an 
expenditure side. The PSEs were supposed to bring in revenue, but they don't. 
On the other hand, losses suffered by the PSEs require government 
expenditure in the form of subsidies. There are around 240 PSEs at the central 
government level, and around 1000 at the state level. Of course, there are 
different types of PSEs. Some are directly run by the government. Others have 
been set up as autonomous and independent companies. Still others, like the 
post office, railways or telecom are run as departmental undertakings. 
Thus, the primary objective of economic reform is to create conditions favorable 
for rapid and enduring growth through better allocation of resources. 
Like most of the developing countries, India's reforms were also preceded 
by an economic crisis. In 1990-91, the gross fiscal deficit of the central 
government reached 7.85 per cent of GDP and annual rate of inflation peaked 
at nearly 17 per cent. During 1980s, the growth rate was accelerated by 
borrowing, but without any drastic restructuring of the economy. This, in turn, 
aggravated the problem of external indebtedness. The external debt rose from 
12 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 to 23 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. India 
borrowed heavily from abroad particularly in late 1980s. Much of the 
borrowings were from commercial banks and a large part was in the form of 
Non-Resident Indian (NRI) deposits which were short term capital inflows at 
high interest rates. Consequently, the debt service burden rose from 10 percent 
of current account receipts and 15 percent of export earnings in 1980-81 to 22 
per cent of current account receipts and 30 percent of export earnings in 1990-
91. 
Besides, the growth rate of India's GNP for the second half of 1980s was 
5.8 per cent per annum as compared to that for the post-reform period 
excluding 1991-92 as the year of exceptional crisis. Being aware of this critical 
phase, the-then Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh proposed to adopt 
market liberalization measures in 1991. 
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The reforms in India followed a gradualist approach. Being crisis-oriented, 
the initial phase of reforms had to focus on macro-economic stabilization. 
Simultaneously reforms of industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policies 
and foreign investment policy were initiated along with tax reforms, financial 
sector reforms and public sector reforms. 
Based on the above analysis of the available empirical evidence relating 
to the behavior of certain key economic variables/ indices it was observed that: 
• The real GDP growth rate (average annual growth rate) increased by 
one and a half percent i.e. 4.47 per cent to 5.95 per cent. 
• Both the savings rate (GDS as % of GDP) and the rate of capital 
formation (GCF as % of GDP) increased significantly - the annual 
average of the savings rate from 21.47 per cent to 23.27 per cent and 
that of capital formation from 23.37 per cent to 24.26 per cent. 
• The volume of foreign trade recorded an impressive growth with the 
growth of exports from 9.0 per cent in 1990-91 to 21.8 per cent in 2006-
07 (i.e. increase of 142.2 percentage points) and growth of imports by 
51.39 percentage points (14.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 21.8 per cent in 
2006-07). 
• There were significant improvements in the debt position - the external 
debt declined from 28.7 percent in 1990-91 to 17.9 percent in 2006-07. 
• The average annual growth rate of developmental and non-
developmental expenditure of centre and states combined both 
increased. On the other hand, there was a marginal increase in the 
growth of gross fiscal deficit as percent of GDP. 
• Productivity of investment as indicated by IGOR (Incremental Capital 
Output Ratio) did not record any improvement. The ICOR increased 
from 4.02 (during 1981-82 to 1985-86) to 4.56 (during 1986-87 to 1990-
91) and to 4.74 (during 1992-93 to 1996-97). 
Since economic reforms were born out of an economic crisis, the 
government and the policy makers had a keen desire to go in for a programme 
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of structural adjustment which should help to strengthen the process of 
stabilization by pulling the economy out of the crisis of balance of payments 
and fiscal deficits. Nearly a decade of the working of economic reforms had 
brought out a significant stabilization of our economy. The growth rate of GDP 
during 1993-94 to 1997-98 had averaged to more than 7 per cent per annum. 
Even during 1998-99, the GDP growth was estimated to be 6.8 per cent and 
during 1999-2000, it was 6.4 percent. Thus, the Indian economy had crossed 
the barrier of Hindu rate of Growth as propagated by Prof. Raj Krishna. 
Secondly, the country had been able to build a foreign exchange reserve of the 
order of US $ 32.4 billion in 1998-99 and thus it was not threatened with the 
problem of paying for its imports. Thirdly, the country had been able to manage 
its external debt, which stood as US $ 98.2 billion in 1999, but the short-term 
debt was only of the order of US $ 4.3 billion. Thus, the country had no fear of 
defaulting on its external obligations. Fourthly, the average export-import ratio 
was improved for the period from 1992-93 to 1998-99. This was really a healthy 
sign. This ratio had slumped to 74 per cent during 1987-88 to 1990-91. Fifthly, 
wholesale price index during 1995-96 to 1999-2000 had shown a very modest 
increase of 3.54 per cent per annum on the average. During 1999-2000, the 
economy witnessed WPI increasing by only 3.3 per cent. Lastly, on the matter 
of reducing fiscal deficit of the central government, the performance had not 
been up to the mark and the fiscal deficit which was 6.3 per cent of GDP in 
1993-94, came down to 4 per cent in 1996-97, but again rose gradually to 5.6 
per cent in 1999-2000 and was expected to be around 5.1 per cent during 
2000-01. But for the fiscal deficit, which had evaded an effective downtrend, it 
could be reasonably established that stabilization of the economy had been 
achieved as a result of economic reforms and the country would shift gears of 
the economy from a 'crisis-driven' economic reforms to 'development-driven' 
economic reforms. The Finance Minster Yashwant Sinha, therefore, asserted in 
his budget speech on 29'" February 2000: " I propose to put India on a 
sustained, equitable and job-creating growth path of 7 to 8 percent year in 
order to banish the scourge of poverty from our land within a decade. The next 
10 years will be India's decade of development." 
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Therefore it can be said tliat, India's reform strategy of stabilization-cum-
structural adjustment measures has produced some satisfactory results in the 
fields of inflation control, industrial growth, foreign currency reserves, banking 
sector, capital market, insurance market and so on. But such inputs are 
inadequate to capture the nature of reforms and their impact on revamping the 
PSUs. Such issue needs to be examined exclusively for the PSUs. 
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CHAPTER-5 
PROFILE OF THE EXISTING PUBLIC SECTOR 
ENTERPRISES 
In the sixties and seventies the public sector policy had been basically 
guided by the industrial policy resolution of 1956, which gave the public sectors 
a strategic role in the economy. Massive investments v^ /ere made in the public 
sector around this time. As a result, many key-sectors of. the economy are 
today dominated by mature public enterprises that have effectively expanded 
production, opened up new areas of technology and built up a reserve of 
technical competence in a number of areas. 
However, there were step-wise developments with reference to the public 
enterprises in India. At first, the public sector turned towards a developmental 
stage during the late fifties. Afterwards, the policies of the government like 
nationalization of Banks and General Insurance, along with the evolution of the 
concept of a joint sector in industry were significantly witnessed. The period 
from the late 1970s was characterized by a review of approaches to planning 
and the role of the public enterprises. In furtherance of this reviewal, a set of 
policies termed the 'New Economic Policy' emerged by the mid 1980s, but from 
the late 1980s, the public sector quite disappointingly began suffering from 
financial problems, stemming almost exclusively from a steady decline in the 
budgetary support. 
In 1985-86, budgetary resources were being provided to the public 
enterprises to meet almost 50 per cent of their investment requirements. This 
share fell to less than 20 per cent by the mid 1990s. Correspondingly, internal 
and extra-budgetary resources increased from about 50 per cent to over 80 per 
cent to the total investment. The direct borrowing within that investment 
increased from about 15 per cent to about 25 per cent (CSO, National 
Accounts Statistics, successive issues). 
These data illustrate the impact of the worsening fiscal situation on the 
resources requirement of the public sector enterprises. The government simply 
could not afford to play an active role as an owner in supporting these 
enterprises in the industrial sector in future without being exceptionally 
selective. The increasing coverage of the public sector enterprises to both 
domestic and external debt also led to the problems of sickness in the future. 
In fact, if the government as the owner can no longer supply ample 
volumes of equity in support of the financial necessities for new investment, 
there is a feeble substitute to the allocation of equity outside the government. 
Thus, the predicament of moderately extensive public sector has become a 
widespread feature and a foremost reliability in the development efforts of 
developing countries. The public sector has been assigned an essential 
responsibility in execution of the basic task of socio-economic development and 
modify with a view to laying the fundamentals of a modern economy. If we look 
at the role of public sector, we find that since 1950, the public sector has been 
attributed to become an instrument in securing speedy import substituting 
industrialization and it is opening avenues to the much desired economic 
infrastructure for initiating a self-reliant growth process, which perhaps may not 
be in the desirable cost-effect manner. 
The gradual increase in the volume of losses by some of these public 
enterprises along with overall low return on capital employed resulted in 
gradual breach of faith in the public sector which was to be generated by 
degrees during the early decades. General opinion was now been turning 
towards the different directions because of the reasons stated below: 
Increasing monopoly, 
Increasing budget and suppression of entrepreneur. 
Poor profitability. 
Encouragement to waste and inefficiency. 
Over production of unwanted goods and services, 
Increasing volume of losses, and 
Constant underutilization. 
At this stage, the appraisal of the progress and performance of the 
public sector is necessary to see whether the objectives for which so much 
stress was laid on, have been fulfilled. Undoubtedly, there has been a 
magnificent growth of the public sector since the beginning of the planning in 
the country. The public sector enterprises occupy a crucial position in the 
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Indian economy particularly in the directions such as development of backward 
regions, provision of public utility services, selling basic inputs or products at 
administered prices, providing medical, educational and housing facilities to the 
employees. These are prominent in key-industries like steel, coal, minerals, 
metals, and heavy equipments Including those mandatory for generating the 
power. It was in the context of the Mahalanobis strategy that the approach to 
the public sector got further crystallized. The long-term growth orientation in an 
import substitution dominated approach required that the domestic capacity of 
conception be biased in the direction of producing capital goods to produce 
more and more. Prof. Tendulkar views that "the distinct preference for the 
public sector in this strategy can be traced to the following reasons: 
First, the concentration of economic power that would result from the 
uncontrolled operation of the market forces can be reduced through the 
extension in the public ownership of means of production. 
Secondly, private investors may demand a higher risk premium for 
investment in certain industries that would be socially justified. Offshore drilling 
of oil is one example in this connection. 
Thirdly, the scale of investment efforts in certain heavy industries may 
be beyond the capital-raising capacity of the private sector, e.g. Steel mill, 
heavy electrical machinery. 
Fourthly, the public sector, through the appropriate price policy for its 
output will generate investible surpluses for further investment in the economy. 
Fifthly, by production as well as distribution of certain universal 
intermediate inputs like coal, steel, electricity etc., the state will be able to 
control the composition of private economic ability in socially desirable 
direction. 
Finally, the public sector would assume the role of a model employer 
and its employment and wage policies would have a moderating influence on 
the corresponding policies in the private sector. 
Analyzing these reasons, one finds that the public sector was expected 
to fulfill varied and sometimes conflicting objectives. The generation of 
investible surpluses was bound to conflict with subsidies involved in keeping 
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the prices of certain universal intermediates at low levels as well as the role of 
public sector like a model employer.^  
Given, the government's target of achieving for this the commanding 
heights of the economy, it was fairly reasonable that the public sector grew 
astonishingly and nowadays it occupies a significant space in the industrial 
sector. Out of 236 operating Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) in 1990-91, on 
the eve of economic reforms, only 123 were profit-making. The top 20 profit-
making PSEs accounted for 80 per cent of the profits, implying that less than 
10 per cent of the PSEs were responsible for 80 per cent of the profits. As 
regards loss-making PSEs, as many as 40 per cent of those were earlier in the 
private sector and then taken over by the government to protect interests of the 
labor, and these accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the losses suffered by the 
public sector. The return on the public sector investment for the year 1990-91 
was just over 2 per cent. Further, the share of the public sector in the net 
capital stock (1992) was 46.2 per cent and its share in the gross value added 
(1990-93) was just 26.8 per cent. Yet another study indicates that while the 
public sector accounted for 55 per cent of the total investment, it contributes 
only 15 per cent of the output. It has also been estimated that of the 2.2 million 
employees in the public sector, nearly 25 per cent of them were surplus. Thus, 
the principal charges against the public sector were low rate of return on 
investment, declining contribution to national savings, poor capacity utilization, 
overstaffing and bureaucratization leading to excessive delays and wastage of 
scarce resources. Under the New Economic Policy (NEP), refocusing of public 
expenditure has concerned selective disinvestments in the public sector 
industries. The goal of privatization is to ensure a better and more effective use 
of capital and greater investment in the social sector on the one hand and to 
enhance the efficiency of the public enterprises and help them assimilate into a 
competitive environment on the other. 
Our aim here is to scrutinize as what is the role of public sector in 
different sectors and different fields of the economy, inclusively whether reform 
^ S.D. Tendulkar; "Approach to the Public Sector in the context of an Overall Development Strategy", Qt. 
by Kapila, Uma; Indian Economy: Issues in Development and Planning and Sectoral Aspects, Academic 
Foundation, New Delhi, 2001, PP.195-196. 
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has shown improvement in its functioning or not? For this purpose, we have to 
proceed to the detailed analysis of its pattern of investment, savings, and its 
contribution to the central exchequer, employment and in many other fields. 
5.1 Financial Presentation of the Public Sector Enterprises: 
5.1.1 Profit outline of the PSEs: 
Profit maximization may not be the only criterion to judge the 
performance of the PSEs as they are guided by a variety of considerations In 
determining prices of their products mainly in the social utility sector. 
Nevertheless, profitability criteria are an important factor and for that reason, 
the study of the financial performance of PSEs becomes essential. Trend of 
profitability of PSEs in the last 15 years from 1991-92 to 2005-06 is given in 
Table 5.1. Table shows that gross profit and gross margin both are increasing 
over the years. As will be seen forth, the return on capital employed is relatively 
low. This is mainly occupied since a large number of enterprises continue to 
make losses. 
Table 5.1 
Trend of Profitability 
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The outline of profit-making and loss-making enterprises over the years 
is given in Table 5.2 In 1990-91, 23 enterprises made net profit of Rs.2272 
crores and in 2005-06, 157 enterprises earned net profit of Rs.76240 crores, 
whereas, 111 enterprises made losses of Rs.3122 crores in 1990-91 and this 
loss increased to Rs.5952 crores which was made by only 58 enterprises in 
2005-06. 
In 2005-06, 157 enterprises made profit and 58 made losses as 
compared to 2004-05, wherein 138 enterprises made profit and 79 made 
losses. Formerly, the profit-making enterprises in 1991-92 and 2000-01 were 
133 and 123 respectively. In the year 1991 -92 and 2000-01, 102 and 110 
enterprises made losses. 
Table 5.2 
Profile of the Public Sector Enterprises 
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Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
An analysis of the 157 profit-making enterprises in 2005-06, reveals that 
the top 10 enterprises earned a net profit of Rs.47371.19 crore (473.7 billion) 
which is 62.13 per cent of Rs.76240 crore (762.40 billion) of profit to the profit-
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making enterprises. The numerals of these enterprises along with their 
proportionate percentage in the total profit are credited to ONGC (30.46 per 
cent), BSNL (18.87 per cent), NTPC (12.28 per cent), IOC (10.37 per cent), 
SAIL (8.47per cent), GAIL (4.37 per cent), National Mineral Development Corp. 
Ltd. (NMDCL) (3.85 per cent), Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd. (NPCL) (3.61 
per cent). Coal India Ltd. (3.61 per cent) and Oil India Ltd. (3.56 per cent). 
It may be noted that the top 10 profit-making enterprises are usually 
working in monopoly environment. Four enterprises are related to oil sector 
(ONGC, IOC, GAIL, Oil India Ltd.), one in telecom sector (BSNL), three in 
power sector (NTPC, Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd., Coal India Ltd.), and 
one pertains to steel sector (SAIL) and last one is National Mineral 
Development Corp. Ltd. Sector-wise analysis reveals that a few sectors are 
major contributors to the profits. As shown in the Table 5.3 three sectors 
(petroleum, power and telecommunications) contribute between 50 per cent 
and 70 per cent of profit of profit-making enterprises. 
Table 5.3 
Sector-Wise Analysis of Profit after Tax 
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5.1.2 Net Loss of PSEs: 
It comes into view that PSEs have sadly failed to wipe out the loss-
making problem, as observed by the persistent losses incurred by them. This is 
effectively supported by the Table 5.4. 
As would be obvious from the Table 5.4, it is disheartening that 44 per 
cent of the total PSEs have incurred a loss to the tune of Rs.1112 crore in 
1984-85, which further increased to Rs.3122 crore in 1990-91, registering the 
growth of loss up to 181 percentage points by 111 units of the total PSEs. 
Contrarily, only 3 PSEs, on an average are found to have made neither profit 
nor loss during the pre-reform period. 
Table 5.4 
Year-Wise Net Loss of CPSEs 
Year 
1984-85 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Source: Data c( 
Total No. of 
Operating CPSEs 
207 
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236 
241 
232 
234 
231 
226 
230 
227 
225 
Dmpiled from Pu 
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1112 
1962 
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4883 
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12841 
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8522 
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Making CPSEs 
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98 
111 
109 
105 
110 
109 
105 
89 
79 
58 
Survey, Various 
No. of CPSEs 
Making Neither 
Profit Nor Loss 
2 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
— 
--
ssues. 
Despite the fact that the degree of loss increased further from Rs.3122 
crore in 1990-91 to Rs.5952 crore in 2005-06, so far the growth of loss has 
reduced from 181 per cent to 91 percentage points. Similarly, the number of 
loss making PSEs has also decreased from 47 per cent in 1990-91 to 26 per 
cent of the total number of PSEs in 2005-06. Besides, the average number of 
PSEs making no profit or no loss has also decreased from 3 to 1 in the post-
reform period. It may, therefore, be concluded that the reform measures of 
1991 have gone in favour of reducing the incidence of the growth of loss in 
PSEs. 
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Amongst the 58 loss-making enterprises in 2005-06, the top 10 incurred 
loss of Rs.4551.85 crores (45.51 billion), which is 76.48 per cent of the Rs.5952 
crore (59.52 billion) loss of loss-making enterprises. The particulars of these 
enterprises together with their proportionate percentage in the total loss are 
Fertilizer Corp. of India Ltd. (28.43 per cent), Hindustan Fertilizer Corp. Ltd. 
(21.19 per cent), Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (12.32 per 
cent). Burn standard Company Ltd. (9.73 per cent), ITI Ltd. (9.29 per cent), 
Hindustan Cables Ltd. (6.49 per cent), Konkan Railway Corp. Ltd. (5.18 per 
cent), Madras Fertilizer Ltd. (2.89 per cent), NTC (A.P., Karnataka, Kerala & 
Mahe) Ltd. (2.28 per cent), and Brahmaputra Valley Fertilizers Corp. Ltd. (2.19 
per cent). It may possibly be noted that amongst the top 10 loss-making 
enterprises, four are from fertilizer sector (Fertilizer Corp. of India Ltd., 
Hindustan Fertilizer Corp. Ltd., Madras Fertilizer Ltd., and Brahmaputra Valley 
Fertilizers Corp. Ltd.) 
Further, it is of great worth to study the composition of the losses in 
terms of the key-sectors. Major losses are accounted in fertilizers, chemicals & 
pharmaceuticals, medium & light engineering, agro-based industries, and 
contract & construction services. These industries are characterized by the 
incidence of a large number of players, most of them being in the private 
sector. The entirely contestable nature of these markets has ensured fair 
degree of protection of the consumer's interest. This raises the concern 
whether the public sector existence is mandatory in markets that are 
completely grown-up. 
From 1991, increasing levels of deregulation and globalization have led 
in an age of strong competition in the economy and the effects of which have 
been felt on certain PSEs. In a number of cases, even profitable PSEs have 
been adversely affected, while in some other cases, the losses of the loss-
making PSEs have compounded. This instance and the effect of sudden 
withdrawal of budgetary support have led to increase level of losses of loss-
making units from about Rs.3723 crore (37.2 billion) in the financial year (FY) 
1990-91 to about Rs.5952 crore (59.52 billion) in the FY 2004-05. In the future. 
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increasing globalization and the orientation towards a market-driven economy 
will bring more competitive pressure on these loss-making PSEs. 
The main reasons for poor performance of the PSEs are overstaffing, 
obsolete technology and lack of funds to invest (e.g., Air India has an old fleet 
of aircraft carriers which are risky to fly but lacks funds to modernize. Likewise, 
National Fertilizer Ltd. has three typical fuel-based plants but lacks funds to 
convert them to gas-based). Another reason is the burden of taking over sick 
units (e.g. National Textile Corporation has 119 sick textile mills making a loss 
of Rs.1058 crore during 1999-2000 alone). 
5.1.3 Export Earning: 
In the framework of the balance of payments position of a country, public 
sector is called upon to play a prominent role in easing the position. Table 5.5 
as given below shows the growth of export earnings by the public enterprises 
over a decade and is divided into three categories, viz. export of canalized 
items, export on non-canalized items and export of services. This table 5.5 
shows that in 1984-85, export earning by PSEs was 5.41 per cent as compared 
to the previous year, which increased to 30.12 per cent in 1989-90. Since the 
reform was initiated in 1990-91, this number fell to 11.31 percent. 
Table 5.5 
Export-Earning of Public Enterprises 
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Source; Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
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Thereafter, as the table shows, a mixed trend i.e. upsurge of a lot of ups 
and downs and in the year 1996-97 there was a marginal increase of 0.55 per 
cent which again increased to 10.93 per cent in 1997-98. Thus, reform has a 
mixed impact on the foreign exchange earnings of public sector enterprises. 
5.1.4 Foreign Exchange Earnings: 
The Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) have contributed 
appreciably to the foreign exchange earnings, which have been demonstrated 
through Table 5.6. Table reveals that excluding the year 1985-86 and 2001-02 
there has been a constant increase in the absolute value of the foreign 
exchange earnings during the period from 1984-85 to 2004-05. Further, it is 
encouraging to note that the foreign exchange earnings, which stood at 
Rs.5830 crores in 1984-85, considerably increased to Rs.7096 crores in 1990-
91, and to Rs.46403 crores in 2005-06, showing an annual growth rate of 
553.93 per cent. However, the percentage increase as compared to the 
previous year shows a lot of ups and downs. The year 1985-86 registered a 
negative percentage increase of 34.38 per cent. However, this negative 
increase resolved to positive increase of 30.80 per cent in 1989-90, which 
declined to 10.94 per cent in 1990-91. In 1991-92 the percentage increase was 
29.65 per cent which declined to 0.55 per cent in 1996-97. It again fell down to 
-15.69 percent in 2001-02. Besides these fluctuations, the year 2005-06 shows 
a positive growth of 9.80 per cent. 
Table 5.6 
Growth of Foreign Exchange Earnings in PSEs 
(Rs. in Crores) 
Year 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
Foreign Exchange 
Earnings 
5830 
3820 
6396 
7096 
9200 
10338 
11873 
Percentage Increase in Foreign 
Exchange Earnings From 
Previous Year 
~ 
-34.48 
30.80 
10.94 
29.65 
12.37 
14.85 
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1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2004-05 
2005-06 
13216 
16269 
16359 
18147 
18828 
19737 
24772 
20886 
42264 
46403 
11.31 
23.10 
0.55 
10.93 
3.75 
4.83 
25.51 
-15.69 
21.12 
9.80 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
5.2 Essential Services: 
The Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs) in India encompass as 
model employers. The five-year plans have highlighted that the profit motive 
and the exploitation of workers for private gain have no place in the state-
owned enterprises. The Fourth plan stated that "the economic activity has not 
to be considered of only in terms of output and return, the primary assessment 
of this would be the good of all those who are engaged in it." 
5.2.1 Township and Housing: 
The PSEs have also made a sizeable amount of investment on 
developing townships and constructing houses for their employees during the 
period under reference. This is evidently verified through the Table 5.7. The 
number of houses per thousand of employees, as shown in the Table 5.7, is 
increased from 298 in 1984-85 to 371 in 1990-91, indicating the growth of 
24.49 per cent. It further increased from 371 in 1990-91 to 494 in 2004-05, 
fetching the growth of 33.15 percentages points. On the contrary, the ratio of 
investment to fixed assets decreased from 2.69 in 1984-85 to 2.55 in 1990-91, 
showing a marginal decline of 5.20 per cent with a fluctuating trend. The above 
ratio further reduced from 2.55 in 1990-91 to 2.26 in 1994-95 to 2.07 in 1999-00 
and to 0.95 in 2004-05 with a persistently descending tendency showing a 
decrease of 62.75 percentage points. 
On the basis of these figures, it may perhaps be safely concluded that 
the ratio of number of house to the employees has satisfactorily improved in the 
post-reform period, possibly owing to labor reformation. Though, a declining 
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tendency of the ratio of investment to fixed assets illustrates a change in 
precedence from social to economic performances of the PSEs. 
Table 5.7 
Development of Township and Construction of Residential Houses 
by PSEs 
Year 
1984-85 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2004-05 
No. of 
Houses (in 
'000) 
628 
807 
824 
900 
806 
878 
869 
840 
Employment 
(Persons in 
Lal(li) 
21.07 
22.36 
22.19 
20.62 
18.06 
17.40 
19.92 
17.00 
No. of 
Houses Per 
000 of 
Employees 
298 
361 
371 
436 
446 
505 
436 
494 
Gross 
Blocl< 
Including 
Work in 
Progress 
(Fixed 
Asset) 
47361 
113602 
148178 
229513 
381210 
411865 
490518 
649159 
Investment 
In 
Township 
(Rs. in 
Crores) 
1274 
2965 
3334 
5187 
7912 
6572 
6791 
6163 
Ratio of 
Investment 
to Fixed 
Assets 
2.69 
2.61 
2.55 
2.26 
2.07 
1.60 
1.38 
0.95 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
5.2.2 Other services: 
Aside from township and housing, the PSEs have also provided 
necessary community facilities like education, health care, recreational facilities 
etc. The following table shows the cost incurred by the PSEs on the socio-
economic welfare of their employees. It is revealed from the Table 5.8 that per-
employee welfare cost of the PSEs increased from Rs.2947 in 1984-85 to 
Rs.6854 in 1990-91, fetching a growth of 133 percentage points. It continued to 
increase further from Rs.6854 in 1990-91 to Rs. 11285 in 1994-95 to Rs. 19424 
in 1999-00 to Rs. 18224 in 2004-05. The growth rate also showed enough 
progress from 133 per cent in the pre-reform period to 166 per cent during the 
post-reform period. 
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Table 5.8 
Cost Incurred on Socio-Economic Welfare by PSEs 
Year 
1984-85 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1994-95 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Employment 
(Persons in Lakhs) 
21.07 
22.36 
22.19 
20.62 
18.06 
17.40 
19.92 
18.66 
17.62 
17.00 
Total Welfare Cost 
(Rs. in Crores) 
621 
1358 
1521 
2327 
3508 
3797 
3060 
3147 
2929 
3098 
Per Employee 
Welfare Cost (Rs.) 
2947 
6073 
6854 
11285 
19424 
21822 
15361 
16865 
16623 
18224 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
5.3 Relation between Fiscal Deficit and Savings-Investment Gap: 
Whereas the savings are more than investnnent in the private sector, i.e. 
private corporate and household, there is a savings-investment gap for the 
public sector. This is owing to macroeconomic imbalances. 
The fiscal situation in India in the 1980s was exemplified by the 
noteworthy inequality deflecting the position to rising fiscal deficit and accretion 
of debt. The revenue account of the center turned into deficit in the beginning of 
1979-80 and the state governments happened to experience revenue gaps 
since 1987-88. Table 5.9, conveys prominent features of the combined central 
and state governments' finances. The combined gross fiscal deficit (GFD) ratio 
of the central and state governments, which averaged 8.8 per cent during the 
five-year period ending in 1989-90 stood at 9.4 per cent in 1990-91 and 
declined to 6.5 per cent by 1995-96, but again reverted to 9.4 per cent by 1999-
2000 and in 2006-07 it reduced to 6.7 per cent. The combined debt to GDP 
ratio of central and state governments touched 61.7 per cent of GDP in 1990-
91. Since then, there has been some improvement in reducing debt ratios, 
although, noticeable regress in 1999-2000. The current level of debt is, still 
amongst the highest in the world. On the expenditure side, the total expenditure 
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of central and state governments which averaged 27.3 per cent of GDP in the 
first-half of the 1980s and 30.1 per cent of GDP in the second-half of the 1980s, 
declined to 25.2 percent of GDP in 1996-97 with rationalization of expenditure. 
Nevertheless, this ratio increased to 28.5 per cent of GDP in 1999-2000. The 
overall repression of expenditure in the recent years was brought about mostly 
by slash in capital expenditures, which is a distributing feature. During the 
recent years, concentration has been strained to the close association between 
the trend components of real output growth and the rates of savings and 
investment in India. For that reason, it is proper to take a look at the sector-
wise gross domestic savings and gross capital formation. 
Table 5.9 
Major Fiscal Indicators (GFD, DEBT, EXP.) 
Period /Year 
1980-81 to 1984-85 
1985-86 to 1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
(As percent of GDP at current market price) 
GFD* 
7.2 
8.8 
9.4 
7.0 
7.0 
8,3 
7.1 
6.5 
6.4 
7.3 
8.9 
9.4 
Debf^  
48.3 
59.1 
61.7 
60.9 
60.6 
62.5 
60.1 
58.0 
56.5 
58.6 
59.5 
62.2 
Exp# 
27.3 
30.1 
28.8 
28.5 
27.2 
27.1 
27.0 
25.7 
25.2 
25.9 
26.3 
28.5 
Note: 
* GFD: Combined gross fiscal deficit of central and state governments. 
^ Debt: Combined debt of central and state governments. 
# Exp: Combined expenditure of central and state governments. 
Source: RBI: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy and Economic 
Survey, Various Issues. 
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5.3.1 Gross Domestic Savings: 
Table 5.10 exhibits the sector-wise rates of gross domestic savings. The 
foremost element of gross domestic savings has been the household sector. 
Within the household sector, the savings continue to be the most important 
support. In 1990s, the household savings accounted for almost 80 per cent of 
the total savings, which is about 16 per cent of GDP. On the other side, public 
savings have been extremely unsatisfactory. The stagnation in the savings rate 
of the corporate sector can be credited to low profitability conditions associated 
with the slackening of industrial activity as well as the restrained capital market. 
The rate of public sector savings which turned negative in 1998-99, 
deteriorated further to a dis-savings of 2.0 per cent in 2001-02 mainly on 
account of a widening trend of revenue deficits in the center and states 
primarily to accommodate the impact of the pay-revisions under the fifth pay 
commission award. However, in the year 2006-07, public sector savings 
increased to 3.2 per cent. Since the public sector has grown up significantly 
and its savings performance is inadequate, the upshot is that it is relying on 
l i in 
capturing private savings for its own use capable of the growing extent. The 
public sector deficit is primarily on account of rapid growth of current 
expenditure as brought out in the Table 5.10The deficit can be reduced only by 
a radical decrease in the government expenditure, predominantly revenue 
expenditure and by raising the government revenue. 
Table 5.10 
Gross Domestic Saving 
Period/Year 
1980-81 to 1984-85 
1985-86 to 1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Household 
13.2 
16.0 
19.3 
17.0 
17.5 
18.4 
19.7 
18.1 
17.0 
17.8 
19.1 
21.1 
21.0 
22.1 
23.2 
24.4 
23.0 
24.2 
23.8 
(As percent of GDP at current market price) 
Private Corporate 
1.6 
2.0 
2.7 
3.1 
2.7 
3.5 
3.5 
4.9 
4.5 
4.2 
3.7 
4.5 
4.3 
3.4 
3.9 
4.4 
6.6 
7.5 
7.8 
Public Sector 
3.7 
2.4 
1.1 
2.0 
1.6 
0.6 
1.7 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
-0.8 
-0.8 
-1.9 
-2.0 
-0.6 
1.1 
2.2 
2.6 
3.2 
Total 
18.5 
20.4 
23.1 
22.0 
21.8 
22.5 
24.8 
25.1 
23.2 
23.5 
22.0 
24.8 
23.4 
23.5 
26.5 
29.9 
31.8 
34.3 
34.8 
Source: Economic Survey, Various Issues. 
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5.3.2 Gross Capital Formation: 
Table 5.11 gives the sector-wise rates of gross capital formation. The 
sectoral composition of gross capital formation points out an enhancement in 
the rates of capital formation in the household sector and public sector in 1999-
00 specifically in comparison with 1998-99, mirroring the increase in 
investments in construction, machinery and equipment by both the sectors. But 
from 2000-01, the public sector has shown fall in gross capital formation due to 
increase in the prices of capital goods corresponding to the general price level, 
by way of growing technological complexity of the production processes in the 
economy in general and manufacturing in particular. On the other hand, the 
rate of private corporate investment has declined with reflecting pressure of 
excess capacity and some loss in the financial health of corporate sector during 
the period of deceleration in overall activity. 
Table 5.11 
Gross Capital Formation 
PeriodA'ear 
1980-81 to 1984-85 
1985-86 to 1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Household 
6.8 
8.8 
10.6 
7.5 
8.8 
7.4 
7.8 
9.3 
6.7 
8.0 
8.2 
10.5 
10.6 
11.3 
12.9 
13.0 
12.9 
12.5 
12.5 
(As percent of GDP at current market price) 
Private Corporate 
4.1 
4.3 
4.1 
5.7 
6.5 
5.6 
6.9 
9.6 
8.4 
8.4 
6.6 
7.4 
5.6 
5.4 
5.7 
6.6 
10.5 
13.3 
14.5 
Public Sector 
9.9 
10.1 
9.3 
8.8 
8.5 
8.2 
8.7 
7.7 
7.0 
6.6 
6.4 
7.4 
6.9 
6.9 
6.1 
6.3 
6.9 
7.6 
7.8 
Total 
20.8 
23.2 
24.1 
21.9 
23.8 
21.3 
23.4 
26.5 
22.1 
22.9 
21.2 
25.3 
23.1 
23.6 
24.7 
25.9 
30.3 
33.4 
34.8 
Source: Economic Survey, Various Issues. 
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GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION (Fig. 5.3) 
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5.3.3 Savings-Investment Gap: 
Savings-Investment gap in respect of the public and private sector is 
obtainable from Table 5.12. The savings-investment gap for the public sector 
augmented to 8.2 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 and causing a large draft on 
household savings. This gap became concentrated to 5.2 per cent in 2003-04 
and further reduced to 4.6 per cent in 2006-07. Further study make known that 
household sector is generating surplus (i.e., savings being more than 
investment); the corporate and public sector is always in deficit. The public 
sector has experienced a remarkable decline in its saving perfomnance. The 
maintenance of domestic savings-investment gap of such an enormity is 
attributed to macroeconomic imbalances. 
AAt 
Financial 
Year 
FY 1980 to 84 
FY 1985 to 89 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Table 5.12 
Savings and Investment Gap: 
(As percent of GDP at current market price) 
Public Sector 
C 
o 
E _ 
in - -
a > 
9.9 
10.1 
9.3 
8.8 
8.5 
8.2 
8.7 
7.7 
7,0 
6,6 
6.4 
7.4 
6.9 
6.9 
6.1 
6.3 
6.9 
7.6 
7.8 
(A 
O) 
IS 
w 
3.7 
2.4 
1.1 
2.0 
1.6 
0.6 
1.7 
2.0 
1.7 
1.5 
-0.8 
-0.8 
-1.9 
-2.0 
-0.6 
1.1 
2.2 
2.6 
3.2 
ii 
6.2 
7.7 
8.2 
6.8 
6.9 
7.6 
7.0 
5.7 
5.3 
5.2 
7.2 
8.2 
8.8 
8.9 
6.7 
5.2 
4.7 
5.0 
4.6 
c 
0) 
E_ 
0) — 
o 
> 
10.9 
13.1 
14.7 
13.1 
15.3 
13.0 
14.7 
18.9 
15.1 
16.3 
14.8 
15.6 
17.9 
16.7 
18.6 
19.5 
23.4 
25.8 
27.0 
Private Sector 
Savings 
2 
o 
1 
O 
n 
3 
o 
I 
13.2 
16.0 
19.3 
17.0 
17.5 
18.4 
19.7 
18.1 
17.0 
17,8 
19.1 
21.1 
21.0 
22.1 
23.2 
24.4 
23.0 
24.2 
23.8 
2 
n 
u 
0 
a 
8 
1.6 
2.0 
2.7 
3.1 
2.7 
3.5 
3.5 
4.9 
4.5 
4.2 
3.7 
4.5 
4.3 
3.4 
3.9 
4.4 
6.6 
7.5 
7.8 
o<2. 
14.8 
18.0 
22.0 
20.1 
20.2 
21.9 
23.2 
23.0 
21.5 
22.0 
22.8 
25.6 
25.3 
25.5 
27.1 
28.8 
29.6 
31.7 
31.6 
(A 
3 
£•« 
3 — 
3.9 
4.9 
7.3 
7.0 
5.0 
8.9 
8.5 
4.1 
6.4 
5.7 
8.0 
7.7 
8.8 
8.8 
8.5 
9.3 
6.2 
5.9 
4.6 
Total 
Public and Private 
Sector 
c 
E _ 
to — 
> 
20.8 
23.2 
24.0 
21.9 
23.8 
21.2 
23.4 
26.6 
22.1 
22,9 
21.2 
23.0 
24.8 
23.6 
24.7 
25.8 
30.3 
31.8 
34.8 
(A 
15 
ra 
18.5 
20.4 
23.1 
22.1 
21.8 
22.5 
24.9 
25.0 
23.2 
23,5 
22.0 
24.8 
23.4 
23.5 
26.5 
29.9 
31.8 
34.3 
34.8 
a '" 
2.3 
2.8 
0.9 
0.2 
2.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.6 
1.1 
0.6 
0.8 
1.8 
1.4 
0.1 
1.8 
4.1 
1.5 
2.5 
0 
Source: Econonnic Survey, Various Issues. 
5.3.4 Fiscal Deficit, Savings and Investment: 
Table 5.13 indicates that between 1990-91 and 1995-96 the combined 
fiscal deficit declined by about 3 per cent of GDP. This fiscal contraction 
together with other factors, such as deregulation of industry and foreign trade, 
made opportunity for the investment boom of first-half of the 1990s and 
acquired aggregate domestic investment to a peak of 35 per cent of GDP in 
2006-07. Deficit reduction in the first-half of the decade facilitated to foster the 
increase in gross savings and investment which in turn gave a boost to India's 
growth to 7 per cent plus. Second-half of the decade also shows the same 
trend i.e. reduction in the fiscal deficit leads to increment in the gross domestic 
investment and gross domestic savings. 
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Table 5.13 
Fiscal Deficit, Savings and Investment 
Year 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1999-00 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
Source: Tab 
Fiscal Deficit 
(Centre + 
State) 
9.4 
6.5 
9.4 
10.3 
9.5 
8.4 
7.4 
6.7 
6.4 
e 5.9 and Tat 
Gross 
Domestic 
Investment 
24.0 
26.6 
23.0 
23.6 
24.7 
25.8 
30.3 
31.8 
34.8 
)le5.12 
(As percent of GDP at current market price) 
Gross 
Domestic 
Saving 
23.1 
25.0 
24.8 
23.5 
26.5 
29.9 
31.8 
34.3 
34.8 
Public 
Savings 
1.1 
2.0 
-0.8 
6.9 
6.1 
6.3 
6.9 
7.6 
7.8 
Private 
Savings 
22.0 
23.0 
25.6 
25.5 
27.1 
28.8 
29.6 
31.7 
31.6 
FISCAL DEFICIT, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT (FIG. 5.4) 
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In the second-half of the decade, between 1995-96 and 2006-07, the 
fiscal deficit shows almost constancy, I.e. decline of 0.1 per cent of GDP. 
However, public savings declined from plus 2 per cent in 1995-96 to minus 0.8 
per cent in 1999-00 and further increased to 7.8 per cent in 2006-07. This in 
turn, explains the drop in gross domestic savings from its peak 25.0 per cent of 
GDP in 1995-96 to 23.5 per cent in 2001-02, i.e. a fall of 1.5 percent of GDP. It 
is quite strange how the drop of 1.5 per cent of GDP in the gross domestic 
savings is reflected exactly in the fall of same magnitude in gross domestic 
investment over these years. It may be described as an adverse impact of 
deficits on savings and investment. However, in 2006-07 gross domestic 
investment increased to 34.8 per cent from 24.8 per cent in 1999-00, fetching a 
growth of 10 per cent. As a result public savings increased from -0.8 per cent in 
1999-00 to 7.8 per cent in 2006-07. 
Further, it is said that larger the public sector deficit, the larger the fiscal 
deficit. The PSEs' savings-investment deficit forms part of overall public sector 
deficit and progress directly in tandem with fiscal deficit. Thus, harmonizing 
PSEs savings-investment deficit is imperative for fiscal stability. 
5.4 Budgetary Support to the Public Sector Enterprises: 
The public sector enterprises (PSEs) are often incapable to produce the 
resources to finance their operation and expansion. The PSEs' savings-
investment deficit is compensated by the government transfers, domestic 
private savings, foreign borrowings, or a mix of all three. Since 1990-91, the 
budgetary support as a percentage of total budgets has declined considerably. 
The size of budgetary support is reflected in the Table 5.14 However, the 
PSEs' need of funds is augmented in turn to become competitive through 
technology up-gradation, downsizing and widening of scope business. 
The Table shows that a module of the gross internal resources created 
by each enterprise is employing for repayment of loans, additional working 
capital requirements, meeting non-plan capital requirements etc. Therefore, the 
total internal resources generated are not always accessible for financing the 
plan schemes. The amount of net internal resources (after utilization internally) 
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offered for financing tlie plan schemes of public enterprises are given in the 
Table 5.14 
Table 5.14 
Resource Mobilization and Plan investment by Central Public Sector 
Enterprises 
Year 
VII Plan 
Period 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
Net 
Internal 
Resources 
20755.35 
6180.57 
7293.45 
10081.80 
9862.03 
14932.90 
16726.90 
13157.81 
15111.81 
19294.95 
13245.95 
25046.96 
25744.98 
32858.83 
31103.29 
32222.46 
42143.53 
Extra 
Budgetary 
Resources 
18053.62 
7696.74 
7987.82 
11001.43 
14743.93 
13445.53 
12674.02 
16901.23 
14912.25 
12280.46 
17700.37 
18007.71 
24713.19 
21017.05 
26855.66 
26006.52 
35723.30 
Budgetary 
Support 
25536.67 
4474.17 
3617.07 
3443.66 
4067.65 
4379.59 
3919.46 
3644.37 
3840.56 
4250.32 
4528.66 
4472.09 
4909.70 
5313.91 
5014.46 
5090.24 
4271.70 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Budgetary 
Support 
from 
Previous 
Year 
--
.. 
-19.16 
-4.79 
18.10 
7.67 
-10.51 
-7.02 
5.38 
10.67 
6.55 
-1.25 
9.79 
8.23 
-5.64 
1.51 
-16.08 
Plan 
Outlay 
64345.64 
18351.48 
18898.34 
24526.89 
28673.61 
32757.12 
33320.38 
33703.41 
33864.62 
35825.73 
35474.98 
47526.76 
55367.87 
59189.79 
62973.41 
63319.22 
82138.53 
Subsidies 
~ 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31210 
43533 
44256 
46514 RE 
47432 BE 
RE: Revised Estinnate, BE: Budget Estimate 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey and RBI: Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy, Various Issues. 
The table also records the amount of extra-budgetary resources raised 
by the public enterprise, budgetary support acknowledged from the government 
and the total plan outlay. 
The Budgetary support accredited from the government increased from -
19.16 per cent in 1991-92 to 18.10 per cent in 1993-94 which declined to -1.25 
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per cent in 2000-01. In 2001-02, the budgetary support was 9.79 per cent 
which fell to -16.08 per cent in 2005-06 showing a fall of 16.08 percentage 
points from pre-reform to post-reform period (i.e. 1991-92 to 2005-06). 
In addition the budgetary support to the PSEs, a big amount of funds is 
used up on providing subsidy as well as sign of loans and interest. The 
government offered a subsidy of Rs.12158 crore (121.5 billion) in 1990-91 
which fell to Rs.11854 crore (118.5 billion) in 1994-95, registering a fall of 2.5 
percent. The subsidy respectively increased to Rs.24487 crore (244.8 billion) in 
1999-00, to Rs.43533 crore (435.3 billion) in 2002-03 and to Rs.47432 crore 
(474.3 billion) in 2005-06, fetching a growth of 93.70 percentage. Thus, 
evaluating the increasing trend of subsidy from pre to post-reform period, we 
find the total growth of 290.13 percentage points. 
5.5 Impact of Economic Reforms of the Year 1991 on the 
Performance of the PSUs: 
In view of the earnestness of crumbled circumstances and growing 
pressure of frequent losses of the PSEs, the Government of India, by means of 
its new economic reforms of 1991, took the first noteworthy step to produce 
maximum-possible funds of their own and also planned through floating of 
shares from the market for bringing them on the right path of sustainable 
growth and constancy in future. Secondly, the monopoly of public sector over 
as many as 17 reserved areas was slashed down to the three. Thirdly, 
accordingly the public sector had now to face a strong competition not only 
from the Indian private companies, but also from those established in abroad. 
Regardless of these snags, the studies carried out in the previous sections of 
this chapter evidently signify a much better performance of PSEs in the country 
during the post-reform period. Some of the most peculiar inferences emerging 
from the interpretation are recorded here under: 
1. This is a reality that the public sector in India has experienced a 
persistently rising trend of investment growth in absolute terms 
throughout the period under reference. But it is quite fatal that as 
compared to the pre-reform period, the growth rate of investment in the 
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PSEs is found to be surprisingly lower during the post-reform period, in 
addition experiencing a marginal reduction in total number of 
enterprises. 
2. A slower growth rate of investment in the PSEs during the post-reform 
period might be, along with other things, one of the factors mainly 
accountable for lowering down the scope of employment as observed 
by the considerable decline in the total number of persons employed 
during the said period. 
3. Analysis reveals that, less than three times increase in internal 
resources of the PSEs along with the noteworthy increase In the ratio 
of internal resources to capital employed has finally resulted in a 
substantial improvement in both the value of output and the value 
added during the post-reform period. 
4. Besides, there has been noticeable boost in the magnitude of sales, 
showing a significant development in the marketing efficiency of the 
PSEs. Thus, a remarkable enhancement in internal resources of the 
PSEs, as observed during the post-reform period, appears to go for 
validating the supposition that economic reforms will lead to not only 
intensification of the total capacity of the PSEs but also accelerating 
the growth rates of both the value of output and the value added. 
5. Consequently, not only foreign exchange earnings have shown a 
considerable increase during the post-reform period but the revenue 
receipts from the PSEs going to the state exchequer have also 
confirmed an exceptional increase during the same period. 
6. In contrast with the pre-reform period, about five times increase in the 
ratio of net profit to capital employed in PSEs during the post-reform 
period has also gone in favour of validating the premise that economic 
reforms of 1991 will help a lot in improving the rate of return on capital 
employed. 
7. An estimation of the financial performance of the PSEs shows that 
though the number of the PSEs incurring losses has, no doubt, shown 
a marginal reduction, the unparalleled increase in the size of incurred 
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losses is of alarming nature, trenchant ahead of suspicions and still 
enduring to sustain a rising level. 
8. Gross fiscal deficit, debt and expenditure as the per cent of GDP are 
almost the same in the pre-reform (1990-91) and post-reform period 
(1999-2000). However, gross domestic savings increased by three 
times in the post-reform period (2006-07) as compared to pre-reform 
period (1990-91). But this increase was slightly less as compared to 
the growth of savings in the private sector. 
9. Similarly, gross capital formation in the public sector has shown 
deterioration. Whereas the private corporate investment has increased. 
10. Lastly, the savings-investment gap for the public sector units shows 
that they are in deficit, whereas for the private sector it was surplus. 
Thus, public sector has experienced a notable downturn in its savings 
performance. 
5.6 Causes of Poor Performance of the PSEs: 
Moreover the satisfying advantages in terms of huge investment, 
government protection, and priority over the private sector, it has not been 
achievable for the PSEs to reach the comprehensive level of advancement 
over the period. The following are the causes of poor performance of the PSEs: 
i. Unresponsiveness or lack of interest on the part of the government 
and/ or public managers towards the financial profitability, 
ii. Unnecessary protection from domestic and foreign competition and 
obligation of monopoly powers or consolidation of several 
enterprises into a single one without any apparent economies of 
scale, 
iii. No strain on enterprises to make a dividend payment or earn 
enough return on capital, 
iv. Too much dependence on government funds normally at 
subsidized rates and extreme confidence on debt more willingly 
than equity financing. 
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V. Poor condition of delayed financial accounts. Besides, divergence 
between social and financial objectives, and prevalence of social 
objectives, 
vi. Excessive control of, and intervention with, the operations of public 
enterprises as well as politics motivated board directors, 
vil. No financial venture of managers in company's financial 
performance, 
viii. Little autonomy for public managers in daily operations. Besides, 
variety of agencies involved in coordination, control and supervision 
of public enterprises, 
ix. Faulty pricing policy and inefficiency in management. 
Apart from the above, the World Development Report^ , 1983 has 
summarized the following reasons, which exemplify the working of PSEs: 
1. Inadequate measure to judge the performance, 
ii. Non-viable or sick State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are seldom 
liquidated, 
iii. No incentives or rewards for improved performance. 
Over and above, sufficient corporate governance practices and efficient 
decision-making skills are by and large absent in the PSEs. All this has finally 
led the PSEs to the poor performance. 
5.7 Proposal for Betterment of the PSEs: 
i. Site comprehensible and realistic goals. 
ii. Liquidate and speed up privatization of some PSEs. 
iii. Reduce unwarranted interference. 
iv. Design the structure of incentives. 
V. Recruit a team of managers with suitable skill 
5.8 Some Procedures to Improve Performance of the PSEs: 
i. Exposing of the public enterprises to domestic and foreign competition. 
•World Development Report; Chapter 8, Managing SOEs, 1983, PP.74 & 76 
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ii. Encouragement of the public enterprises to compete along with and with 
private companies in the same line of business, 
iii. De-linking of enterprise recruitment, promotion and salary administration 
from public service regulations, 
iv. Lessening of operating subsidies, if needed in a phased way, with the 
goal of their total elimination. 
V. Infringement of explicitly centralized and monolithic companies into 
smaller ones, where economies of scale are not important, 
vi. Appointment of proficient directors and entrustment of substantial 
managerial sovereignty in routine operations of the public enterprise 
managers, 
vii. Greater lucidity in the enterprise to make sure improved financial 
accountability, 
viii. Understandable differentiation of the ownership, strategic and operating 
roles, 
ix. Appropriate debt and equity ratio consistent with the business risk. 
X. Concerning of performance to a system of rewards and penalties for 
managers and key staff, 
xi. Dependence on the capital market as principal source of financing and 
stern enforcement by the government of return on capital criteria, 
including dividend payments, 
xii. Bringing into play commonly acknowledged accounting standards, timely 
publications of financial statements, audited by independent private 
auditors, 
xiii. Strengthening of slighted agencies for healthier supervision and setting 
up of some crucial points of the public enterprise for policymaking and 
execution. 
After a through investigation into the policy of reform in the PSEs, it can 
be lucidly concluded that the public sector in India, which was supposed to be 
the vehicle of speedy economic development, has gone through various ups 
and downs. It not only failed to produce surpluses which were anticipated to 
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generate for the future growth, but the return on its investment also remained 
poor. 
There was a mild deceleration in the growth of industrial production in 
1989-90 mainly because of a slow down in manufacturing and mining. With 
regards to the macro-economic environment, the growth of industrial production 
in 1990-91 was encouraging. Regardless of the Gulf Crisis and several 
restrictions on imports of POL and raw materials, the general index of industrial 
production recorded a growth of 8.4 per cent in 1990-91 as compared to a 
growth of 8.6 per cent in 1989-90. The performance of the public sector 
worsened sharply in 1990-91 when the net profit (profit after tax) of all non-
departmental central public sector declined to Rs.2,368 crore from the level of 
Rs.3,789 crore in 1989-90. Such type of poor drift continued in 1991-92. The 
budgetary support to the public sector enterprises was considered necessary to 
be scaled down and they were expected to sustain financial discipline in their 
operation. The sector had also to be exposed to competitive pressures 
wherever possible. The de-licensing of industries in July, 1991 worked well. 
Competition was exaggerated and positive enthusiasm was imparted to Indian 
industry. The achievement of the research favored additional progress in the 
same direction. An important feature of the economic situation in the second 
half of 1992-93 was the resumption of investment activity. 
The industrial sector has been the center of attention of much of the 
economic reforms carried out over the last decade. The slowdown in industrial 
production over the years was, therefore, of particular concern. The reforms of 
the 1990s, which had removed entry barriers to investments, opened trade, 
provided free access to foreign technology, opened up foreign direct 
investment, and removed barriers hindering admittance to capital markets 
which were expected to remain in unremitting high growth in industrial 
production. It was anticipated that, in harmony with the country's comparative 
advantage, the structure of investment in industry would shift from more capital-
intensive industries to more labor-intensive ones. It was also supposed that 
such a change would provide for greater profitability and earnings growth, more 
export-oriented production and greater employment opportunities in industry. 
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However, advancement in this tracl< was restricted after an initial growtti 
episode. 
In the new economic environment, where competition is increased and 
budgetary support reduced, their continued existence in many cases is at 
stake. Most of loss-making enterprises are in the sectors which have become 
fully competitive. This raises the concern that whether the present problems of 
the PSEs can be moderated by change of their ownership or not? 
Arguments in favor of private sectors are largely based on the premise 
of low efficiency for following reasoning: 
First, when market power is momentous, there is no organized efficiency 
divergence between the public and private firms. Hence, there is a little 
pragmatic explanation for a common opinion in favour of or type of ownership 
in the cases where market power is significant. Second, in competitive markets 
where allocative inefficiencies linked with market failures are not substantial, 
other private firms are more proficient than the public ones. This does not 
represent that in competitive markets, the public enterprises are always less 
resourceful. Comparatively, competent public enterprises can and do survive, 
but on an average, incidence of this occurrence is presumed to be lower than 
the private enterprises. Third, the key-factor motivating performance is 
competition. When the public enterprises function in the markets where they 
have market power, they do just as well as private firms operating in the similar 
markets underneath regulation. Where markets are deregulated, the 
performance of both the firms, public and private improves. 
In 1991-92, the Government embarked on a limited disinvestment of a 
part of public sector equity to the public through public financial institutions and 
mutual funds so as to raise non-inflationary finance for development. The 
disinvestment was intended to bring in greater public liability and help to 
generate a new culture in the PSEs' working which was needed to improve the 
efficiency. Being familiar with that the sickness was a serious problem in many 
public sector units; the government modified the Sick Industrial Companies Act 
(SICA) to bring the public sector undertakings also within its purview. This 
made sick public sector units subject to the same regulation as private sector 
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units with reference to the BIFR for Identification of a feasible restructuring 
package or closure as the case may be. 
Making an innpartlal approach to the subject matter, it can be stated that 
the role of the private sector in the economic development of the country would 
not be In a strained manner. The well-designed privatization policy can help to 
give credltablllty and guidance to the process. The strategy involves Identifying 
government objectives, defining guidelines for selecting the PSEs, and 
choosing suitable techniques for privatization. 
The usually pursued objectives are budgetary and financial 
improvement, development of the economy and competence of the enterprise. 
The wide range of privatization activities can be divided into three broad 
modalities: First, ownership transfer, which may be partial or total. Second, 
management transfer which includes management contract, lease and joint 
venture. The third modality is marketisation, which includes distancing of state-
owned enterprises (SOE), providing autonomy, liberalization and deregulation. 
Thus, privatization/disinvestment strategies need to be practical and in 
accordance with the explicit conditions and characteristics of the country 
concerned. The political, economic, social and institutional settings and the 
risks associated with the interaction of all these must be carefully analyzed. 
The next chapter deals with the outcome of the policy of disinvestment and its 
effect on the developing economy of India. 
Since the disinvestment/privatization has been at the core of the PSEs 
reforms, the matter that needs to be enquired thoroughly is especially the 
issues pertaining to the selection of PSE units for disinvestments and the 
resulting social and economic impacts. The task is attempted in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER-6 
DISINVESTMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES: 
AN EVALUATION 
The public sector enterprises have long been a subject of controversy as 
quite many of them were incurring huge losses and, therefore, were considered 
to be drain. In spite of that the PSEs continued to be defended on the ground 
that regardless of profit or loss their existence serves various purposes 
especially the social one besides contributing to the economy in an indirect 
fashion. But a stage comes when the losses become unsustainable and 
continued budgetary support to make up for such losses begins to militate 
against the objective of fiscal corrections. Therefore, the high on the agenda of 
PSEs reforms was the selling of such units to private sector. This would not 
only save the expenditure on keeping them alive but it could fetch non-debt 
incurring revenue which the central government needed most at that time of 
fiscal crisis when not only fiscal deficit but revenue deficit too was quite high 
and was slipping towards unsustainability. 
Besides strategic sale of these loss-making units, some revenue was 
also proposed to be received from the profit-making PSEs by off-loading a part 
of their equity holdings. 
6.1 Disinvestment Program and Strategy: 
In the year 1993, a committee was constituted under the chairmanship of 
Mr. C. Rangrajan by the Central Government. Suggestions were given by the 
committee that the disinvestment of contribution in the public sector should not 
be more than 49 per cent of paid up capital. In addition to this the government 
will secure its share to the minimum 51 per cent in coal, minerals, petroleum, 
atomic energy, railways and military materials. Afterwards, a new commission 
was established in the year 1996 under the leadership of G.V. Ramakrishnan, 
the former member of planning commission. The Disinvestment Commission 
was taken to be responsible for the following strategies in the public sector: 
• Opening of public sector units to private participation which denotes a 
new approach in looking after the needs of the society and rethinking 
on the role of government. 
• The commission evolved that a long-term disinvestments protects 
employee's interest and broadcasting ownership. 
• The commission also suggested strengthening of profitable PSEs to 
promote greater competitiveness and profitability, to pay higher 
dividend and enhance share value. 
• Sustaining long-term employment by financial turnaround of loss-
making PSEs and providing better compensation through VRS 
scheme. 
• The commission ensured the long-term viability of loss-making units. 
The PSEs were needed to be allowed to operate freely to make 
strategic alliances with domestic private enterprises or with foreign 
companies. Yet another pattern could be the formation of joint 
ventures. 
• If the basic objective is to improve performance, the PSEs should be 
so structured that they provide a faster response and promote 
decision-making with managerial autonomy. In short, we can say that 
restructuring in ownership, organization technology, resources and 
personnel is the utmost need of the present day. 
The commission divided the process of disinvestment into two parts: 
a) To draw up a comprehensive long-term disinvestment program, 
b) To bring priorities in the sequence and determine the extent of 
dominance and supervise the sales process. 
While the modalities of disinvestment were determined by the commission, the 
actual sale of shares of PSEs was done through the Department of Public 
Enterprises. The Disinvestment Commission presented its report in three parts: 
• Part A-dealing with an overview of the Central Public Sector 
Enterprises. 
• Part B-containing general recommendations. 
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• Part C-containing specific recommendations with regard to IVIodern 
Foods Industries Ltd., Indian Tourism Development Corporation and 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. 
6.2 Classification of Industry Groups: 
The Disinvestment Commission classified the public sector enterprises 
into three broad sectors; strategic, core and non-core. 
A. Strategic Sector; It contains industries that are important from the national 
security angle. These industries are the exclusive preserve of public sector 
and the question of disinvestments in such industries does not arise. These 
are: (a) arms and ammunition and the allied items of defence equipment, 
defence aircrafts and warships, (b) atomic energy, (c) minerals specified in 
the schedule to Atomic Energy (control of production and use) order 1953 
and (d) railway transport. 
B. Core Sector; It contains industries which are capital or technology intensive. 
Telecommunications, power generation and transmission, petroleum 
exploration and refining are the cases in point. With the entry of private 
sector in these areas, there may be a tendency towards an oligopolistic 
market structure. Hence, presence of public sector will be necessary for 
sometime as a countervailing force and prevent concentration of private 
economic power. The commission was of the view that public sector 
disinvestment in such core industries would be limited to a maximum of 49 
per cent. 
C. Non-core Sector: This category is self-explanatory. The commission was of 
the view that existing public sector in these industries has no unique or 
special responsibilities. It favored disinvestments up to 74 per cent or more 
in such cases. 
Based on the foregoing framework, the commission classified 20 PSEs 
as core and 15 as non-core out of 40 PSEs referred to it. The remaining 5 
(Bharat Electronics Ltd., Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd., 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd., 
and Engineers India Ltd.) were left to be considered at a later date. The 
strategic industries were not referred to it (Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1 
Disinvestment Commission's Categorization of PSEs into 
Strategic, Core, Non-core Sectors 
strategic Sector: 
(i) Arms and ammunitions, 2. Atomic energy, 3. IVIinerals, 4. Railway transport. 
Core Sector: 
1. Oil and Natural Gas Commission, 2. Oil India Ltd., 3. Bongaingaon Refineries and 
Petrochemicals Ltd., 4. Steel Authority of India, 5. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., 
6. Gas Authority of India Ltd., 7 Air India, 8. Container Corporation India Ltd., 9. Pawan 
Hans Ltd., 10. Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., 11. Northern Coal Fields Ltd., 12. South 
Eastern Coal Fields Ltd., 13. Western Coal Fields Ltd., 14. Bharat Aluminium Co. Ltd., 
15. National Aluminium Co. Ltd., 16. IBP Co. Ltd., 17. National Thermal Power 
Corporation Ltd., 18. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., 19. National Hydro Power 
Corporation, 20. Kudremukh iron Ore Co. Ltd. 
Non-core Sector: 
1. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd., 2. India Tourism Development Corporation, 3. 
Indian Petrochemical Corporation Ltd., 4. Fertilizer and Chemicals (Travancore) Ltd., 5 
National Fertilizers Ltd., 6. Madras Fertilizer Ltd., 7. Hotel Corporation of India Ltd., 8. 
HTL Ltd., 9. ITI Ltd., 10. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., 11. Hindustan Latex 
Limited, 12. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd., 13. Hindustan Copper Ltd., 14. Hindustan Zinc 
Ltd., 15. Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. 
The commission outlined a long-term strategy for disinvestment with the 
following four long-term objectives: 
• To strengthen the PSEs where appropriate in order to facilitate 
disinvestment, 
• To protect employees' interests, 
• To broad base ownership and 
• To augment receipts for the government. 
The Central Government was much interested in quick disinvestments. Hence, 
for first time, the Disinvestment Ministry was established and a three-tier 
system was developed for the implementation of program: 
• Cabinet Committee under the leadership of Prime Minister for final 
decision. 
• Secretary Level core group committee- Discussion on the commission's 
suggestions. 
• Inter-Ministry Co-ordination Committee for coordination and suggestions 
to the cabinet committee. 
It was also announced that for strategic considerations, the government will 
continue to retain a majority holding and also protect the interest of workers in 
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all cases of disinvestments. Opposition parties criticized the disinvestments of 
profit making PSEs. In the Union budget 2000-01, the Finance Minister assured 
for restructure and revival of potentially viable and close down government 
equity in all strategic PSEs to 26 per cent or lower, if necessary and full 
protection of the interest of workers. 
The UPA Government stated its disinvestments policy in the National 
Common Minimum Programme (NCMP) of May 2004. The statement made on 
the new policy was that, "the government is committed to a strong and effective 
public sector, whose social objectives are met by its commercial functioning. 
But for this, there is need for selectivity and a strategic focus. It is pledged to 
evolve full managerial and commercial autonomy to successful, profit 
companies operating in a competitive environment." 
The disposition was that the generally profit-making companies will not 
be privatized. All privatization will be considered on a transparent and 
consultative case by case basis. The existing 'Navratna' (See Annexure-1) 
companies will be retained in the public sector while these companies raise 
resources from the capital market. Every effort will be made to modernize and 
restructure sick public sector companies and revive sick industries. Chronically 
loss-making companies will either be sold off or closed after all workers have 
got their legitimate dues and compensation. 
6.3 Short fall of PSEs Disinvestment: 
In view of increasing revenue deficit in the Central Budget on account of 
the revenue expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and 
salaries of Government employees and subsidies, the Government was left 
with hardly any surplus for capital expenditure on social and physical 
infrastructure. A huge amount of public resources is blocked in several non-
strategic PSEs which give an insufficient return to the government. The 
Government is forced to commit further resources for sustenance of many non-
viable PSEs in the absence of exit route. Above all, it has to subsist a huge 
amount of outstanding debt before any money is available for investment in 
infrastructure. The case for disinvestment of Government's stake is obvious. 
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As compared to private sector, public sector units often suffer from 
interference or neglect. For private owners, the economic success of their 
enterprise is their top priority. 
Even when a public sector unit is well-managed, cash-poor Governments 
often cannot give it the investment capital it needs for new equipments and 
staff-training. Private owners have better access to investment of money to 
help the business grow. 
Disinvestment can make poor economies richer because: 
• It reduces the economically-crippling Government debt. 
« It turns the loss-making, tax-eating public sector units into profitable, 
tax-paying business, by giving to the government more money to spend 
on infrastructure, schools and clinics etc., 
• It provides goods and services more efficiently than the units under the 
government management, generally resulting in better service and 
lower prices to the consumers, 
• It expands the scope of services with its access to investment capital, 
so that electricity, telecommunications and other necessities are 
available to more people, 
• it makes the young employees better-trained and builds up a national 
talent-pool which helps to attract more investment to India in many new 
and different sectors, 
• It often spreads share-ownership, letting more and more ordinary 
families share in corporate profits and build their own wealth, 
• It convinces potential investors that India is a good place in which they 
can invest their money, create newer and bigger industries and more 
jobs. 
6.4 Revival of Sick PSEs. 
Sickness in PSEs was a continuing concern of the government. The 
reasons for sickness varied from enterprise to enterprise. During the past 
fifteen years, that is from 1992-93 to 2006-07, 75 PSEs had been referred to 
the BIFR (Annexure-2). The year-wise registration of CPSEs with BIFR is given 
Table 6.2. 
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In some cases, the cause of sickness is historical; textiles companies 
which were taken over from the private sector on social consideration for 
protecting employment of workers in early seventies could not be modernized 
quickly. British India Corp., Bird Jute & Exports and NTC belong to this group. 
Besides textile companies, there are other enterprises as well which were 
taken over from the private sector but could not be modernized. These include 
engineering and refractory enterprises such as Andrew Yule & Co., Bharat 
Wagons & Engineering, Biecco Lawrie, Praga Tools, Burn Standard, 
Braithwaith & Co., Richardson and Cruddss Ltd.; drug companies like Bengal 
Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., transportation/ shipping companies like 
Hooghly Dock & Port Engineering Ltd., Central Inland Water Transport Corp. 
and consumer goods companies like Tyre Corp. of India and Hooghly Printing 
Co. Ltd. 
Table 6.2 
Registration of PSEs with BIFR 
Year 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
Total 
No.ofCPSE 
33 
6 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
5 
2 
1 
1 
75 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07 Vol.1 
The other groups of sick companies (other than taken over) are 
Greenfield companies. These became sick on account of obsolete technology, 
high input cost, high overhead cost and the administrative price mechanism. 
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These include fertilizer companies such as Fertilizer Corp. of India, Hindustan 
Fertilizer Corp., Pyrites, Phosphates and chemicals Ltd.; chemicals and drugs 
companies like Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Hindustan Insecticides 
Ltd., and Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. Etc. 
Some companies have been set up for serving national objectives like the 
development of backward areas. The Nagaland Pulp & Paper Company Ltd., 
Manipur State Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., North Eastern Regional 
Agricultural Marketing Corp. Ltd. are the examples of such enterprises. These 
companies have been suffering from losses from inception on account of 
inadequate infrastructure etc. 
In addition to the above reasons, some common problems faced/being 
faced by sick and loss making PSEs include adverse market/ administrative 
prices, stiff competition, weak marketing strategies, low capacity utilization and 
high interest rates. Table 6.3 shows the status of PSEs registered with BIFR. 
Table 6.3 
Status of PSEs Registered With BIFR 
S. No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
Particulars 
Revival scheme sanctioned 
Draft scheme circulated 
Declared no longer sick 
Dropped on net worth becoming positive 
Dismissed as non-maintainable 
Winding up recommended 
Failed and reopened 
To be allocated 
Remanded by Court/AAIFR 
Deregistered vyjth BIFR 
Change in management 
Total 
Number 
19 
2 
5 
4 
3 
26 
1 
12 
1 
1 
1 
75 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07 
Attempts have, therefore, been made to overcome 'sicknesses' in these 
PSEs through various policy initiatives. The statement on industrial Policy 
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(1991), the different Budget speeches over the years and other policy 
pronouncements by the Govt, have addressed this issue from time to time. 
As many as 75 sick industrial PSEs were registered with BIFR up to 
30.6. 2007; out of these 5 enterprises have been declared no longer sick and 
the cases of another 4 PSEs have been dropped due to their net worth 
becoming positive. A company is termed sick if at the end of any financial year, 
it has accumulated net losses equal to or exceeding its entire net worth. 
A perusal of Table 6.4 shows that the number of loss-making PSEs had 
been declining over the years. In comparison to 97 loss-making enterprises in 
March 2003, there were 59 PSEs in March, 2007. The number of employees in 
these enterprises has also been showing a big decline, it came down from 
631040 employees as on 31.3.2003 to 103599 employees as on 31.3. 2007. 
Table 6.4 
Highlights of Loss-Making PSEs 
Years 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
2005-06 
2006-07 
PSEs 
(no.) 
97 
83 
81 
63 
59 
Accumulated Net Losses 
(Rs. In crores) 
As on 31*'March 
68048 
64806 
77826 
61550 
70796 
During the 
Year 
_ 
(-)3242 
13020 
(-) 16276 
9246 
Employees 
(no.) 
631040 
375587 
341053 
108931 
103599 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07 
Government set up a Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector 
Enterprises (BRPSES) in Dec, 2004 to advise the Govt, inter-alia on the 
measures to be taken to restructure/revive the PSEs, including cases where 
disinvestments or closure or sale were justified. As per the definition of sick 
PSEs given above and the performance evaluation of PSEs for 2005-06 and 
previous years, 75 PSEs were referable to BRPSE. Up to 30.9.2007, cases of 
57 sick PSEs had been referred to the BRPSE, out of which the Board had 
made recommendations in respect of 46 cases. In addition, the Board had also 
recommended to the Govt, to accord "in principle" approval for rescinding of its 
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earlier decision to close the units of Fertilizers Corp. of India Ltd. (FCIIL) and 
Hindustan Fertilizers Corp. Ltd. (HFCL) and to explore various options for their 
revival. Out of these 46 cases, Govt, had approved revival proposals in respect 
of 26 cases of CPSEs. Out of these 26 cases of revival approved by the Govt, 
till 31.10.2007, 15 were approved during 2005-06, 10 cases were approved 
during 2006-7 and one case was approved during 2007-08 (up to 31.10.2007). 
The restructuring/revival proposals approved by the Govt, involved a total 
expenditure of Rs.8285 crores including Rs.1955 crores as cash assistance an 
Rs.6330 crores as non-cash assistance. The enterprise-wise details of cash 
and non-cash assistance in respect of revival proposals are given in Annexure-
3. 
6.5 Modes and Effects of Disinvestment: 
The disinvestment process started in the year 1991 with sale of minority 
stake, which continued up to 1999. The first disinvestment commission 
submitted its reports on 58 PSEs (includes 38 profit-making), whereas 72 PSU 
were referred to the commission (includes 47 profit-making) up to 1999. The 
commission suggested six modes for disinvestment, viz; 
Strategic Sale: under strategic sale method the management control was also 
transferred to the buyer. A substantial stake is being sold along with control 
over the PSEs. 
Trade Sale: under this mode, small lots of shares were to be offered in the 
market for sale. It involved 100% change of ownership through direct sale of 
stock at a pre-fixed price. 
Sale Involving no Change in Ownership/ Management: this mode involved 
sale of shares in small lots at a fixed price so that their may not be any change 
in ownership or management 
Disinvestment Deferred: commission recommended postponing 
disinvestment in a few PSEs which may be considered later. Second 
commission had referred 3 PSEs of this category for strategic sale. 
No Disinvestment: the first commission recommended one PSEs for no 
disinvestment but the second commission referred that PSEs for strategic sale. 
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Closure/Sale of Assets: the commission suggested tliat if there is no interest 
of investor's in any PSEs, there would be no option but to liquidate the 
company. 
Table 6.5 
Mode of Disinvestment and No. of Companies Recommended by the 
Disinvestment Commission 
Mode of Disinvestment and Name of Companies Recommended 
A. Involving Change in Ownership/ iVIanagement 
1. Strategic Sale*: Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd., Indian Telephone 
Industries Ltd., Bharat Aluminium Co.Ltd., Hindustan Organic Ltd., 
Kucdremukh Iron Co. Ltd., BHEL, Engineer India Ltd., Bharat Refinery 
Petroleum Ltd., Indo-Burma Petroleum Co. Ltd., NEPA (formerly The 
National Newsprint Papers Mill Ltd.), Hindustan Zinc Ltd., Pyrites 
Phosphates and Chemical Ltd., National Fertilizers Ltd., Fertilizers and 
Chemicals Travancore Ltd., Indian Petrochemicals Corporation, 
Hindustan Cables Ltd., Shipping Corporation of India, Hindustan Latex 
Ltd., Air India Ltd., Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., State Trading 
Corporation, Paradeep Phosphates Ltd., Metallurgical & Engineers 
Consultants India, Hindustan Petroleum Co. Ltd., Hospitals Services 
Consultants Ltd., Modern Food Industries Ltd., Rastriya Chemicals & 
Fertilizers Ltd., Reyroll Burn Ltd., Neyveli Lignite Corp.Ltd. and 
Manganese Ore India Ltd. (Employee's Buyout Strategic Sale: Rail 
India Technical Services Ltd. and Projects and Equipment Corp. Ltd.) 
2. Trade Sale: Indian Tourism Development Corp. Ltd., Madras Fertilizers 
Ltd., Pawan Hans Helicopters Ltd., Ranchi Ashok Bihar Hotel Corp. (R. 
Ashok), Utkal Ashok Hotel Corp. (U. Ashok), Hotel Corp. of India Ltd., 
Metal Scrap,Trading Corp. and Sponge Iron Ltd.. 
B. Involving No Change in Ownership/ Managements: 
Gas Authority of India Ltd., Container Corp. of India Ltd., Mahanagar 
Telephone Nigam Ltd., National Aluminium Co. Ltd., and National 
Mineral Development Corp. Ltd. . 
C. No Change: 
1. Disinvestment Deferred: Oil India Ltd., Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd., 
Manganese Ore India Ltd., NTPC, National Hydro Power Corp. Ltd., 
Neyveli Lignite Corp.Ltd., Power Grid Corp. of India Ltd., Steel Authority 
of India Ltd., Central Electronics Ltd., Projects & Equipments Corp. Ltd., 
and Mineral Exploration Corp. Ltd. 
2. No Disinvestment: Rail India Technical & Economic Services Ltd.# 
D. Closure/ Sale of Assets: 
Engineering Projects (India ) Ltd., Electronic Trade & Technology 
Development Corp., Hindustan Vegetable Oil Corp. Ltd. And 
Rehabilitation industries Corp. Ltd. 
Grand Total 
No. of 
PS Us 
29 
08 
05 
11 
01 
04 
58 
* The first Disinvestment Commission had identified 29 PSEs for strategic Sale, while the 
second Disinvestment Commission referred 2 more PSEs for strategic Sale 
# Second Disinvestment Commission recommended it for strategic sale. 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey 
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6.6 Use of Proceeds: 
Disinvestment means sale of assets and any prudent financial 
management would suggest that proceeds must be used for creation of another 
asset; however it has never been so. Thus, the process of disinvestment can 
be meaningful when the best of public purpose is served and when the manner 
of utilizing the proceeds of disinvestment is clearly in the national interest. If 
disinvestment is linked to the budgetary deficit, it cannot be considered 
desirable. That is why the Disinvestment Commission had recommended that it 
should be completely de-linked from budgetary requirement. It was argued that 
the proceeds of disinvestment should go towards retirement of Government 
debt and thereby reduce the burden of interest payment on the budget. 
Another point of view expressed by the official agencies is that all 
monies in the budget are fungible and it matters little whether the proceeds of 
disinvestment are merged with capital receipts and used to reduce the fiscal 
deficit or to retire Government debt. The argument further points out that in a 
situation of government having to borrow to meet the fiscal deficit, the use of 
disinvestment proceeds for this purpose would reduce borrowing. The capital 
receipts from disinvestment are therefore effectively used to reduce 
Government's capital liabilities and have the same effect as retiring 
Government debt. 
It is necessary to examine both points of view in order to build public 
awareness on the need for an orderly disinvestment programme for profitable 
PSEs as well as loss-making PSEs. 
While the argument of fungibles of resources is plausible, it has to be 
examined with reference to budgetary practice and convention. Broadly, 
budgetary expenditure is classified as plan and non-plan, Revenue and Capital. 
Similarly, revenue and capital receipts are treated as Government income, 
apart from receipts in the public account. These conventional classifications in 
the budget are intended to inform parliament and the public about the 
Government's sources of income and the purposes for which the funds are 
spent. Moreover, disinvestment proceeds arise from a one-time sale of 
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Government shares in the PSEs, while the revenue deficits and fiscal deficits 
can be recurring and even increasing on a long-term basis. 
As indicated in the overall approach to disinvestment in loss-making 
PSEs, several of them need funds for financial restructuring and for downsizing 
the workforce through the acceptable Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS). 
Disinvestment only in the most profitable PSUs will be of temporary and limited 
benefit to the budget unless the recurring draft on the budget from loss-making 
PSEs is eliminated on a long-term basis. This would require an initial release of 
funds from the budget which can be recovered from later disinvestment after 
restructuring. The separation of disinvestment proceeds from the other non-
debt receipts In the budget; 
• Will help in highlighting the seriousness of the fiscal and revenue 
deficits and can compel actions to deal with them in the context of 
taxation, subsidies etc., 
• Will demonstrate that disinvestment in the profitable PSEs will 
initially go to take care of employee interests through VRS and other 
measures and for preparing the potentially viable PSEs in non-core 
and core sectors for eventual disinvestment, 
• Will provide greater public awareness of the justification for 
disinvestment as a long-term solution to the problems connected with 
improving efficiency in the use of capital, reducing budgetary drain 
from loss-making PSEs and persistent shortage of budgetary 
resources for accelerating grov\/th to alleviate poverty. 
The common minimum programme of the United Front Government had 
stated that the proceeds from the disinvestment process would be appropriate 
for utilization in two vital areas. Viz. health and education, particularly in the 
poorer and backward districts of the country. It further stated that a part of such 
revenue will be allowed to create an investment fund to be used to strengthen 
other public sector enterprises. 
On its part, the Disinvestment Commission recommended that, proceeds 
of disinvestment be placed separately in a Disinvestment Fund (DF) and not be 
fungible with other Government receipts. The National Renewal Fund (NRF) 
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should be merged with this fund, the resources in the disinvestment fund may 
be used for temporarily meeting the losses of some PSEs before 
disinvestment, where required, for a limited period during the process of short-
term cent to ensure limited control over special resolutions brought forward in 
the general body meetings; 51 per cent to have effective control and 100 per 
cent for full ownership. The extent of disinvestment in strategic, core and non-
core non-strategic sectors could be 'Nil'; 49 per cent and 74 per cent or more, 
respectively. The common minimum programme has also indicated the 
possibility of withdrawing PSEs from non-core and non-strategic sectors. The 
Approach Paper of the Ninth Plan also states that: 'disinvestments will be 
considered up to 51 per cent and beyond in the case of PSEs operating in a 
non-strategic and non-core sectors'. The utmost need is to define very clearly 
what enterprise falls into what category. There is a general degree of 
consensus that in non-strategic and non-core sectors disinvestment can be 
beyond 51 per cent. For the rest of the sectors, the criterion of disinvestment 
can be up to the extent of improvement and efficiency that can be brought 
about as well as the need to take care of the financial requirements of the 
government. 
The last and the most important issue that arises with respect to 
disinvestment relates to the process adopted for disinvestment. This revolves 
around appropriate valuation of the shares and the modus operandi or modes 
adopted for sale. 
An important and perhaps most critical issue in the process of 
disinvestments or privatization of PSEs is valuation. Be it disinvestments of 
1991-92 or that of BALCO in 2001, valuation has always been at the core of 
controversy. This is so because there are several methods of valuation and 
different methods yield widely varying results. As a consequence, valuation 
becomes more an individual perception of the valuer. Disagreement on the 
pricing is one of the major reasons for sluggishness in disinvestment 
programme in India as different people put different values on the PSEs leading 
to suspicion and controversy and consequent confusion. For instance, while 
some felt that the price realized from sale of 51 percent shares of BALCO was 
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reasonable, others thought that the price realized was only a fraction of the real 
value and the deal smacked of scam and corruption. The criticality of the Issue 
in disinvestment or privatization can be easily gauged from the fact that the 
value of BALCO as put by different people differed as widely as from RS.1100 
crore to Rs.5000 crore. 
Another aspect which makes the valuation a sensitive issue is that the 
disinvestments/ privatization of PSEs involves transfer of ownership of public 
assets to private individuals and any suspicion on account of valuation can give 
the impression that undue benefit has been given to the buyers who are private 
individuals at the expense of public exchequer. 
6.7 Valuation Techniques: 
The guidelines on valuation in the PSEs, are prescribed in chapter 18 of 
the manual entitled "DISINVESTMENT: POLICY & PROCEDURES", published 
by the Ministry of Disinvestment in 2001. The disinvestment commission has 
prescribed four approaches to valuation of PSEs.^  These are: 
• The discounted cash flow method 
• The balance sheet method 
• Transaction multiple method 
• The net asset value method 
While the first three are business valuation methodologies generally 
used for valuation of a going concern, the last methodology would be relevant 
only for valuation of assets in case of liquidation of a company. 
Valuation is a different exercise whether in the private or public sectors -
in India or elsewhere. This is all the more so when the different valuation 
methods give different results. 
Thus, there are two processes available that prove to be of greater 
transparency during the disinvestment process: 
I. Offering shares of public sector enterprises at a fixed price through 
a general prospectus. The offer is made to the general public 
through the medium of recognized market intermediaries. 
^ Net. 
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II.. Sale of equity through auction of shares amongst predetermined 
buyer clientele whose number can be as large as necessary or 
practicable. The reserve price for the public sector enterprises 
equity can be determined with the help of merchant bankers. 
Both the methods have their own merits and demerits. In the first 
alternative of 'offer for sale', difficulties may be to estimate and determine the 
'fixed price', if the sale is done for the first time and the shares have not been 
traded in the stock exchange. On the other hand, this method is advantageous 
of increasing the ownership widely amongst the general public. In case of those 
public enterprises for which the sale of equity is to be done for the first time and 
where track record of trading in shares is yet to be established, the tender 
system would be advantageous. Once a reasonable market price is established 
by normal trading after a reasonable period of time and a public enterprise 
completes the preparatory work, the fixed price method would be appropriate. 
The next issue is in respect to restructuring. In some cases, restructuring 
can result in increasing the proceeds of disinvestment. Thus, a proper cost-
benefit analysis must be carried out in this regard to make restructuring 
process profitable. 
6.8 Progress of Disinvestment Program: 
The PSEs were disinvested with various methods under different 
schemes to have fair receipts. Thus, it becomes quite apparent to understand 
the actual sales proceeds and methodology adopted in the proceeds of 
disinvestment and also to have a look at the sales receipts in various years. 
Therefore, in the year 1993, the Government appointed a committee on 
disinvestment in public sector enterprises. The committee suggested the best 
method for disinvestment by offering the shares to the general public at a 'fixed 
price' through general prospects. Since these shares were not traded on the 
stock market, it remained difficult to decide the 'fixed price'. The optimum is that 
till a normal trading atmosphere Is created, the auction method with wide 
participation may be adopted. The choice of the method of valuation of shares 
of public sector enterprise should take into account the special circumstances 
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affecting the operations of the public sector enterprises, such as the past focus 
on social responsibilities rather than pure commercial considerations. In a 
general practice, 10 per cent of the proceeds of disinvestment may be set apart 
by the government for lending to the public sector enterprises on confessional 
terms to meet their expansion and rationalization needs. The Government 
adopted two methods of disinvestment: 
I. Selling of shares in selected public sector enterprises; and 
II. Strategic sale of a public sector undertaking to a private sector 
company. 
The first method was adopted over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99 and since 
1999-2000 emphasis shifted to the second method. 
Strategic sale has been proved very successful. Before the year 2000, the 
Government had primarily sold minority shares in public sector companies. The 
prices realized through the sale of shares (see Table 6.6), even in blue chip 
companies like IOC, BPCL, HPCL, GAIL & VSNL was low as shown by Price to 
Earning Ratios (PE Ratios). On the other side, the prices realized through 
strategic disinvestment have been very high. 
Table 6.6 
Comparison of PE Ratios for sale of Shares vs. Strategic Disinvestment 
Sale of Shares 1991-99 
NameofPSE 
IOC 
BPCL 
HPCL 
GAIL 
VSNL 
PE Ratio 
4.9 
5.7 
5.9 
4.4 
6.0 (in monopoly days) 
Strategic Disinvestment (1999 to Oct. 
2002) 
Name of PSE 
BALCO 
CMC 
HTL 
MFIL 
LJMC 
PPL 
JESSOP 
IBP 
VSNL 
HZL 
MARUTI 
IPCL 
PE Ratio 
19 
12 
37 
Very High as earning 
per share was 
negative 
-do-
-do-
-do-
63 
11 (inclusive of 
income from dividend 
etc.; after the end of 
monopoly) 
26 
89 
58 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Vol. 1, 2002 
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Table 6.7 shows the summary of progress of Disinvestment Program from 
1991-92 to 2004-05. From 1991-92 to Jan. 2004-05, disinvestment had been 
completed in 48 central Government PSEs. Target receipt from disinvestment 
of these PSEs was Rs.95, 500 crore of which actual receipts amounts to Rs.47, 
750 i.e. 50 per cent. Except 1991-92, 1994-95, 1998-99 and 2003-04, the 
target was unrealized. This confirms slow and poor progress of disinvestment 
policy of the government and strong antagonism/resistance by opposition 
parties, trade unions and business and social organizations. 
The success in 1991-92 was due to the decision to accept extremely 
low bids for share 'bundles' which Included equity from PSEs which would have 
othenA/ise commanded a handsome premium. The average price at which more 
than 87 crore shares were sold in this year was only Rs.34.83 as compared 
with the average price realization of Rs. 109.61 since then. 
In 1994-95, success was due to off-loading of a significant chunk of 
shares in very attractive and profitable PSEs like BHEL, Bharat Petroleum, 
Container Corporation of India, Engineers India, GAIL, and MTNL etc. In 1998-
99, the success was due to the reason that cash rich PSUs like ONGC, GAIL 
and IOC were forced to buy shares of PSEs. 
In the Budget Speech for 2002-03, it was stated that the Government 
has completed strategic sales in 7 public sector companies and some hotels 
properties of the Hotel Corporation of India Limited (HCIL) and the India 
Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC). The change in approach from the 
disinvestment of small lots of shares to strategic sales of blocks of shares to 
the strategic investors has improved the price-earning ratios obtained. 
In 2003-04 budgets, the target for disinvestment was set at Rs.14, 500 
crore. The Govt was able to raise Rs.13, 200 crore by making public offer In 
MarutI Udyog Ltd. (MUL), and Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (HZL). In order to achieve 
the targets the government decided to make public offer of shares of six PSUs, 
CMC (formerly computer Maintenance Corporation), IPCL (Indian petro-
chemicals Corp.), IBP (earlier Indo-Burma petroleum), now controlled by Indian 
Oil Corporation, Dredging Corp. of India, ONGC and GAIL. Since all these 
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PSUs are highly profitable organizations, their shares were over subscribed 
and the government hoped to collect Rs.14, 126 crore. 
Table 6.7 
Disinvestment in PSEs and Methodologies Adopted 
No. of Target receipt Actual receipt Methodology 
Companies In for tfie year 
which equity (Rs. In crore) 
sold 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00# 
2000-01 
2001-02# 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Total 
47 (31 in one 
tranche and 16 
in other) 
35 (in 3 
tranches) 
13 
5 
1 
1 
5 
4 
4 
9 
6 
9 
1 
48* 
2500 
2500 
3500 
4000 
7000 
5000 
4800 
5000 
10000 
10000 
12000 
12,000 
13,200*^  
4000 
95,500 
3038 
1913 
0 
4843 
361 
380 
902 
5371 
1860 
1871 
5632 
3348 
15547 
2684 
47,750 
Monitory shares sold by auction 
method in bundles of'very good', 
'good' and 'average companies' 
Bundling of shares abandoned. Shares 
sold separately for each company by 
auction method. 
Equity of 7 companies sold by open 
auction but proceeds received in 94-
95. 
Sale through auction method, in which 
NRIs and other persons legally 
permitted to buy, hold or sell equity 
allowed to participate. 
Equities of 4 companies auctioned and 
Government piggy backed in the IDBI 
fixed price offering for the fifth 
company. 
GDR (VSNL) in international market. 
GDR (MTNL) in international market. 
GDR (VSNL)/ Domestic offerings with 
the participation of Flls. 
(CONGER, GAIL). Cross purchase by 
3 oil sector companies i.e. GAIL, 
ONGC & Indian Oil Corporation, 
GDR-GAIL, VSNL - domestic issue, 
BALCO - restructuring, MFlL's 
strategic sale and others. 
Strategic sale of BALCO, LJMC, 
Takeover- KRL (CRL), CPCL(MRL), 
BRPL 
Strategic sale of CMC- 51%, HTL -
74%, VSNL- 25%, IBP- 33.58%, PPL -
74%, and sale by other modes: ITDC & 
HCL; surplus reserves: STC and 
MMTC. 
Strategic sale: HZL -26%, MFIL -26%, 
IPCL-25%, HCI, ITDC, Maruti; control 
premium from renunciation of right 
issue, ESOP: HZL, CMC. 
Maruti - IPO (27.5%), Jessop & Co. 
Ltd. (Strategic sale -72%), HZL (call 
option of SP -18.92%), Public Offers -
IPCL (28.95%), CMC (26%), IBP 
(26%), DRDG (20%), GAIL (10%), 
ONGC (10%), ICI (9.2%) 
NTPC (IPO) (5,25%) 
* Total number of companies in which disinvestment had taken place. 
# Figures (inclusive of control premium, dividend/ dividend tax, restrictions and transfer of 
surplus cash reserves prior to disinvestment etc) 
" Revised budget estimate was Rs.14, 500 crore for the year 
Source: Public Enterprise Survey, 2004-05. 
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Disinvestment had also been undertaken in the states Out of 222 State 
Level Public Enterprises (SLPEs) identified for disinvest, winding up, 
restructuring, the process of disinvestment had been initiated in 124 
enterprises, 30 SLPEs had been privatized and 68 SLPEs were closed down. 
Taking the Central Government PSEs and State Level PSEs, total investment 
in public enterprises in India is of the order of about Rs.4,86,700 crore - a huge 
figure indeed. Three-fourths of this investment has been in heavy and basic 
industries and in infrastructure so as to provide an industrial base to the 
economy as also to build its capacity for growth. As per the information, 
investment in Central Government PSEs during 1990-2005 had risen from 
Rs.99,329 crore on 3 f ' March 1990 to Rs.3,57,939 crore as on March 31, 
2005 (Public Enterprises Survey), showing an annual average growth rate of 
6.67 percent Total proceeds realized from disinvestment was Rs.47, 750 crore 
i.e. 13.34 per cent of total investment in PSEs. Till March 2004, as against the 
target of Rs.95, 500 crore, actual realization had been of the order of Rs.47, 
750 crore (Table 6.7). 
6.8.1 Privatization through Change of Ownership: 
The industrial policy statement of 24 July 1991, for the first time 
envisaged disinvestments of part of Government holdings in the equity share 
capital of the selected PSEs. From 1991 to 2000, the emphasis of privatization 
was on the disinvestment - the offloading of government's minority shares to 
the public or financial institutions. During this period, the government offloaded 
shares in as many as 39 public enterprises. Since March 2000, emphasis was 
increasingly been on strategic sales of identified PSEs. Strategic sale refers to 
outright transfer of control in PSEs to private management. This normally 
involved the sale of 26 per cent or more of government equity to a private 
ownership. 
Table 6.8 briefly summarizes the amount realized and the number of 
PSEs disinvested or privatized till 2004. Modern Foods was the first PSE to be 
strategically sold. Ever since the sale of Modern Foods, every single 
disinvestment had followed the strategic sale route. 
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Table 6.8 
Strategic Sale of PSEs Year 2000 Onwards 
S.No. 
1a. 
1b. 
2. 
3. 
4 a. 
4 b. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 a. 
10 b. 
10 c. 
11. 
12 a. 
12 b. 
13. 
14. 
15-17. 
18-36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
Name of PSE 
Modern Food 
Industries Ltd. (MFIL) 
MFIL- Phase-ll 
Lagan Jute Machinery 
Corporation 
BALCO 
CMC 
CMC$ 
HTL 
VSNL'^  
IBP 
PPL 
IPCL 
HZL 
HZL"* 
HZL$ 
Jessop 
Maruti Udyog Phase 1 
Maruti Udyog Phase II 
State Trading 
Corporation of India 
(STC)# 
MMTC Ltd. # 
HCL (3 Hotels) 
ITDC (19 Hotels) 
ICI 
IPCL 
IBP Co. Ltd. 
CMC Ltd. 
DCI 
GAIL 
ONGC 
Total 
Date 
January 2000 
July 2000 
March 2001 
October 2001 
October 2001 
February 2002 
February 2002 
February 2002 
May 2002 
April 2002 
Nov. 2003 
April 2003 
August 2003 
March 2002 
July 2003 
March 2003 
March 2003 
2001-02 
Various Dates 
2001-02 
Various Dates 
October 2003 
March 2004 
March 2004 
March 2004 
March 2004 
March 2004 
March 2004 
Ratio of paid 
up equity 
sold % 
74 
26 
74 
51 
51 
61 
74 
25 
33.6 
74 
26 
26 
18.92 
1.5 
74 
-
27.5 
100 
100 
9.2 
28.95 
26 
26.25 
20 
10 
10 
Face Value of 
Equity Sold 
(Rs. in Crore) 
9.63 
3.38 
0.70 
112.52 
7.73 
0.91 
11.10 
71.20 
7.40 
320.10 
64.50 
109.80 
79.90 
6.17 
68.10 
-
39.73 
14.70 
27.10 
3.76 
71.85 
5.80 
3.98 
5.60 
84.60 
142.60 
1272.86 
Realization 
(Rs. Crores) 
105.45 
44.07 
2.53 
826.50 
152.00 
6.07 
55.00 
3689.00 
1153.68 
151.70 
1490.84 
445.00 
323.88 
6.19 
18.18 
1000.00 
993.34 
40.00 
60.00 
242.51 
444.17 
77.10 
1202.85 
350.66 
190.44 
221.20 
1627.36 
10542.40 
25462.12 
'^ Including dividend & dividend tax, withdrawal of surplus cash prior to disinvestment, 
*** Realization from call option 
$ Disinvestment in favor of employees 
# The receipt is on account of transfer of cash reserves. 
Source: Public Enterprises survey, NET 
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PROCEEDS FROM DISINVESTMENT 
(Rs. lnCrore)(Fig. 6.1) 
12000 
10000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
10542 
1627 1491 
1154 827 
445 
JZI 
441 
3010 
243 
ONGC VSNL GAL PCL BP BALCO 
COMPANY 
HZL (TDC HCL OTHERS 
The second strategic sale was of Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO). 
After this 43 central PSEs have been strategically sold. Of these, nineteen are 
hotels of Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) and three were 
hotels of Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. (HCIL). Together, these hotels had 
contributed 686.68 crores towards divestiture proceeds. For all the nineteen 
hotels, 100 percent of the equity was sold. In terms of individual sales, as 
shown in Figure 1 , maximum proceeds (Rs. 10542.40 crore) were collected by 
selling 10 percent of the equity in ONGC, followed by the contribution made by 
VSNL (Rs. 3689 crore), Maruti Udyog- MUL (Rs. 1993.34 crore), Indian 
Petrochemicals Ltd., IPCL (Rs.1490.84 crore), GAIL (Rs.1627.36 crore) and 
IBP(Rs. 1153.68 crore). 
1 7 7 
6.8.2 Disinvestment Decisions under Review: 
On the 6'*^  July, 2006, the Govt, decided to keep all disinvestment 
decisions and proposals on hold, pending further review. The PSEs, where 
disinvestment decisions were to be/ had been reviewed, are mentioned below: 
National Mineral Development Corporation Limited (NMDC): 
The Govt, had decided on 12"^  January, 2006 for disinvestment of 15% 
equity in NMDC out of the Government's holding of 98.39% through the 
process of book building the decision of 6'^  July, 2006, the process for 
implementation of the disinvestment decisions was not pursued further. 
Neyveli Lignite Corporation Limited (NLCL): 
The Govt, had decided on 22"" June, 2006 for disinvestment of 10% 
equity of NLCL out of Government's holding of 93.56%) through the book 
building process. Following the decision of 6"^  July, 2006, the process for 
implementation of the disinvestment decision was not pursued further. 
National Aluminium Company Limited (NALCO): 
On 22"^ ^ June, 2006, out of the 87.15% Government's holding, 
government decided to disinvest of 10% equity of NALCO through the book 
building process. Following the decision of 6'^  July, 2006 the process for 
implementation of the disinvestment decision was not pursued further. 
Power Finance Corporation Limited (PFCL): 
The Govt, had approved on 22""^  December, 2005 an IPO by PFCL, 
consisting of fresh issue of 10 percent of pre-issue paid-up capital of the 
company and disinvestment through a public offer (IPO) of 5 percent of 
government's shareholding in PFCL. This was reviewed consequent to the 
decisions of 6^^ July, 2006. Subsequently, on 23''' November, 2006, the Govt, 
approved an IPO by PFCL consisting of a fresh issue of equity only consisting 
11.385% of pre-issue capital of PFCL. The IPO of PFCL was completed in 
February, 2007. 
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REC, NHPC and PGCIL: 
The Govt, had approved on 23'"'' November, 2006, the proposals 
for fresh issue of 20% of the pre-issue paid-up equity capital in Rural 
Electrification Corp. (REC) and fresh issue not exceeding 24% of the Power 
Grid Corp. of India Ltd. (PGCIL) paid-up equity capital in tranches, first tranch 
being limited to 10% only through IPO. Subsequently, on 7"" December, 2006, 
the Govt, approved the proposal of National Hydroelectric Power Corp. Ltd. 
(NHPC) for fresh issue not exceeding 24% of the paid-up capital in one or more 
tranches. Thereafter, on S"' February 2007, the Govt, decided to piggy-back 
with an offer for sale of 10%, 5% and 5% of the pre-issue paid-up equity of 
REC, PGCIL and NHPC respectively. The details of expected realization from 
these disinvestments are given in Table 6.9 
Table 6.9 
Expected Realization From Disinvestment 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
PSE 
REC 
PGCIL 
NHPC 
Equity on 
31.3.06 
(Rs. in 
crores) 
780.60 
3,623.44 
10,349.00 
GO! 
holding 
Pre-
issue 
(%) 
100 
100 
100 
Tota 
Book 
Value 
as on 
31.3.06 
(Face 
value 
of Rs. 
10) 
53.78 
26.80 
14.40 
Proposed 
fresh 
issue of 
equity by 
PSE. 
%of 
Equity 
Capital 
(Pre-
issue) 
10 
10 
10 
Proposed 
disinvest-
ment out 
of Govt.'s 
share 
holding. 
%of 
Equity 
Capital 
(Pre-
issue) 
10 
5 
5 
Realization 
based on 
book value 
(Rs. in crore) 
CPSE 
420 
971 
1,490 
2,881 
GOI 
420 
486 
745 
1651 
GOI 
holding 
after 
the IPO 
(%) 
81.22 
86.36 
86.36 
Source: Public Enterprises Sun/ey, 2006-07; Vol.1 
OIL, IOC, HPCL & BPCL: 
On 30'*' August 2007, the Govt approved the proposals for fresh issue of 
10% the post-issue paid-up capital of OIL through IPO, and also to issue 
additional 1% of the post-issue paid-up capital to the employees of OIL on 
reservation basis at the issue price of retail investors. Simultaneously, the Govt. 
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also approved disinvestment equal to 10% of Oil's pre-issue paid-up capital in 
favour of IOC, HPCLand BPCLin the ratio of 2:1:1 respectively. 
6.9 Performance of the Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs): 
It has been observed in the recent years that there is a noticeable in the 
performance of PSEs and this is evident by their recent upbeat on several 
indicators of performance. 
The changing profile of PSEs is evident from the fact as the Bombay 
Stock Exchange PSE Index denoted that the value of shares of 34 PSUs rose 
from 988 in January 2002 to 3,812 on February 20, a rise of 386 percent; as 
such the PSEs have become machines which create wealth very rapidly. 
Similarly, the shares of individual companies also show remarkable upward 
movement. 
The performance of related PSEs after the introduction of disinvestment 
Programme is as follows: check data given upto 2003 
I. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC): With Rs.1, 20,000 crore, IOC is about 
twice the size of the Reliance or the Tata Group. The revenues of the 
company increased from Rs. 69,430 crore in 1998-99 to Rs.1, 19,848 
crore in 2002-03 a noticeable increase of 73 percent. IOC is the only 
company which has entered the list of fortune 500 companies. (Rank 191 
in 2003). 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Reserves 
Source: Public Enl 
2000-01 
1,17,371 
2,720 
15,192 
erprises Survey, Vol.3 
2001-02 
1,14,864 
2,885 
14,532 
2002-03 
1,19,848 
6,115 
18,149 
I. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC): ONGC is India's most 
valuable company with Rs.1, 06,000 crore in February 2004. It earned a 
net profit of Rs.10, 529 crore in 2002-03 the upto highest level achieved. 
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Thus, even after paying a 300 percent dividend, the ONGC could have 
reserves worth Rs.34, 313 crore. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Reserves 
2000-01 
24,270 
5,299 
28,885 
2001-02 
23,857 
6,198 
28,296 
2002-03 
35,387 
10,529 
34,313 
Source: Ibid 
These reserves are undistributed profits which indicate investment 
capacity. The company is investing Rs.400 crore per day on oil exploration and 
hopes to reach the target of 20 million tones of oil and gas by 2020. it has 
further explored Bombay High with an investment of Rs.8, 200 crore in 2001-
06. at the same time the company is entering in the field of refining and retail 
trade to minimize the risk inherent in exploration. It had also started setting up 
its petrol pumps in 2004-05. 
III. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL): SAIL is India's biggest producer of 
steel. The company has reduced its labor costs by reducing its manpower 
from 1.78 lakh in 19996 to 1.33 lakh in 2003, and at the same time, raised 
its average labor productivity from 95 tonnes of crude steel per employee 
to 123 tonnes within five years. The company was able to generate a net 
profit of Rs.1498 crore in 2003 as against a net loss of Rs.1, 707 crore in 
2001-02. It had also repaid a debt or Rs.3000 crore and thus, became 
able to reduce its debt equity ratio from 6.5 to 2.5 which is also recorded 
as a healthy development. But the company was expected to improve its 
performance to come at par with Tata Steel producing 245 tonnes per 
employee in a year. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Reserves 
2001-02 
15,502 
-1,707 
-1,301 
2001-02 
19,207 
-304 
-1,605 
April-Dec.2003 
16,934 
1,498 
NA. 
Source: Ibid 
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IV. Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL): GAIL is engaged in the business of 
gas transmission and retailing covering 90 percent of the natural gas sold 
in the country. It has monopoly in gas business. It earned a net profit of 
Rs.1639 crore in 2002-03 and created a reserve of Rs.5493 crore in 2002-
03. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Resen/es 
2000-01 
9,197 
1,126 
4,634 
2001-02 
9,568 
1,186 
4,490 
2002-03 
10,642 
1,639 
5,493 
Source: Ibid 
V. National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC): NTPC is the single 
largest producer of power accounting for 27 per cent of the electricity 
produced in the country. It earned a net profit of Rs. 3,608 crore in 2002-
03 and created a reserve worth Rs. 23,700 crore. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Resen/es 
2000-01 
18,970 
3,734 
18,008 
2001-02 
17,787 
3,548 
20,840 
2002-03 
19,020 
3,608 
23,700 
Source: Ibid 
The company planned to raise its capacity from the present level of 
20,935 MW to 56,000 MW by 2017. For this purpose it decided to invest 
Rs.1, 40,000 crore from 2004. 
VI. Shipping Corporation of India (SCI): SCI accounts for 40 percent of 
Indian tonnage. Its employee strength was reduced from 10,000 in 1996 
to 7225 in 2003. It earned a net profit of Rs.275 crore in 2002-03. But 
there occurred a decline in the revenue from Rs.3, 132 crore in 2000-01 to 
Rs.2, 443 crore, which was due to freight traffic fluctuation resulting from 
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the impact of global trade. Now, SCI ships are also carrying goods from 
US to China. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Reserves 
2000-01 
3,132 
383 
1,925 
2001-02 
2,906 
242 
1,852 
2002-03 
2,443 
275 
2,030 
Source: Ibid 
VII. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (BSNL): BSNL was corporatized In 
October, 2001. BSNL has been slow in its growth as against private 
players like Reliance and Bharati Tele Ventures. This is due to the fact 
that BSNL has failed to compensate for the decrease in demand of basic 
telephones by increasing demand for mobile phones. If the BSNL can 
combine flexibility with efficiency, it can still hope to rule the telephone 
market. 
Rs. Crore 
Revenue 
Net Profit 
Oct.-March 2000-01 
11,597 
375 
2001-02 
2,430 
5,740 
2002-03 
25,293 
1,444 
Source: Ibid 
6.9.1 Profit and Loss Making PSEs: 
Table 6.10 and 6.11 provide the list of top ten profit-making and top ten 
loss-making PSEs. ONGC, BSNL and IOC Ltd. ranked first, second and third 
amongst the profit-making enterprises, which coincides with the cognate group-
wise performance. Equally significant was to note that these ten companies 
accounted for 62.76 per cent of the total profits of all profit making PSEs. 
Amongst the loss-making companies, the fertilizer companies led the rest. The 
total net loss of these ten PSEs amounted to Rs.6236 crore during 2006-07 
which was as high as 75.84 percent of the total net loss of loss-making 
enterprises. This included accounting losses of closed/non-operating 
enterprises as well. 
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S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Table 6.10 
Top Ten Profit Making PSEs 
Name of the PSEs 
Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. 
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. 
National Thermal Power 
Corporation Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
Coal India Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. 
GAIL (INDIA) Ltd. 
National Aluminium Company 
Ltd. 
National Mineral Development 
Corp. Ltd. 
Total 
Net Profit 
2006-07 
15642.92 
7805.87 
7499.47 
6864.71 
6202.29 
2822.81 
2414.70 
2386.67 
2381.38 
2320.21 
56341.03 
(Rs. in crores) 
%age share 
17.42 
8.70 
8.35 
7.65 
6.91 
3.14 
2.69 
2.66 
2.65 
2.58 
62.76 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07; Vol.1 
Table 6.11 
Top Ten Loss Making PSEs 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
To 
Name of PSEs 
Fertilizer Corporation of 
India Ltd. 
Hindustan Fertilizer 
Corporation Ltd. 
National Jute Manufacturers 
Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan Photo films 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 
National Textile Corp. Ltd. 
Air India Ltd. 
ITI Ltd. 
Indian Drugs & 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Hindustan Cables Ltd. 
Indian Airiines Ltd. 
tal 
Net Loss 
2006-07 
(-)1432.59 
(-)1065.14 
(-)794.49 
(-)653.06 
(-)535.80 
(-)447.93 
(-)405.26 
(-)351.16 
(-)310.68 
(-)240.29 
(-)6236.40 
(Rs. in crores) 
%age share 
17.42 
12.95 
9.66 
7.94 
6.52 
5.45 
4.93 
4.27 
3.78 
2.92 
75.84 
Source: Ibid. 
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6.9.2 PSE Wise Net Profit / Loss of 'Taken Over' Sicic PSEs: 
The table given below shows that, top three loss-making enterprises in 
2006-07 were National Textile Corp. Ltd., Burn Standard Co. Ltd., and Andrew 
Yule & Co. Ltd. The loss of each in figure was Rs. (-) 53580 lakh, Rs. (-) 15186 
lakh and RS. (-) 8957 lakh respectively. On the contrary, top three profit-making 
enterprises were Central Inland Water Transport Corp. Ltd (Rs.26, 288 lakh), 
Praga Tools Ltd. (Rs.9192 lakh) and Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd (Rs. 7022 lakh). 
Birds Jute & Exports Ltd was the only company which earned a loss of about 
Rs. (-) 882 lakh in 2003-04 and had no profit or loss in 2004-05 but again it 
gained a profit of Rs.857 lakh in 2005-06 which turned into a loss of Rs. (-) 463 
lakh in 2006-07. If we look at their total net profit/loss we find that over the 
years i.e. from 2003-04 to 2006-07 their losses were increasing. These 20 
companies were earning a total net loss of Rs. (-) 35358 lakh in 2003-04 which 
is increased to Rs. (-) 57865 lakh in 2006-07 registering a negative growth of 
63.65 percentage points. 
Table 6.12 
Net Profit / Loss of 'Taken Over' Sick PSEs 
(Rs. in Lakh) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5, 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
PSEs 
Andrew Yule & Company Ltd. 
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. 
Bengal Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. 
Bharat Refractories Ltd. 
Bharat Wagon & Engg. Co. Ltd. 
Biecco Lawrie & Co. Ltd. 
Birds Jute & Exports Ltd. 
Braithwaite & Co. Ltd. 
Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. 
British India Corp. Ltd. 
Brushware Ltd. 
Burn Standard Company Ltd. 
Central Inland Water Transport 
Corp. Ltd. 
Hindustan Vegetable Oils Corp. Ltd. 
Hooghly Dock & port Engineers Ltd 
Hooghly Printimg Co. Ltd. 
National Textile Corp. Ltd. 
Praga tools Ltd. 
Richardson & Cruddas Ltd. 
Tyre Corp. of India Ltd. 
Total 
2006-07 
-8957 
7022 
-469 
-1532 
-2414 
231 
-463 
57 
447 
-366 
-4 
-15186 
26288 
-2291 
-7297 
12 
-53850* 
9192 
-3762 
^793 
-57865 
Net Profit/Loss 
2005-06 
-7407 
4680 
-845 
-707 
-2488 
22 
857 
221 
139 
-20287 
-3 
-44274 
-4366 
-3433 
-3803 
24 
-700 
11651 
-4259 
-4769 
-61347 
2004-05 
-7544 
2983 
-353 
-521 
-2810 
128 
0 
-2190 
94 
-1354 
-4 
-11872 
-6726 
-3433 
-4192 
99 
-662 
-3439 
-3306 
-5686 
-50788 
2003-04 
-5463 
1858 
795 
-940 
-2405 
-296 
-882 
-2356 
119 
2175 
-4 
-11065 
-14791 
-3433 
-3065 
73 
-1033 
1604 
-3296 
455 
-35358 
* Due to consolidation of accounts of merged 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2005-06 
subsidiary companies. 
& 2006-07 
185 
6.9.3 PSEs in Terms of Investment: 
Total investment in the top ten enterprises accounted for Rs.208197 
crore i.e. 52.97 per cent of the total investment of Rs.393057 crore made in 239 
PSEs as on 31" March, 2006. NTPC Ltd. led the list of the top ten PSEs as 
given in Table 6.13 below: 
Table 6.13 
Top Ten Enterprises in Terms of Investment 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Name of the Enterprises 
NTPC Ltd. 
Power Finance Corporation Ltd. 
Rural Electrification Corp. Ltd. 
Housing & Urban Dev. Corp. Ltd. 
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. 
Nuclear Power Corp. of India Ltd. 
Indian Railway Finance Corporation Ltd. 
ONGC Videsh Ltd. 
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. 
Total 
Investment 
28442.80 
25783.61 
24314.81 
22788.31 
19783.92 
18099.57 
17925.25 
17742.83 
17380.83 
15934.95 
208196.84 
(Rs. in crores) 
%age share 
7.24 
6.56 
6.19 
5.80 
5.03 
4.60 
4.56 
4.51 
4.42 
4.05 
52.97 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2005-06 & 2006-07 
6.9.4 PSEs in Terms of Net Sales: 
Table 6.14 shows the contribution of PSEs in terms of net sales. Indian 
Oil Corporation Ltd. (lOCL) has been the major contributor in terms of net sales 
over the period from 2004-05 to 2006-07. iOCL contributed Rs.1, 37, 65,983 
lakh in 2004-05 which increased to Rs.2, 02, 50,381 lakh in 2006-07. IOCL 
ranked no.1 in terms of net sale in 2006-07. BPCL, HPCL, ONGC ranked 2"^ ,^ 
3"^  4"^  respectively in terms of net sale. 
Table 6.14 
PSES in Terms of Net Sales 
Name of PSEs 
IOCL 
BPCL 
2006-07 
20250381 
9756022 
Net Sales 
2005-06 
16758685 
7703592 
(R! 
2004-05 
13765983 
5896999 
5. in Lakhs) 
Rank 
2006-07 
1 
2 
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HPCL 
ONGC Ltd. 
Food Corp of India Ltd. 
(FCIL) 
BSNL 
SAIL 
NTPC Ltd 
Mangalore Refinery & 
Petrochemicals Ltd. (MRPL) 
Chennai Petroleum Corp. 
Ltd. (CPCL) 
MMTC Ltd. 
BHEL 
GAIL (INDIA) Ltd. 
State Trading Corp. of India 
Ltd. (STCIL) 
Air India Ltd. (AIL) 
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. 
(RINL) 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
(HAL) 
Numaligarh Refinery Ltd. 
(NRL) 
Indian Airlines Ltd. (lAL) 
National Aluminium Co. Ltd. 
(NALCO) 
Total 
8357114 
5664142 
4448405 
34361621 
3433312 
3259527 
2863314 
2475463 
2334614 
1723753 
1604718 
1433527 
843886 
793266 
778192 
721245 
598627 
594019 
6816177 
4796640 
4464678 
3613894 
2826557 
2690491 
2496754 
2112877 
1639339 
1337403 
1445941 
712524 
883371 
730571 
534150 
526804 
576601 
485190 
5926455 
4636437 
4516253 
3345004 
2862994 
2256492 
1850833 
1421360 
1513807 
952714 
1359138 
956249 
758817 
735984 
453380 
391723 
533312 
412396 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2005-06 & 2006-07 
Regarding the progress of disinvestment program, the following 
observations are important: 
It is a matter of concern that the amount realized through disinvestment 
has fallen far short of the amount targeted. Table 6.15 shows that the total 
amount realized through disinvestments from 1991 to 2005 was Rs.47, 750 
crore against a target of Rs.95, 500 crore leading to an average under 
subscription of 50 percent. The disinvestment proceeds (target versus realized) 
is shown in Figure 2. If we look at the realization as a percent of target we find 
that in 1991-92, that 121.52 per cent of target was realized whereas it was 
121.08 and 107.42 per cent in 1994-95 and 1998-99 respectively. On the other 
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6.10 Disinvestment and the Efficiency Dimension; 
Here, the two relevant questions in the context are: 
• Would the sale of a part force the government of India and the new 
shareholders to monitor the PSEs managers more effectively? 
• How far are the PSEs shares traded on the stock market so that prices 
of these shares can be looked upon as an indicator of management's 
performance? 
Answering to the first part of the question (that is, would the partial sale 
of equity improve the shareholders monitoring); the following observation needs 
to be made noticeable. For many of the PSEs, less than 2 per cent of the equity 
has been disinvested, since the inception of the disinvestment policy in 1991-
92. In fact, in only 4 out of 43 enterprises less than 10 per cent of the shares 
were disinvested. Only in 8 enterprises (namely MFIL, LJMC, BALCO, CMC, 
HTL, PPL, JESSOP, and HCL) the extent of divestiture exceeded 40 per cent 
of the government equity. If it is assumed that at least 51 per cent of the shares 
have to be divested to the private sector for effective efficiency implications, 
then it is clear that this would not happen. However, with the government's 
decisions as taken till then to strategically sell PSEs, one could expect 
efficiency enhancement in the concerned PSEs. 
We now try to answer the next question. Stocks like IPCL, HPCL, 
ONGC, VSNL and BPCL, which came out with public issue and invoked 
tremendous responses from the retail investor, are very unstable because of 
wider holding. On the other hand, shares like CONCOR and HOCL are 
delicately traded. Moreover, the main activity is between the financial 
institutions. Participation by the retail investor is almost negligible. Further, it 
was estimated that nearly 80 per cent of PSEs shares acquired by financial 
institutions and mutual funds during 1992-93 and later, still wait for being 
offloaded in the secondary market. Since PSE shares are not traded actively, 
their prices do not reflect management's performance. It is undoubtedly clear 
that the efficiency of privatization exercise will critically depend on the ability of 
private participants to take full part in the exercise. 
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hand, in 2003-04 Rs. 15547 crore was realized against the target of Rs.13, 200 
crore i.e. 117.78 percent. 
Table 6.15 
Disinvestments During 1991 to 2005 (Target Vs. Realized) 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
1991 to 200! 
PSEs Offered 
47 
35 
0 
13 
5 
1 
1 
5 
4 
4 
9 
6 
9 
1 
48* 
Target (Rs. 
Crores) 
2,500 
2,500 
3,500 
4,000 
7,000 
5,000 
4,800 
5,000 
10,000 
10,000 
12,000 
12,000 
13,200 
4000 
95,500 
Amount Realized 
(Rs. Crores) 
3038 
1913 
0 
4843 
361 
380 
902 
5371 
1860 
1871 
5632 
3348 
15547 
2684 
47,750 
Realization as 
% of Target 
121.52 
76.52 
0 
121.08 
5.16 
7.6 
18.79 
107.42 
18.6 
18.71 
46.93 
27.9 
11778 
671 
49.25 
* Total number of companies in which disinvestment has taken place so 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2005-06 & 2006-07 
far. 
Disinvestment during 1991 to 2005 (Target Vs Realized) (Fig. 6.2) 
18.000 
16,000 ( 
•5 10,000 
™ I H. 
D T«ra«t (Rs. Cror»s) B Amount R*allz*d (Rs. Crorss)^ 
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6.11 Disinvestment and the Fiscal Dimension: 
It is often stated that the prime objective of disinvestment is mainly to 
mobilize non-inflationary resources for the budget. This being the case, it is 
necessary to have a close look at the disinvestment proceeds and its relation to 
fiscal deficit. This is shown in Table 6.16 and Figure 3. Table 6.16 reveals that 
the amount of earnings realized through PSEs disinvestment is Rs. 47750 
crore, while the total fiscal deficit since 1991-92 to 2004-05 has been 
1295781 crore. This means that on an average only 3.69 per cent of the fiscal 
deficit has been financed through the sale of PSUs equity (shown by the dotted 
line in Figure 6.3), being as low as 0.6 per cent in 1995-96 and 0 per cent in 
1993-94 (Figure 6.3). Therefore, it can be inferred that the current levels of 
disinvestment are of limited consequence for closing the fiscal deficit. However, 
if we look at the disinvestment as a percent of capital receipt, the table shows 
that ratio was 7.89 per cent in 1991-92 and it fell to 1.4 per cent in 2004-05. 
Table 6.16 
Disinvestment as % of Capital Receipts and Fiscal Deficit 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
1991-92 to 
2004-05 
Disinvestment 
Proceeds (Rs. 
in Crores) 
3038 
1913 
NIL 
4843 
361 
380 
902 
5371 
1860 
1871 
5632 
3348 
15547 
2684 
47750 
Center's Gross 
Fiscal Deficit 
36325 
40173 
60257 
57703 
60243 
66733 
88937 
113348 
104716 
118816 
140955 
145072 
232852 
139231 
1405361 
Center's Capital 
Receipts 
38528 
36178 
58646 
68695 
58338 
61544 
96731 
86399 
103574 
111591 
161,004 
182414 
207390 
191669 
1462701 
Disinvestment 
as % of Fiscal 
Deficit 
8.36 
4.76 
0 
8.39 
0.6 
0.57 
1.01 
4.74 
1.78 
1.57 
4.0 
2.31 
6.68 
1.93 
3.39 
Disinvestment 
as % of Capital 
Receipt 
7.89 
5.29 
0 
7.05 
0,62 
0.62 
0.93 
6.22 
1.78 
1.68 
3.50 
1.84 
7.5 
1.4 
3.26 
Source: Economic Survey of various 
Economy, Various Issues. 
Years, Handbook of Statistics on the Indian 
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DISINVESTMENT AS A PERCENT OF CAPITAL RECEIPTS AND FISCAL 
DEFECIT (Fig. 6.3) 
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6.12 Net Profit of Selected Companies: 
Table 6.17 shows the net profit of some selected companies. In this we 
find that all the companies were showing increasing trend over the years 
except SAIL. Up to 1995-96 it showed increasing trend but thereafter i.e. from 
1996-97 to 2002-03 there was a mixed trend. It manifests that some oil 
companies had shown increasing trend while others declining trend in their net 
profits. Total profit in 2003-04 was Rs.2512.08 crores. In 2003-04, except 
ONGC, all other companies had shown improvement. And in 2004-05 oil 
companies gained a net profit of Rs.6816.97 crores in which the performance 
of lOCL, BPCL, and HPCL had deteriorated. As regards ONGC, it showed vast 
improvement in comparison to meagre improvement of GAIL, NTPC, MTNL, 
NALCO and BHEL. SAIL was the only company which incurred net loss in five 
consecutives years i.e. from 1998-99 to 2002-03. From 2003-04 onwards the 
performance of SAIL has shown some positive trend. 
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Table 6.17 
Net profit of the companies 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-9-^  
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
2003-04 
2004-05 
Total 
lOCL 
730.04 
786.78 
676.99 
772.00 
1018.86 
1248.71 
1408.22 
1706.50 
2213.52 
2443.40 
2720.33 
2884.66 
6114.89 
7004.82 
4891.38 
36621.1 
BPCL 
127.81 
148.46 
170.07 
217.51 
292.18 
385.77 
407.60 
521.40 
706.02 
701.64 
-
-
1250.03 
1694.57 
965.86 
7588.92 
HPCL 
-
129.76 
227.14 
306.97 
391.29 
514.24 
612.22 
701.16 
901.26 
1057.41 
1088.01 
787.98 
1537.36 
1903.94 
1277.33 
11436.07 
Name of the Compan 
ONGC 
1048.30 
408.32 
788.20 
2009.39 
1931.07 
-
2033.65 
2677.78 
2754.50 
3629.47 
5228.78 
6197.87 
10529.32 
8664.44 
12983.05 
60884.14 
GAIL 
22.72 
93.55 
210.53 
320.54 
367.62 
515.52 
619.55 
1020.31 
1059.92 
861.27 
1126.17 
1185.84 
1639.11 
1869.34 
1953.91 
12865.9 
NTPC 
700.95 
1007.06 
886.57 
1057.97 
1124.55 
1352.61 
1679.43 
2153.50 
2815.73 
3424.53 
3733.80 
3539.62 
3607.57 
5260.77 
5807.01 
79726.9 
es 
MTNL 
103.07 
216.24 
208.37 
344.16 
576.58 
729.59 
932.79 
1130.13 
1297.24 
1087.85 
1540.18 
1300.67 
877.16 
1150.48 
138.98 
11633.49 
SAIL 
244.69 
365.72 
423.40 
545.33 
1108.58 
1318.61 
515.17 
132.99 
-1573.66 
-1720.02 
-728.66 
-1706.89 
-304.31 
2512.08 
6816.97 
7950 
(Rs. In 
NALCO 
-
59.41 
134.88 
156.72 
300.17 
614.55 
491.76 
546.97 
248.25 
511.53 
655.83 
409.35 
520.92 
737.37 
1234.84 
6622.55 
Crores) 
BHEL 
36.94 
150.08 
-
-
140.93 
350.16 
463.19 
719.53 
544.64 
-
312.61 
467.95 
444.51 
658.15 
953.40 
5242.09 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
6.13 The Employment Implication of Divestiture: 
The impact of liberalization on employment primarily depends on the 
components of measures one takes into account, viz. stabilization or structural 
adjustment. It is generally supposed that stabilization measures are likely to 
have an adverse effect on employment growth whereas the impact of structural 
adjustment on employment needs to be tested empirically. 
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In India, the policy of disinvestment has been looked upon with doubt. 
The strategic sale of BALCO, in 2000, to a private party was met with a lot of 
resistance from the workers. They went on an indefinite strike, which lasted for 
over 60 days. They allowed Sterlite Industries (the new employers) entry into 
the premises only when the latter agreed not to retrench a single worker. Given 
this, the focus of this sub-section is specifically to examine the impact of 
disinvestment on employment levels in the Indian PSEs. 
The public sector in India until the late 1980s played an essential role in 
the development of the economy. It accounted for almost 70 per cent of the 
total employment in the 'organized sector'. Despite the process of liberalization 
in early 1990s, the public sector continued to account for a large per cent of 
total employment in the organized sector. However, its share marginally 
declined from 71.28 per cent in 1991 to 68.06 per cent in 2005. 
We now show the break up of the level of employment in the 240 PSEs 
in terms of employment in the disinvested and non-disinvested PSEs from 1981 
to 2000 (Table 6.18). The rates of growth of total employment in the PSEs, 
divested PSEs and non-divested PSEs were 14.43 per cent, 20 per cent and 
12.5 per cent respectively from the period 1981 to 1991. The corresponding 
figures for the post-reform period (1991-2000) were -16.67 per cent, -15 per 
cent and -16.67 per cent respectively. This implies that the decline in 
employment In the post-reform period was almost the same for the three 
categories. Moreover, the share of employment in disinvested PSEs to total 
PSE employment remained at 27.03 percent in the 10 year period (1981 to 
1991). This indicates that even though the absolute number of people 
employed in disinvested PSEs decreased from 0.6 million in 1990-91 to 0.51 
million in 1999-00, it might had nothing to do with the policy of disinvestment. 
In Figure 4 we clearly see that the employment in the post-reform period 
has declined in both the disinvested and non-disinvested PSEs. Interestingly, 
the decline in employment in the post-reform period has been greater for the 
non-disinvested PSEs than for the disinvested PSEs. 
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Table 6.18 
Employment in Dislnvested and Non-Disinvested PSEs 
Year 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
t994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
(In 
Total 
Employment in 
PSEs 
1.94 
2.02 
2.07 
2.11 
2.15 
2.21 
2.21 
2.21 
2.24 
2.22 
2.18 
2.15 
2.07 
2.06 
2.05 
2.01 
1.96 
1.90 
1.85 
millions) 1981-2000 
Employment In 
Dislnvested PSEs 
0.50 
0.53 
0.54 
0.56 
0.57 
0.59 
0.59 
0.59 
0.59 
0.60 
0.60 
0.59 
0.58 
0.57 
0.56 
0.55 
0.54 
0.53 
0.51 
Employment In 
Non-Disinvested 
PSEs 
1.44 
1.50 
1.53 
1.55 
1.58 
1.62 
1.62 
1.62 
1.65 
1.62 
1.58 
1.56 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.50 
1.42 
1.47 
1.35 
Employment in 
Dislnvested 
PSUs as percent 
of Total PSE 
Employment 
25.77 
26.24 
26.09 
26.54 
26.51 
26.70 
26.70 
26.70 
26.70 
27.03 
27.52 
27.44 
28.02 
27.67 
27.32 
27.36 
27.55 
27.89 
27.57 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, Various Issues. 
Employment in Dislnvested and Non-Disinvested PSEs (In millions) 
1981-2000 (Fig. 6.4) 
, ^ . i t ! ^ ^ ' ^ " ' ^ ^ ^ " > ; ^ % 2 j f l ^ . 
Years 
t.35 
- Total Bnployment in PSUs —«— Employment in Dlslnv*st*d PSU« Employment in Non-Disinve*te<i PSUs 
6.14 Public Sector and Foreign Exchange Earnings: 
A detailed analysis sliows that during the year 2006-07, PSEs earned 
Rs.63798.18 crore as compared to Rs.45953.98 crore during the previous year, 
thus showing an increase of Rs. 17844.2 crores or 38.83 percent. The 
enterprises which had shown improvement in foreign exchange earning by 
either increasing the earning or reducing the earning during 2006-07 as 
compared to the previous year by more than Rs.50 crore are given below. 
ONGC Videsh Ltd. improves its earning by Rs.7196 crore as compared to 
previous year and leads the list. Other top earners are Indian Oil Corp. Ltd., 
Shipping Corp. of India Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. Etc. 
Table 6.19 
Foreign Exchange Earning by PSEs 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
II. Deere 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
^ 
Nameof CPSEs 
ONGC Videsh Ltd. 
Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. 
Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 
State Trading Corp. of India Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 
MMTC Ltd. 
Bharat Heavy Electriacls Ltd. 
Oil & Natural Gas Corp. Ltd. 
Cochin Shipyard Ltd. 
National Aluminium Company Ltd. 
Rites Ltd. 
Indian Airlines Ltd. 
Stel Ltd. 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
Antrix Corporation Ltd. 
BemI Ltd. 
2006-07 
9232.83 
9126.23 
3993.55 
5198.84 
2702.12 
5585.13 
3436.93 
1095.91 
2990.66 
506.33 
2576.2 
274.17 
1821.63 
590.02 
270.51 
1169.55 
100.77 
106.56 
ase (more than Rs.50 crore): 
Dredging Corp. of India Ltd. 
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
Airports Authority of India Ltd. 
PEC Ltd. 
Air India Charters Ltd. 
Mangalore Refinery & 
Petrochemicals Ltd. 
Kudremukh Iron Ore Co. Ltd. 
7.27 
35.47 
829.89 
138.85 
0 
11615.27 
49.99 
( 
2005-06 
2037.08 
5617.56 
1032.91 
3271.39 
929.65 
4286.67 
2899.3 
709.63 
2609.38 
187.51 
2318.2 
136.5 
1691.08 
470.78 
188.02 
1091.64 
25.74 
44.61 
61.89 
103.01 
903.36 
279.17 
242.93 
11917.19 
942.65 
Rs. in crores) 
Change Over 
the Previous 
Year 
7195.75 
3508.67 
2906.64 
1927.45 
1772.47 
1298.46 
537.63 
386.28 
381.28 
318.82 
258 
137.67 
130.55 
119.24 
82.49 
77.91 
75.03 
61.95 
54.62 
67.54 
73.47 
140.32 
242.93 
301.92 
892.66 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07; Vol. 1 
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6.15 International Finance and Investment and PSEs: 
The international operations of PSEs may be appreciated with reference 
to Trade, Finance and Investment. Trade in goods and a service has a direct 
relationship with earnings and out go of foreign exchange; finance relates to the 
external borrowings as well as raising of resources through the equity market 
and Investment comprises off-shore investment by PSEs by way of joint 
venture, merger and acquisitions as well as operation of Indian subsidiaries 
abroad. 
Table 6.20 
Mobilization of Funds from Abroad 
(Rs. in crores) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18, 
19. 
20. 
21. 
CPSEs Under the 
Cognate Group 
Enterprises under 
Construction 
Steel 
Minerals and Metals 
Coal & Lignite 
Power 
Petroleum 
Fertilizers 
Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals 
Heavy Engineering 
Medium & Light 
Engg. 
Transportation 
Equipment 
Consumer Goods 
Textiles 
Trading & Marketing 
Services 
Transportation 
Services 
Contract & 
Construction 
Services 
Industrial Dev. & 
Tech. Consultancy 
Services 
Tourist Service 
Financial Services 
Telecommunications 
Section 25 
Companies 
Total 
2005-06 
Secured 
Loan 
132.7 
534.71 
0 
3090.91 
8009.69 
4133.82 
0 
0 
0.1 
1.38 
26.49 
0 
0 
0 
1088.62 
81.66 
5287.17 
0 
5252.4 
0 
0 
27639.65 
Un-secured 
Loan 
0 
73.1 
0 
0 
0 
2208.36 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.37 
0 
0 
0 
44.86 
0 
0 
2331.69 
2004-05 
Secured 
Loan 
496.64 
1074.42 
0 
3373.14 
8083.36 
4021.12 
0 
0 
0.1 
3.94 
27.31 
0 
0 
0 
1030.69 
0 
5006.04 
0 
5433.12 
0 
0 
28549.88 
Un-secured 
Loan 
0 
395.03 
0 
0 
0 
1171.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45.68 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1612.60 
Source: Ibid 
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Globalization has forced Indian companies both the public and private 
(corporate) sector to focus on the prime areas and enhance their inherent 
strengths, if possible, through cross border mergers and acquisitions. There is 
a growing realization among Indian companies that mere organic growth is not 
enough to propel a company towards growth. 
Mobilization of funds from abroad (secured and un-secured loans) of 
PSEs, during the last two years i.e. for 2004-05 & 2005-06 may be seen in 
table 6.20 as given above. 
6.16 Improvement in the Indian Economy: 
An experience of disinvestment programme has been both good as well 
as bad. After the disinvestment of PSUs, their profitability has improved. It has 
been observed that before reforms, the number of profit-making PSEs was 123 
(Table 6.21). After reforms, this number increased to 157. Similarly the number 
of loss-making units decreased to 58 from 111 and the number of no profit no 
loss units also decreased to 0 from 2. 
Table 6.21 
Financial Performance of PSUs 
Particulars 
Profit Making 
Loss Making 
No Profit No Loss 
Number of PSUs 
Before Reforms (1990-91) 
123 
111 
2 
After Reforms (2005-06) 
157 
58 
-
Source: Public Enterprises Sun/ey, 1990-91 and 2005-06. 
6.17 Problems: 
Apart from the above mingled experiences, the following problems have 
been observed in the disinvestment process: 
• The progress of disinvestment program has been very slow, as 
disinvestment targets for various years were not achieved. 
• Disinvestment process has been carried out in a hasty, unplanned and 
hesitant manner. 
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• Disinvestment policy announced by the Government is vague and unclear. 
It lacks vision, direction and is riddled without adhocism. In every year's 
budget, it is modified by the Government. It lacks the support of political 
parties, trade unions and social business organizations. 
• Disinvestment programme has been launched without creating favorable 
conditions for its take-off. 
• The most critical issue in the process of disinvestment of PSUs is valuation. 
There was no appropriate pricing of shares and complete transparency in 
the valuation of shares. In all the cases of strategic sale, sale of equity in 
Modern Food, BALCO, VSNL, there was a lot of criticism, since the 
valuation was not transparent. Right price for ITDC Hotels were not 
charged. One PSU hotel in New Delhi was sold to Rs. 70 crores. After one 
month, the private owner of the same hotel sold a very portion of the hotel 
for the commercial complex for Rs. 70 crore. 
• Government has not made any effort to list the shares of PSUs in stock 
market. Also there is no linkage between PSUs and capital market. 
• For the overseas disinvestment programme Government did not adopt 
suitable methods. 
• There was no coordination between disinvestment ministry and concerned 
ministry. When the matter of HPCL and IPCL arose for discussion in the 
Parliament, Arun Shouri was on one side and the Petroleum Minister Ram 
Nayak was on another side. Even in many cases, different components of 
NDA government were not unanimous on disinvestment of the particular 
PSUs. Due to these controversies, investors were hesitating to purchase 
the shares of PSEs offered for strategic sale. 
• In many cases, disinvestment has not really changed the ownership of 
PSUs as the Government has retained a majority stake in them. There has 
been the same apprehension that disinvestment of PSUs might result in 
'crowding out' of private corporate from the primary capital market. 
• There was no proper use of disinvestment proceeds. The money was used 
for meeting the budgetary deficit. This money was to be used for VRS 
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payments and infrastructural facilities like road, health, education, irrigation 
etc. 
• Disinvestment of PSEs has weakened the small scale industries. After 
disinvestment, ancillary SSIs are not getting orders from these PSEs. 
• Disinvestment has been used merely as a revenue raising affair for the 
government with little thought being given to the requirement of the firms 
concerned. 
• It was thought that if public sector units are given to private sector, the 
government will concentrate more on the development of social sector. But 
it has proved wrong. It was also thought that disinvestment will give way to 
become Indian industries market-oriented but it could not happen. 
• It is also charged that by doing disinvestment the government has helped 
big industrial houses like Tatas, Sterilite, and Suzuki etc. 
6.18 Suggestions: 
Following suggestions may be given to improve the disinvestment program: 
• The criticality of the issue of valuation in disinvestment can be easily 
gauged from the fact that the value of BALCO as put by different people 
differed as widely as from Rs.1100 crore to Rs.5000 crore. Nonetheless, 
what is important is that, not merely should the value derived be 
unquestionable on the basis of well established equity valuation principles, 
but also the processes and methodologies adopted for deriving such value 
are reasonable. Transparency in valuation is a must so as to avoid 
controversies. 
• There is an urgent need of a long term strategy for entire disinvestment 
programme. 
• The government should provide all informations about the concerned public 
enterprises to the public, financial institutions and other interested parties so 
that investor may get an opportunity to make the necessary evaluations. 
• Proceeds from disinvestments should be used for capital expansion and not 
for bridging the Governments revenue deficit. The IMF had already 
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intimated the Government ttiat it cannot continue to use the resources 
raised from disinvestments to bridge the fiscal deficit in coming year. 
• Public financial institutions and mutual funds should be left free to take their 
own independent decisions but such dealing would disturb the market. 
• Invite direct foreign investment on attractive term which will benefit all the 
states. 
• The role and size of the government needs to be reduced to facilitate the 
growth of private sector. 
• A new vision of the timing and mechanism of further disinvestments is 
highly desirable. If the target of fiscal deficit reduction can be achieved 
through some alternative means of higher resource mobilization, the 
government should postpone further disinvestments tills PSEs are 
revamped so that they fetch better prices from such off-loading. 
• For the left over enterprises, it is advisable to pursue more vigorously the 
application and extension of the Navratna and Miniratna models. There is 
still a need to strengthen these models by de-linking PSEs from the 
government. 
Thus, Disinvestment is an effective instrument for restructuring of the 
PSEs. If this is not properly understood and effective and quick measures are 
not taken, then drain on the scare budgetary resources will be such that sooner 
or later most of the undertakings will go bankrupt and there will be a dead 
weight of assets and unemployment for which it is not easy to find a 
satisfactory solution. 
Disinvestment of a part of Government equity in public sector enterprises 
is a major policy initiative in India to carry out economic reforms. The purpose 
of disinvestment exercise is to improve the performance of PSEs as also to 
increase their public accountability by broad basing their management and 
ownership. Moreover, the merit of privatization is seen in terms of improvement 
in efficiency and reduction in the budgetary burden of state-owned enterprises. 
The Defence Minister George Fernandez among others criticized the 
Disinvestment Ministry's over-enthusiasm for privatization, and opposed the 
disinvestment of highly profitable PSEs, and the methods of disinvestment. The 
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Disinvestment policy should be to offer the companies, created with wealth of 
the people of India to the public of India. In the U.K., the entire privatization was 
to the public at large i.e. the Airlines, the Steel Industry, the Telecom Industry, 
the Automobile Industry, the gas and Petroleum Sector etc. are privatized by 
offerings through the stock markets and not through strategic sales. In the 
transfer of VSNL and IPCL to the Tata and Reliance, monopolies are being 
created, i.e. richer becoming richest with the peoples' money. 
Various issues raised by the critics are: 
• Is the Govt, classification of 1999 into strategic and non-strategic sectors 
correct? 
• Is it desirable to disinvest profit-making public enterprise, while keeping the 
loss-making PSUs under state ownership? 
• What should be the procedure for disinvestment of public offering through 
stock exchange or strategic sale to a private party? 
• Should disinvestment create private monopoly in place of public monopoly? 
• What should be the method of valuation of PSEs before bid for 
disinvestment is made? 
• Should PSEs be allowed to participate in the bids for disinvestment of 
PSEs? 
• How should be proceeds from disinvestment be utilized? 
• How should the interests of workers and employees be safeguard? 
It would be advisable to reconsider the areas which are to be included in 
the strategic sector. Certain other industries, e.g. power generation may be 
vitally important for the economy and their continuance in the public sector may 
be justifiable like BHEL- a PSU - has beaten the world leaders like ABB, 
Stemen and GEC. 
In the beginning, disinvestment was undertaken subject to government 
equity remaining at 51 per cent. Subsequently, it was announced that as a 
general rule it will dilute its holding to 26 per cent (except strategic areas where 
national security is involved). 
The process of disinvestment started when the Finance Minister 
announced in his March 1990 budget speech a plan for share issues by state-
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owned companies to their employees. Thus, it diluted its own equity from 60 
percent to 51 per cent in the prestigious public sector Maruti Udyog Limited (a 
car manufacturing company in collaboration with Suzuki of Japan) to enable the 
workers to take a stake in the company. The holding pattern of equity after 
dilution became: government-51 per cent; Suzuki-40 per cent, and workers-9 
percent. Though the government claimed that the move was intended to 
involve the employees in the growth of the company, many saw it as a 
obscured step toward privatization. 
VSNL and IBP both were highly profitable PSEs, yet 25 per cent stake in 
VSNL was sold out to the Tata Group for Rs.1, 439 crore (@ Rs.202 per share) 
and 33.6% stake in IBP was sold out to iOC for Rs.1, 154 crore. Taking the 
three years period (1997-98 to 1999-00) VSNL earned a total net profit of Rs.3, 
133.14 crore. Then why is it being disinvested? Only to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
The entire policy of privatization of VSNL, a highly profit-making public sector, 
is irrational. 
There is evidence to show that in the post-liberalization period, the 
performance of the Central Public Enterprises has been progressively 
improving. Profit before tax (PBT) had improved sharply from 8 per cent in 
1990-91 to 29.4 per cent in 1997-98. The public sector has become more 
professional than the private sector. 
The Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (lOCL) is a global giant with excellent 
record of performance. The IOC is the sole Indian entry in the Fortune's Global 
500 Companies. The sale of shares of some public enterprises also brought a 
new dimension into their strategic thinking. Some public sector enterprises, 
such as Indian Petro-chemicals Limited (IPCL) sought permission and were 
allowed to access the capital markets directly in order to raise funds for their 
own expansion. 
The privatization of HPCL and BPCL is also being criticized. However, 
there is no opposition to the privatization of loss-making units. Again there is no 
logic in pushing the sale of profit-making PSEs (some designated as Navratna 
or Mininavratnas), Viz. NALCO, SCI (Shipping Corporation of India), Engineers 
India Ltd., BPCL, HPCL, Neyveli Lignite Corp. Ltd. and IRCON International. 
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In the hydrocarbon sector, by 1992, permission had been accorded for 
entry to Private Indian and foreign companies in all exploration development 
and refining. Consequent to these reforms, exploration contracts with a number 
of domestic and foreign companies were finalized. A major initiative in this 
sector during the year was the corporatization of ONGC. Imports of LPG and 
kerosene were de-canalized and private firms were allowed to market these 
products to users. 
According to the Disinvestment Ministry, the logic for privatizing or not 
privatizing PSEs is based on: 
• Whether it is in strategic sector or in a non-strategic sector, and 
• Whether the taxpayers' money can be saved from commercial risk 
by transferring the risk to the private sector where the private sector 
is willing to step in? 
The Govt, has called in criticism for the policy on methodology for 
disinvestment. Previously, it followed the policy of open auction sale and 
allowed NRIs and other persons legally permitted to hold equity to participate. 
This method gave excellent results. But later in 1999-2000, the Govt, shifted to 
strategic sale. Taking up the case of the two public sector oil companies -
HPCL and BPCL, the Govt, has adopted two approaches: In the case of HPCL 
- strategic sale and in case of BPCL - public offering. 
Whereas by the public offering method, the Govt, can unload part of the 
equity and still continue its hold over the PSE, but by the strategic partner 
method, it transfers the management of a company to a private investor. 
Obviously, the public offering methodology is logically superior. 
By accepting Tatas as strategic partners in VSNL and Reliance in IPCL, 
the Govt, has substituted state monopolies with private monopolies. Reliance 
will be able to control 70% to 90% of the Indian market for a wide variety of 
petrochemicals products. 
The valuation of PSEs put up for disinvestment has not been smooth and many 
cases of under-valuation are cited like - BALCO, Modern Food Industries 
(majority stake to sold Hindustan Lever Ltd., HLL), ITDC etc. 
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Though the government assured to provide safety net to the workers 
affected in the disinvestment process, yet in reality very little has been done to 
provide job security and opportunities for retaining and redeployment. 
Consequently the employment level dropped follov\/ing divestiture as expected 
in competitive enterprises. In BALCO, the most widely noticed case of 
privatization, several hundred workmen have been retrenched; in IPCL 400 
workers have been retrenched; Reliance has identified 2,000 excess staff at 
Vadodara plant alone. 
The Department of Disinvestment has been set up to accelerate the 
privatization process. To maximize returns to the government, the approach 
has shifted from the disinvestment of small lots of shares to strategic blocks of 
shares to strategic investors. The government has already approved 
privatization of 27 companies in which the process of disinvestment is expected 
to be completed in course of time. 
Indispensably, a number of major steps were taken in the on-going 
process of industrial policy reforms aimed at promoting greater competitiveness 
and cost efficiency in domestic industry. Efforts were also made to simplify the 
administration of industrial policy and eliminate procedural hurdles. 
Despite the various positive developments on the industrial front cited 
above, some disturbing trends continued to create problems. One of these was 
the virtual stagnation of employment growth in the organized sector. The other 
trend which seriously threatened the prospects of future industrial growth was 
the increasing incidence of industrial sickness. 
Thus, it is clear that the objective of disinvestment should be to benefit the 
public, the consumer and the investor, and at the same time, to improve the 
competitiveness and eliminate monopoly. The disinvestment policy adopted by 
the Govt, under the circumstances is the only solution to a very repetition of 
unprecedented fiscal crisis which was faced by the country in 1990-91. This 
policy will not only make India economically strong but will also lead the nation 
to the path of happiness and prosperity. The results of disinvestment done so 
far are cleariy visible form the better living-standard of a common man who is 
enjoying the benefits of modern development. India's foreign exchange reserve 
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is increasing every year and tine policy adopted for economic reforms will make 
India one of the leading economically strong and developed nations in the 
world. 
After an analysis of the problems and various issues arising out of 
disinvestment in PSEs we may form the opinion that there is no question of 
going back. What we can suggest is that before disinvestment of any PSE, the 
government should take all the above-mentioned suggestions to consideration 
for continuing this disinvestment program. 
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CHAPTER-7 
CONCLUSION 
From the analyses accomplished in the previous chapters, it follows that 
the public sector enterprises should be viewed from multiple angles rather than 
the sole criterion of profitability. The very fact that profitability was not the 
objective before the PSEs reinforces the argument. True, profit aspect can not 
be ignored altogether as persistent losses become unsustainable and drain the 
resources but at the same time we ought not to judge a PSU without the proper 
context. 
Indian economy plunged into crisis in 1991 which prompted multifaceted 
economic reforms. In this context, the point should not be missed that crises 
were not the result of the bad performance of the PSEs, or that the continued 
budgetary support to the PSEs was the cause for crisis. Such budgetary 
support might have created some fiscal imbalance but the crises were not the 
result of fiscal imbalances rather they were triggered by the balance of payment 
difficulties. But since fiscal imbalances too were becoming unsustainable, any 
such factor that might have contributed slightly to such imbalance could not 
have escaped the blame. Thus, this aspect too needed to be examined 
carefully. But the fact can not be ignored that there was not a one-on-one 
relationship between economic crisis and the underperformance of the PSEs. 
The core points to be analyzed, therefore, are: 1- whether profit-making 
enterprise are earning the profit to their potentials i.e. taking into account the 
paid up capital and the kind of market they are enjoying; and 2- whether it is 
worthwhile to continue the operations of loss-making units considering the 
other significant roles they play, which include the linkages they might have 
established, their contribution to the infrastructure and/or the social aspect of 
their existence. 
Economic reforms which began in 1991 in essence were directed at 
virtually every thing that was supposed to be the strain on the resources of the 
economy. That is why the PSEs were to be addressed. At that time, there were 
236 operating PSEs. Out of those, 123 were the profitable one and 111 were 
making losses, 02 were neither making profit nor incurring losses. Since then, 
loss-making units declined in number and in the year 2005 there were only 58 
such units. However, the loss of these loss-making units was Rs.5952 crores 
for 58 units as compared to the loss of Rs.3122 crores coming from 111 units. 
Inspite of various efforts of the government together with the budgetary 
support, the loss of loss-making units increased more than four times in the ten 
years period. Till the year 2000, when the number of loss-making units was 
110, only one less than what it was in 1990. After 2000, the number of loss-
making units declined steadily and so was the loss which declined to Rs.5952 
crores in 2005 from the level of Rs. 12841 crores in 1990. 
As far as profit-making PSEs are concerned their number increased 
from 123 in 1990 to 132 in 1995 but then it started declining each year and 
reached 119 in 2002. Thereafter, their number increased and in 2005, 157 
PSEs were making profit. Total profit coming from such units was Rs.76240 
crores in 2005 in comparison to Rs.5394 crores in 1990. 
These figures do not necessarily means the turning of some of the loss-
making units into the profitable one. Their decline in number was the result of 
either disinvestment or their closing down. Another disturbing fact regarding the 
PSEs has been the slow growth in the profit of the profit-making units 
especially when they were enjoying near monopoly or having very dominant 
share in the market. Production in public sector as percentage of national 
production in coal, lignite, crude oil and natural gas was 93.80 per cent, 71 per 
cent, 87.3 per cent and 78.6 per cent respectively. In each of these products, 
relative shares of public sector have been declining since 1999-00. Crude oil 
and natural gas are other items where public sector has the dominant share in 
the market which helped a great deal in keeping the prices of these items under 
check. Even those areas where the role of the public sector is not dominant, its 
presence is sufficient enough to give the private sector a stiff competition. 
On account of the changing outlook towards the PSEs, budgetary 
support to them has been on decline. Between 1990-91 and 2005-06 this 
support has been fluctuating and in 2005-06 it was at the level only marginally 
higher than what it was in 1990-91. Nevertheless, the focus must be on the 
contribution the PSEs make to revenue receipts of the government, both in the 
form of dividend as well as various taxes that the PSEs pay to the government. 
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A significant fact wtiich seems to be ignored in any policy debate is tinat 
some of the loss-making units were taken over by the government from private 
sector in order to safeguard the interest of large number of employees. 
Therefore, fulfillment of social responsibilities was one of the roles that PSEs 
were made to play and, hence, loss-making units can not be held guilty for not 
earning profit. 
As far as the share in total employment is concerned, in 2005 it 
accounted for 68 per cent of the employment in the organized sector (public 
and private sector taken together). Although the percentage declined from 
71.28 per cent level where it was in 1991 but the situation is favorable as yet. 
Therefore, in an era of various bailouts offered to various business entities to 
keep the economy afloat, the continence of some of the loss-making PSUs may 
still be justified. 
Advocacy for profit seems to ignore yet another fact. Even if some of the 
PSUs are not contributing dividend to the government but their indirect 
contribution to revenue receipts of the budget can not be ignored. The PSEs' 
contribution to corporate tax and excise duties in 2005-06 was nearly 35 per 
cent and 64 per cent respectively. 
As far as the loss-making PSEs are concerned, it is observed that some 
of them should not have been developed in public sector as public sector's 
presence in some areas could not be termed essential from the viewpoint of 
economic development. Investment in such areas would have surely come 
from private sector too. The concerns like India Tourism Development 
Corporation, Modern Food Industries Ltd., and Hindustan Latex Ltd. are few to 
name. 
It also appears that the causes and the magnitude of industrial 
sickness in the PSEs could not be analyzed so far. In view of the total units 
registered with the BIFR till 30'^  June, 2007, merely 5 units could recover latter. 
It is the proof that the sickness of PSEs is almost beyond cure. Out of 28 PSEs 
that were sick, only 2 could be approved for closure, 15 were recommended for 
revival measure, and 3 for either revival or disinvestment. The data could not 
be accessed for the rest. 
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In spite of that serious sickness, tine very employment angle seems to 
have been overlooked in all the disinvestment decisions and industrial 
restructuring programs as the accumulated losses were only marginally higher 
in 2006-07 in comparison to the same in 2002-03 but in terms of employment 
the loss was more than 500 percent. The number of loss-making units though 
declined from 97 to 59 during the period under reference but still the fate of 
more than a lakh employee was at stake. Argument of losses does not hold 
much ground if considered with the fact that significant numbers of them are 
the one that have been taken over from the private sector in order to safeguard 
the interest of the workers. Argument gets diluted further in consideration of the 
profit of the profitable PSEs which is also taken into consideration. Losses 
overall appear to be another problem that arises from the absences of clarity 
over the use of the disinvestment proceeds. The options that seem to find 
favour are to invest in human capital (health and education expenditure) and to 
use it to reduce fiscal deficit. Since price earning ratio of the equity offered to 
sale was considerably high, it can be said that in the opinion of investors these 
companies have greater earning potentialities than are presently realized. In 
such situation an effort could have been made to make the companies realize 
their potentials rather than the disinvestment which would deprive the 
government of future revenue receipts. 
Considerable amount of uncertainties are also found to be there on 
account of non-realization of targets in terms of disinvestment receipts. It was 
only occasionally that targets were either realized or over realized. Generally, 
there has been a shortfall. Since the beginning of reforms in 1991-92 till 2004-
05, the aggregate shortfall has been more than 50 per cent. And this is despite 
the fact that the price the equity fetched was many times higher than the face 
value of the equity. 
Fiscal dimension of the disinvestment may appear to be strong on the 
face value as the latter provides the non-debt receipt but if the magnitude of 
both is taken into consideration, it is found that the disinvestment proceeds do 
not cover the significant part of it. Moreover, uncertainties dilute the matter. The 
magnitude of such uncertainties can be gauged from the fact that during the 
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period between 1991-92 and 2004-05 the same has been only 3.3 percent of 
the fiscal deficit. 
One area where the performance of the PSEs has been found to be 
significantly week is there record of mobilizing the funds from abroad. But such 
could be attributed to the policies for which the PSEs have not been as 
independent as their private sector counterparts. 
In view of the above, it can be summarized that judging the PSEs purely 
from the yardstick of profit would not do justice to them as the same has never 
been the core objective for which they were created. Disinvestment without 
giving them a fair trial would reinforce the same. 
Suggestions for Future Studies and Policy Imperatives: 
As the findings of present study suggest that the PSEs have to be 
evaluated on the basis of composite criteria, it is realized that the studies be 
undertaken to evaluate the aspects that have been indicated here but could not 
be deeply looked into because to do so was beyond the resources and scope 
of present study. 
If disinvestment is to be carried out, it may be done in the following 
manner; 
(1) If closing down is the only option, such should be resorted to in the case of 
loss-making enterprises specially those that produce non-strategic private 
goods. Further, it should be done in a phased manner choosing the certain 
number of enterprises to be disinvested/ closed each year so that their socially 
harmful effects could be minimized. 
(ii) Using the proceeds from disinvestment to cover the deficits in the budget 
(whether fiscal or revenue) may not be a sound policy option as budget can not 
be made to be dependent on uncertain receipts with the potential to deplete the 
future revenue receipts 
(ili) Private partnership could be brought into profit-making public enterprises in 
a purely professional manner in order to improve upon the managerial 
efficiency. Strategic PSEs like railways, atomic energy and other defense 
related industries may be exempted from such option. 
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ANNEXURE 
Annexure-1 
Navratna and MIniratna Public Enterprises 
A. Navratnas 
S.No. 
1 Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL 
1 Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) 
2 Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) (Being Privatized) 
3 Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL) 
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) 
4 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL) (Being 
Privatized) 
5 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (lOCL) 
6 Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. (IPCL) (Privatized) 
7 Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. (MTNL) 
8 National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. (NTPC) 
9 Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC) 
10 Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) 
11 Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL) (Privatized) 
B. IVIiniratnas 
1. Bharat Aluminium Corporation Ltd. (BALCO) (Privatized) 
2. Bharat Dynamics Ltd. 
3. Bharat Electronics Ltd. 
4. Bongaigaon Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. 
5. Central Warehousing Corporation 
6. Cochin Refineries Ltd. 
7. Container Corporation of India Ltd. 
8. Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. 
9. Engineers India Ltd. (Being Privatized) 
10. Fertilizers & Chemicals (Travancore) Ltd. 
11. Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers Ltd. 
12 Goa Shipyard Ltd. 
13. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. 
14. Hindustan Newsprint Ltd. 
15. Hindustan Organic Cliemicals Ltd. 
16. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (Privatized) 
17. IBP Corporation Ltd. (Sold to Public Enterprise) 
18. Indian Mazagaon Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. 
(Partly Privatized) 
19. Ircon International Ltd. 
20. Kudremukh Iron Ore Corporation Ltd. 
21. MMTCLtd. 
22. Chennai Petroleum Corporation Ltd. 
23. National Aluminium Company Ltd. (NALCO) 
24. National Fertilizers Ltd. 
25. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. 
26. Oil India Ltd. 
27. Power Finance Corporation 
28. Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. 
29. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. 
30. Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. 
31. State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. 
32. Telecommunication Consultants India Ltd. 
33. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. 
34. Educational Consultants (India) Ltd. 
35. Ferro Scrap Nigam Ltd. 
36. HMT (International) Ltd. 
37. Hospital Services Consultants Corporation (India) Ltd. 
38. Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corporation Ltd. 
39. MSTC Ltd. 
40. Manganese Ore (India) Ltd. 
41. Mazagaon Docks Ltd. 
42. MECON Ltd. 
43. Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. 
44. National Film Development Corporation Ltd. (NFDC) 
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45. PEC Ltd. 
46. Rajasthan Electrical and Instruments Ltd. 
47. Water & Power Consultants Services (India) Ltd. 
* MIniratnas Status was frozen by the Administrative Ministry 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07 
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Annexure-2 
Status of PSEs Registered With BIFR as On 30.6.2007 
S.No. Name of PSEs 
A. Revival Scheme Sanctioned 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
The British India Corp. Ltd., Kanpur(UP)® 
Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Kolkata 
(W.B)® 
NTC (APKK & Mahe) Ltd., Ahmedabad (Gujarat) ®" 
NTC (Gujarat) Ltd., Ahmedabad (Gujarat)®" 
NTC (Maharashtra North) Ltd., Mumbai (Maharashtra) 
NTC (MP) Ltd., Indore (Madhya Pradesh)®" 
NTC (WB A B & 0) Ltd., Kolkata (W.B.)®" 
NTC(UP)Ltd.,Kanpur, (UP)®" 
NTC (South Maharashtra) Ltd., Mumbai (Maharashtra) 
Instrumentation Lt, Kota (Rajasthan) 
NTC (DPR) Ltd., (New Delhi)®" 
Cement Corporation of India Ltd. (New Delhi)* 
Hindustan Fluorocarbons Ltd., Hyderabad (AP)® 
Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Burdwan (WB) ®" 
Hindustan Salts Ltd., Jaipur (Rajasthan) 
Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., (New Delhi)* 
Praga Tools Ltd., Secundrabad (AP)®" 
Nagaland Pulp & Paper Co. Ltd., Mokokchung, 
(Nagaland) 
Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd., Pune (Maharashtra) 
B. Winding Up Recommended: 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
National Instruments Ltd., Kolkata (WB) 
Heavy Engineering Corp. Ltd., Ranch! (Jharkand)* 
National Jute Manufacturers Corp. Ltd. Kolkata (WB) 
Hindustan Photofilms Mfg. Co. Ltd., Ootacamund 
(Tamilnadu) 
Hindustan Vegetable Oils Corp. Ltd., (New Delhi)® 
Triveni Structurals Ltd., Allahabad (UP) 
Orissa Drugs & Chemicals Ltd., Bhubaneswar (Orissa) 
Bharat Opthalmic Glass Ltd., Durgapur (WB)** 
Richardson & Cruddas Ltd., Mumbai (Maharashtra)® 
Birds Jute and Exports Ltd., Kolkata (WB) ® 
Pyrites, Phosphates & Chemicals Ltd., Rohtash (Bihar) 
Fertilizers Corp. of India Ltd., (New Delhi) 
C. PSEs Recommended for Winding Up and Have been Closed: 
32. 
33. 
Bharat Brakes & Valves Ltd., Kolkata (WB)^ 
Bharat Process and Mechanical Engineers Ltd., Kolkata 
(WB)® 
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34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
Cycle Corp. of India Ltd., Kolkata (WB)® 
Mining and Allied Machinery Corp. Ltd., Durga^ur (WB) 
National Bicycle Corp. of India Ltd., Mumbai 
(Mahasahtra) ® 
Rayrolle Burn Ltd., Kolkata (WB)® 
Southern Pesticides Corp. Ltd., Hyderabad (AP) 
Weighbird India Ltd., Kolkata (WB)® 
Southern Pesticide Corp. Ltd., Hyderabad (AP) 
Bharat Gold Mines Ltd., kolar Gold Fields (Karnataka) 
Cawnpore Textiles Ltd., Kanpur (UP)® 
Bengal Immunity Ltd., Kolkata (WB)® 
Maharashtra Antibiotics & Pharma. Ltd., Nagpur 
(Maharashtra) 
Smith Stainstreet & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Kolkata (WB) 
@ 
D. Dismissed as Non-maintainable: 
46. 
47. 
48. 
Manipur State Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., Imphal 
(Manipur) 
Central Coalfields Ltd., Ranchi (Jharkand)* 
Biecco Lawrie Ltd., Kolkata (WB)® 
E, Draft Sclieme Circulated: 
49. 
50. 
Tyre Corp. of India Ltd. Kolkata (WB) ® 
NEPA Ltd., Nepanagar (MP) 
F. Under Examination/Process: 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
Andrew Yule and Co. Ltd. kolkata (WB)® 
Bharat Wagon & Engg. Co. Ltd., Patna (Bihar)® 
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., Dhanbad (Jharkand)* 
Hindustan Cables Ltd., Kolkata (WB) 
NTC (TN & Pond) Ltd., Coimbatore (Tamilnadu)®" 
Bharat Heavy Plates and Vessels Ltd., Visakhapatnam 
(AP) 
ITI Ltd., Banglore (Karnataka) 
Tungabhadra Steel Products Ltd., (Karnataka) 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., (Maharashtra)* 
HMT Machine Tools Ltd., Banglore (Karnataka) 
Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (Haryana) 
Madras Fertilizers Ltd. 
G. Declared No Longer Sick: 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
67. 
Scooters India Ltd. Lucknow (UP) 
North Eastern Regional Agri. Marktg. Corp. (Assam) 
Vignyan Industries Ltd. (Karnataka)* 
Braithwaite&Co. Ltd. (WB)®" 
Proiects and Development India Ltd. (Jharkhand)* 
H. Dropped (Positive Net worth) 
68. 
69. 
70. 
Bharat Immunologicals & Biologicals Corp. Ltd. (UP) 
Maharashtra Elektrosmelt Ltd. (Maharashtra)* 
HMT Bearings Ltd. (AP) 
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71. Bharat Pumps & Compressors Ltd. (UP)* 
1. Failed & Reopened: 
72. 
J. Remanded 
73. 
K. Change of 
74. 
Burn Standard Co. Ltd. 
by Court 
Bharat Refractories Ltd 
Management 
(WB)® 
(Jharkhand) ® 
Hindustan Fertilizer Corp. Ltd. (New Dellii) 
L. Deregistered from BIFR: 
75. The Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. (UP)® 
® Taken over PSEs (34), * Profit making during 2006-07 (15); ** Merged with 
Holding Co.; *^ Since Closed 
Note: Since Mandya National Paper mills Ltd has been wound up, Jessop & Co. Ltd. has been 
privatized (also discharged from BIFR vide order dated 28.4.2006), UP Drugs and 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd has been transferred to the UP Govt, (also Discharged by the BIFR vide 
order Dated 1.2.2007) and Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. has been merged with SAIL, these 
have not been included in this list. 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey, 2006-07 
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Annexure-3 
Government Approved Revival/Closure of CPSEs 
s. 
No 
. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Name of 
CPSEs 
Hindustan 
Salts Ltd. 
NTC 
including its 
subsidiaries 
Bridge & 
Roof Co. 
(India) Ltd. 
BBJ 
Construction 
Co. Ltd. 
HMT 
Bearings 
Ltd. 
Praga Tools 
Ltd. 
Braithwaite 
& Co. Ltd. 
British India 
Corporation* 
Central 
Inland Water 
Transport 
Recommen 
-dation by 
BRPSE 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Govt. 
Decisions 
Revival. 
Directed for 
considering 
feasibility of 
joint venture 
company for 
the 
management 
of salt 
factory. 
Revival of 22 
mills and 
handing over 
of 2 mills to 
Govt, of 
Pondicherry. 
Revival 
Revival 
Granted 
assistance 
recommende 
d by BRPSE 
& directed for 
identification 
of strategic 
partners. 
Merger with 
HMT Ltd. 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Assistance (Rs. in 
crores) 
Cash 
# 
4.28 
39.23 
60.00 
7.40 
5.00 
4.00 
47.35 
73.60 
Non-
cash @ 
73.30 
42.92 
54.61 
43.97 
209.71 
280.21 
~ 
280.00 
Total 
77.58 
39.23 
102.92 
54.61 
51.37 
214.71 
284.21 
47.35 
353.60 
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10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Corp. Ltd.* 
Heavy 
Engineering 
Corp. Ltd. 
Cement 
Corp. of 
India Ltd. 
Richardson 
and Cruddas 
Ltd.* 
Hindustan 
Antibiotics 
Ltd. 
Hindustan 
Organics 
Chemicals 
Ltd. 
Fertilizer and 
Chemicals 
(Travancore) 
Ltd. 
Tungabhadr 
a Steel 
Products 
Ltd* 
Bharat 
Ophthalmic 
Glass Ltd. 
Hindustan 
Insecticides 
Ltd. 
Mineral 
Exploration 
Corp. Ltd. 
Central 
Electronic 
Ltd. 
Eastern 
Coalfields 
Ltd. 
Revival 
Closure for 
non-
operating 
units and 
revival for 
operating 
units 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Closure 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Closer for 
non-operating 
units and 
revival for 
operating 
units. 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival/ 
Disinvestmen 
t 
Closure 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
Revival 
102.0 
0 
184.2 
9 
137.5 
9 
250.0 
0 
9.80 
** 
1116.3 
0 
1267.9 
5 
267.57 
NA 
670.37 
267.29 
104.64 
6.02 
** 
1218.3 
0 
1452.2 
4 
405.16 
250.00 
670.37 
9.80 
297.29 
104.64 
6.02 
** 
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22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
Bharat Pumps 
and 
Compressors 
Ltd. 
Bengal 
Chemicals & 
Pharmaceuticals 
Ltd. 
HMT Machine 
tools Ltd. 
MECON Ltd. 
Andrew Yule & 
Co. Ltd. 
Hindustan 
Copper Ltd. 
Bharat Yantra 
Nigam Ltd. 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Closure 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Closure 
Total 
3.37* 
207.19 
723.00 
93.00*** 
-
-
3.82 
1954.92** 
153.15 
233.41 
157.80 
23.08 
457.14 
612.94 
7.55 
6329.93** 
156.52* 
440.60 
880.80 
116.08 
457.14 
612.94 
11.37 
8284.85** 
Note: 
# Cash assistance may involve budgetary support through equity/loan/grants 
* Revival through fonnation of joint venture 
** The revival Plan approved by the Govt, inter-alia envisaged non-cash assistance of 
Rs.2470.77 Crores and waiver of service charges of Rs.14 crores per annum from 
2004.05 from Coal India Ltd. 
*** excludes continuation of 50% interest subsidy not exceeding Rs.6.50 crores per 
annum on VRS loans. 
@ Non-cash assistance may involve waiver of interest, penal interest, GOI loan, 
Guarantee fee, conversion of loan into equity/debentures etc 
$ In addition ONGC and BHEL would extend cash support to the extent of Rs.150 
crores and Rs.20 crores respectively. 
NA Not Available 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey 2005-06 
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Annexure-4 
List of PSEs Approved for Disinvestment 
S. No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34, 
35. 
Name of Public Sector Enterprises 
Balmer & Lawrie Co. Ltd. 
Bharat Opthalmic Glass Ltd. (BOGL) 
Bharat Petroleum Company Ltd. (BPCL) 
Bralthwaite & Co. Ltd. 
Burn Standard Company Ltd. (BSCL) 
Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. 
(CIWTC) 
Engineering Projects (India) Ltd. (EPIL) 
Engineers India Ltd. (EIL) 
Fertilizers and Chemicals Tranvancore Ltd. 
(FACT) 
Hindustan Copper Ltd. (HCL) 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. (HOCL) 
Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. 
Hindustan petroleum Co. Ltd. (HPCL) 
Hindustan Salts Ltd. (HSL) 
Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. (HCI) 
Indian Medicines Pharmaceuticals Corp. Ltd. 
(IMPCL) 
Indian Tourism Development Corporation (ITDC) 
Instrumentation Ltd. 
Madras Fertilizers Ltd. (MFL) 
Manganese Ore India Ltd. 
Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL) 
MECON Ltd. 
Minerals and Metal Trading Corp. of India Ltd. 
(MMTC) 
MSTC Ltd. 
National Aluminium Company Ltd. (NALCO) 
National Building Construction Corp. Ltd. (NBC) 
National Fertilizers Ltd. (NFL) 
National Instruments Ltd. NIL() 
NEPA Ltd. 
Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Ltd. (RCF) 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. (SCI) 
Sponge Iron India Ltd. (SIIL) 
State Trading Corporation (STC) 
Tungabhadra Steel Product Ltd. 
Tyre Corporation of India Ltd. 
Source: Public Enterprises Survey 
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Annexure-5 
Summary of Receipts from Disinvestment 1991-92 to 2006-07 
Yea 
r 
199 
1-92 
199 
2-93 
199 
3-94 
199 
4-95 
199 
5-96 
199 
6-97 
199 
7-98 
199 
8-99 
199 
9-00 
200 
0-01 
200 
1-02 
200 
2-03 
200 
3-04 
200 
4-05 
200 
5-06 
200 
6-07 
Budgeta 
ry 
Receipt 
(Rs. 
crore) 
2,500 
2,500 
3,500 
4,000 
7,000 
5,000 
4,800 
5,000 
10,000 
10,000 
12,000 
12,000 
14,500 
4,000 
No target 
fixed 
No target 
fixed 
fetal 
Receipts 
through 
sale of 
minority 
shareholdi 
ngin 
CPSEs 
(Rs. crore) 
3,037,74 
1,912.51 
-
4,843.10 
168.48 
379.67 
910.00 
*5371.11 
"1479.27 
-
-
-
12,741.62 
2,700.06 
-
-
33,543.56 
Receipts 
through 
sale of 
majority 
shareholdi 
ng of one 
CPSE to 
another 
CPSE (Rs. 
crore) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,317.23 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,317.23 
Receip 
ts 
throug 
h 
strategi 
csale 
(Rs. 
Crore) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
105.45 
554.03 
3,090.0 
9 
2,252.7 
2 
342.06 
-
-
-
6,344.3 
5 
Receipts 
from 
other 
relate 
transact! 
on (Rs. 
crore) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
275.42 
-
2,567.60 
1,095.26 
-
64.81 
2.08 
-
4,005.17 
Receipts 
from sale 
of residual 
shareholdi 
ngin 
disinveste 
d CPSEs/ 
companies 
(Rs. crore) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,463.73 
-
1,567.60 
-
4,031.33 
Total 
Receipt 
s(Rs. 
crore) 
3,037.7 
4 
1,912.5 
1 
-
4,843.1 
0 
168.48 
379.67 
910.00 
5,371.1 
1 
1,871.2 
6 
5,657.6 
9 
3,347.9 
8 
4,843.1 
0 
15,547. 
41 
2,764.8 
7 
1,569.6 
8 
-
49,241. 
64 
* Out of Rs.5371.11 crore, Rs.4184 crore constitutes receipts from cross purchase of 
shares of ONGC, GAIL and IOC. 
** Out of Rs.1479.27 crore, Rs.459.27 crore constitutes receipts from cross purchase 
of shares of ONGC, GAIL and IOC. 
Source: Ibid. 
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Annexure-6 
Details of Participation in Equity in PSEs by Different 
Parties As on 31.3.2007 
d 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
m 
Q. 
o 
ONGC 
OIL 
(India) 
Ltd. 
NALCO 
SAIL 
BPCL 
GAIL 
(India) 
Ltd. 
BHEL 
NTPC 
Ltd. 
Air India 
Ltd. 
IRCON 
Int. Ltd. 
Power 
Finance 
Corp. 
MECON 
Ltd. 
MTNL 
BPCL 
Hindustan 
Fertilizer 
Corp. Ltd. 
2 . 
c > 
(U O 
158574 
21000 
56150 
354469 
19860 
48494 
16576 
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Annexure-7 
Disinvestment Policy: 
Interim Budget 1991-92 (Chandrasekhar Government): The policy envisaged to disinvest up 
to 20 percent of its equity in selected public sector undertakings, in favor of mutual funds and 
financial or investment institutions in the public sector. 
Industrial Policy Statement on July 24, 1991: Under this policy, a part of government 
holdings in selected PSEs would be sold but it neither places cap on the extent of 
disinvestment in favor of any particular class of investors. 
Budget Speech 1991-92: The policy adopted was to offer up to 20 percent of government 
equity in selected PSUs to mutual funds and investment institutions in the public sector, as also 
to worker in these firms. The main object behind this policy was to raise resources, encourage 
wider participation and promote greater accountability. 
Report of the Commission on the Disinvestment of Shares in PSEs (Rangarajan 
Committee) April 1993: The Rangarajan Committee emphasized the need for substantial 
disinvestment. It suggested three categories of industries and disinvestment percentage, viz., 
industries explicitly reserved for the public sector (Schedule A industries: divest up to 49 
percent); industries, in exceptional cases, which had a dominant market share of where 
separate identity had to be maintained for strategic reasons (divest up to 74 percent) and other 
industries (100 percent disinvestment). Further, the committee recommended only six Schedule 
A industries, viz., (1) Coal and Lignite; (2) Mineral Oils; (3) Arms, Ammunition and defense 
equipment; (4) Atomic energy; (5) Radioactive minerals; and (6) Railway transport. 
The Common Minimum Program of the United Front Government, 1996: the policy meant 
to carefully examine the public sector non-core strategic areas. The highlights of the policy 
were establishment of disinvestment commission for advising on the matter; to carry 
disinvestment procedure in a transparent manner; and to assure job security and opportunities 
for retaining and redeployment. 
Disinvestment Commission Recommendations, Feb. 1997 to Oct. 1999: Almost 72 PSEs 
were referred to the commission up to 1999; the commission gave recommendations on 58 
PSEs. The commission gave priority to strategic or trade sales, with transfer of management, 
as against Rangarajan committee which suggested public offerings 
Budget Speech 1998-99: Government decided to divest up to 74 percent, in general which 
facilitates change in ownership as per recommendation of the commission. But it was decided 
that majority holding be kept by the Government involving strategic considerations, and further 
the interest of workers would be protected in all cases. 
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Budget Speech 1999-2000: Aim was to strengthen strategic PSUs, privatize non-strategic 
PSUs through gradual disinvestnnents or strategic sale and devise viable rehabilitation 
strategies for weak units. The word 'Privatization' used for the first time. On March 16, 1999, 
Government classified the PSUs as strategic and non-strategic for the purpose of 
disinvestment. Under the category of strategic PSUs following were considered: 
• Arms and ammunitions and the allied items of defence equipment, defence aircrafts 
and warships. 
• Atomic energy (except in the areas related to the generation of nuclear power and 
the applications of radiation and radioisotopes to agriculture, medicine and non-
strategic industries), and 
• Railway transport 
All other PSUs were considered non-strategic. 
Budget Speech 2000-01: the government, emphasizing on strategic sale, for the first time 
declared to divest up to even below that 26 percent, if necessary, in the non-strategic 
industries. Further, it was declared that the entire proceeds from disinvestment would be set 
out to social sector, restructure of PSUs and retirement of public debt. Furthermore, it was also 
decided to restructure/revive potentially viable PSUs and to close down such PSUs which 
cannot be revived. 
Budget Speech 2001-02: the target receipt though disinvestment was set as high as Rs. 
12,000 core. It was decided that out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 7,000 crore would be used for 
providing restructuring assistance to PSUs safety net to workers and reduction of debt burden. 
A sum of Rs. 5000 crore would be used to provide additional budgetary support for the plan, 
primarily in the social and infrastructure sectors. This additional allocation for the plan will be 
contingent upon realization of the anticipated receipts. 
Suo-Moto Statement of Minister of Disinvestment on Dec. 9, 2002: the than minister of 
Disinvestment mentioned that the objective of disinvestment is to put national resources and 
assets to optimal use in general and, in particular, to unleash the productive potential inherent 
in the public sector enterprises. The policy of disinvestment specifically aimed at modernizing/ 
upgrading the PSUs, creating new assets, generate employment and retiring public debt. Its 
was further decided that in order to provide complete visibility to the Government's continued 
commitment of utilization of disinvestment proceeds for social and infrastructure sectors, the 
Government would set up a Disinvestment Proceeds Fund. This fund would be used for 
financing fresh employment opportunities and investment, and for retirement of public debt. 
Excerpts from the Address by the President Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam to the Joint Session of 
Parliament on 7"' June, 2004: "My Government believes that privatization should increase 
competition, not decrease it. We also believe that there must be a direct link between 
privatization and social needs, like the use of revenues generated through privatization for 
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designated social sector sctiemes. Public Sector Companies and Nationalized Banks will be 
encouraged to enter the capital market to raise resources and offer new investment avenues to 
retail investors." 
Budget Speech 2004-05: it was declared to provide equity support of Rs.14, 194 crore and 
loans of Rs.2,132 crore to Central PSUs, including Railways, as healthy PSUs were not given 
adequate notice. Further, it was also decided to supply major investments to PSUs failing in the 
sectors of power, petroleum, telecommunications, railways, roads, coal and civil aviation. 
Furthermore, a proposal to establish a Board for Reconstruction of Public Sector Enterprises 
(BRPSE) was also considered to advise the Government on the measure to be taken to 
restructure PSUs, including case where disinvestment or closure or sale is justified. Besides, a 
financial support for restructuring Hindustan Antibiotics Limited was also announced. A rescue 
package of Rs.508 crore is also worked out for Indian Telephone Industries (ITI) to help it to 
remain out of the net of the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). 
Consequently, Government's holding in NTPC will be marginally diluted. In order to extract 
value for its holding and to compensate the effect of dilution. Government intends to piggy-back 
on the public issue of NTPC and disinvestment approximately 5 percent of its holding. 
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